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This dissertation compares the works of select troubadours with three mystical tracts in 
order to present the similarities found in these two literary traditions.  Mystical writings have a 
far longer history reaching into antiquity and continuing until the present day.  The traces in the 
manuscript traditions situate in the late eleventh century a new poetic form in Occitan with a 
focus on earthly love.  The love as it is described in the songs of the composers who write or sing 
about it comes to be called bon amors or fin’ amors, the term we use today to name the love of 
the troubadour tradition.  The period of lyrical production in Occitan by troubadours speaking of 
fin’ amors does not endure more than three centuries if we begin our count with Guilhem IX 
(1071-1126) and close with the poet so often called the last of the troubadours, Guiraut Riquier 
(1254-1292).   These two traditions of love literature are thus distinguished by the nature of their 
literary histories and also by the loves they describe.  Despite this, the shape of the loves they 
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This study will explore new ways we can account for this sameness.  I propose that 
though the love objects of troubadours and mystics are worlds apart—one found in the beyond 
and of a divine nature, the other found here on earth and all too human— the two érotiques, or 
ways of loving, do in fact share a common structure.  I suggest that the similarities in the 
literature of mystics and troubadours can be explained most of all by the fact that both groups 
share a common understanding of the self and the common goal of dismantling the self before a 
superior being.   
A shared vocabulary of images, notions, and linguistic features sets out the connection.  
The first section of the dissertation will introduce the discourse of these two traditions as that of 
the fragile self.  Part two will analyze how these images, ideas, and language are used to 
destabilize the centered self in the work of various troubadours, including Jaufré Rudel, Arnaut 
de Maruelh, Falquet de Romans, and Bernart de Ventadorn.  Part three will look at these same 
elements in the works of the mystics Angela da Foligno, Marguerite d’Oingt and Marguerite 
Porete.  The dissertation demonstrates how the negation of the self within the experience of love 
can account for the sameness in texts in two different love traditions.  
The idea of love as transformative is shared by both érotiques.  In both discourses love 
has the capacity to better the lover.  In troubadour lyric just as in mystical literature it is 
suggested that through love one should come to resemble the beloved in qualities and character.  
Both the courtly as well as the religious authors here consider love a powerful force that takes 
over a willing or unwilling subject.  Love is spoken of at once as an act and as a supreme being, 
or God.  
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Body parts flee the subject to join the beloved in the images of these authors.  At times 
the subject simply loses parts of the body.  Also body parts are willingly given to the beloved as 
a token of the lover, most notably the heart.  At times the heart is imagined as housed inside the 
beloved, and at times the beloved is imagined to be inside the lover.  Both of these images can be 
evoked within a single work.  The image of the lover as an empty vessel before the beloved is 
also common to both troubadours and mystics.  I shall explore the reasons for the shared imagery 
and vocabulary. 
Subject and Self in Comparing Troubadours and Mystics  
 
This dissertation will look to the common notion of subject or self that structures the 
thinking of both troubadours and mystics.  In general “self” and “subject,” and for medieval texts 
even “soul,” designate the same entity. However, while I use the “self” to refer to the entity 
itself, the being, I generally use the term “subject” to highlight the self as considered from 
outside, either by the self through a sort of imaginary mirror, or by another.  In this way my use 
of the term “subject” functions as it does in philosophy by designating the self-consciousness or 
self-reflexive I who thinks of him or herself.   My understanding of selfhood is certainly 
influenced by my readings of Augustine, medieval mystical and theological writings, and 
modern writers from psychology, neuroscience, and anthropology.  However, for the purposes of 
this work it is primarily the authors studied here who guide the way through the labyrinth of 
speaking the self—its construction and deconstruction.  The significance of my debt to these 
authors and the way they work to underpin my thinking will be addressed in Part I.   
Each of the authors, troubadours and mystics, suggests that the self is an entity 
constructed through time and comprised of various parts including the body, the mind or mental 
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functions, and the emotions or spirit or cor, arma, and esperitz.  Each one of these sites 
represents a possible home for the situation of the subject, and yet at the same time presents a 
site for the subversion of the subject, as none of these alone can fully explain the unity of the self 
to the subject.  The constructed nature of the self, and the definition of each element, as it is 
understood by both the mystics and troubadours, will be the subject of the first chapter of this 
dissertation.   
As noted earlier, both mystics and troubadours present the self as fragile and capable of 
being weakened by outside forces.  Also, both suggest that the best way to love and to reach the 
idolized loved one is to destroy the self.  Each author treated here has conceived a process of 
self-elimination, that is, through creating works with particular images, ideas, and words mystics 
and troubadours have created a mechanism for dislodging the body, the mind, and the emotions 
from the frame of the unified self.  Each part of the self can then be used to weaken the solidity 
of the subject.  While flagellants and ascetics prioritize the bodily in their attempts to destroy the 
self, the authors in this study at times refer to the body as enemy to themselves or to their union 
with the beloved.  The emotions obviously play a large role.  Desire, the expression of will, lies 
at the heart of the self and is, paradoxically, a great obstacle to union with the beloved.  Both 
troubadours and mystics explicitly say that the will of the lover must be in complete accord with 
the will of the beloved or love does not truly exist.  While the term fin’ amors appears in 
troubadour lyric it is interesting to note that the mystical writer Marguerite Porete, like other 
religious writers before her, adopted the words to describe the love between religious practicant 
and God.  In all of the authors studied here the way the mind works, the role of language and 
thinking in the construction, and deconstruction, of the self is peculiar and yet common to each 
of them.  Imagining and contemplating the image of the beloved is one means of reaching the 
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beloved in the érotiques of both troubadour and mystic.  For both, language is often said to 
become inadequate, even meaningless, when faced with the great qualities of the beloved or the 
experience of love.  Language also seems less a means of expressing an experience and more a 
means of constituting that experience.  In this way these images, ideas, and words function 
within the framework of a type of desire or love that makes use of words to reach the goal of 
destroying the self.  
Previous Scholarship 
 
The first brief discussions that brought together the realms of the religious and the courtly 
song did so predominantly in hopes of arriving at a definitive declaration of origin for the courtly 
lyric of the troubadours.  Already in the nineteenth century scholars were eager to discover 
where courtly love originated many focusing their attention on the troubadours.  While some 
scholars suggested that popular song was at the origin of troubadour lyric1, others2 like Guido 
Errante detailed the structural and rhythmic features3 that found their way from the liturgy into 
the songs of the troubadours; though he does also speak of the possibility that a musical feature 
                                                
 
1 Those who were most interested in popular forms of poetry were Friedrick Diez, Joseph Bédier, 
and Ramon Menéndez Pidal.  
 
2 Others who focused on the relation between latin sources were Edmond Faral, R. Bezzola, and 
Dimitri Scheludko. Edmond Faral, Recherches Sur Les Sources Latines des Contes et Romans 
Courtois du Moyen Âge (Paris: É.Champion, 1913). Reto R. Bezzola.  Les origines et la 
formation de la littérature courtoise en Occident (500-1200). Paris: É. Champion, 1944. Dimitri 
Scheludko. "Religiöse Elemente im weltlichen Liebeslied der Trobadors." Zeitschrift 
für französische Sprache und Literatur LIX (1935): 402-21. 
 
3 What he calls the “sviluppi propriamente tecnici,” [completely technical developments] Guido 
Errante, Marcabru E Le Fonti Sacre Dell'antica Lirica Romanza (Firenze, Italy: G. C. Sansoni, 
1948) 106.  
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“prende radici da forze profondamente e universalmente sentite, che invadono tutta la sfera 
dell'espressione.”4  On the other hand, Gay-Crosier who is also concerned with the question of 
origins, decides to move away from the scholars who were preoccupied with specific borrowings 
saying, “I have preferred to emphasize the term sphere of influence rather than the traditional one 
of source, since the former implies the strict avoidance of any one rigid approach or point of 
view.”5  Instead, Gay-Crosier simply feels the language of one world can glide and slip into the 
discourse of another.6  He suggests that troubadours heard the language and the themes of 
mysticism for which he says, “the troubadours had a ready ear.”7  Gay-Crosier admits his is not 
more than an introduction to the religious elements found in troubadour lyric and he outlines the 
topic with broad strokes which it would be hard to refute.  He claims that troubadour songs call 
to mind mysticism because mystical ideas were in the air and troubadours adapted them for their 
own lyric.  Not unlike Errante and Gay-Crosier, Diego Zorzi sifts through the lyric of 
troubadours in search of explicit references to religious phenomena.  His is a morphologically-
based study that stands on concrete examples, but it does not explain why it is songs that do not 
refer explicitly to religion remind listeners, medieval and modern, of the love for God.8  The 
                                                
 
4 Take root with a profound force felt universally that permeates the whole realm of expression. 
Errante, Marcabru E Le Fonti Sacre Dell'antica Lirica Romanza 109.  Errante might be willing 
to speak of influence in broader, general terms of “sfera dell’espressione,” on occasion. 
 
5 Raymond Gay-Crosier, Religious Elements in the Secular Lyrics of the Troubadours (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971) 11. 
 
6 Gay-Crosier 99. 
 
7 Gay-Crosier 90. 
 
8 Diego Zorzi, Valori Religiosi Nella Letteratura Provenzale: La Spiritualità Trinitaria, 
Pubblicazioni. 44, ed. Cuore Università cattolica del Sacro (Milano: Vita e pensiero, 1954). 
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studies in this category are brief and have not explained why people sense some tie between two 
discourses about love whose love objects are so different. 
Given the preoccupations scholars had with elements outside of the texts in question—an 
interest in origin, hopes of tracing direct influence, and the like— it is no wonder that many 
scholars are uncomfortable with the idea of a connection between religious love and fin’ amors.  
Joseph Anglade refutes the possibility of religious influence at the origins of courtly love saying, 
“La religion n’eut point de part à la naissance de la poésie lyrique provençale.”9  Anglade cannot 
accept that the two could be related for the message of fin’ amors, its end, is simply too far from 
the Christian goal.  This is the very problem that led Etienne Gilson to speak of sacrilege:  
En fait, pour commencer par le plus évident, l'amour courtois est 
une conception ‘mondaine’ de l'amour. Il s’adresse à des créatures, 
et s’il était vrai qu'il fût une divinisation de la femme, il serait aux 
yeux d'un Cistercien une caricature de l'amour divin, la plus 
horrible déformation de l'amour sacré bref un sacrilège.10 
 Because the ends were not the same, the nature of the desire or love was completely unrelated, 
“C’est vraiment la nature même de l’amour qui est en jeu.”11 And indeed never the twain shall 
meet for Gilson: 
                                                
 
9 Religion was not involved in the birth of provençal lyrical poetry. Joseph Anglade, Le 
Troubadour Guiraut Riquier; Étude Sur La Décadence de L'ancienne Poésie Provençale 
(Bordeaux: Feret, 1905) 83. 
 
10 In fact, to begin with the most obvious point, Courtly Love is an earthly conception of love.  It 
addresses itself to earthly creatures, and if it were true that it were a divinisation of the woman, it 
would be, in the eyes of the Cistercian, a caricature of divine love, the most horrible deformation 
of sacred love, in short, a sacrilege.  Etienne Gilson, La Théologie Mystique de Saint Bernard, 
Etudes de Philosophie Médiévale (Paris: J. Vrin, 1934) 195. 
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L'amour courtois et la conception cistercienne de l'amour mystique 
sont donc deux produits indépendants de la civilisation du XIIe 
siècle ; nés dans des milieux différents.12 
A different approach attempted to leave behind the cumbersome preoccupation with 
specific points of reference and transmission and instead sought to examine the thematic 
similarities between fin’ amors and the mystic’s love of God.   For Myrrha Lot-Borrodine the 
language and experience of sacred love and that of profane love are “deux puissances, 
fraternelles et rivales,” that together carry on a “marche ascendante jusqu’à la fusion ultime.”13  
In fact, she suggests that secular literary production in twelfth-century France moves from the 
narrative genres to the lyrical in this push ever upward to purification.  The “roman courtois, et 
avec lui toute la poésie du Moyen Age, …s’efforce d’épurer le sentiment au nom d’un idéal”14 
and the “service provençal” is part of a divine project, saying that the service of the troubadours: 
“part d’un principe purement spiritual: de l’amour…Cette refonte de l’être sensible semble 
promouvoir l’amour comme instrument humain du plan divin sur la création.”15  What allows 
for the sense that something ties troubadour lyric to mystical experience is then explained by 
                                                                                                                                                       
11 It is truly the nature of love itself that is in question Gilson, Théologie mystique 203. 
 
12 Courtly Love and the Cistercian conception of mystical love are thus two independent 
products of twelfth-century civilization, born in different milieux.  Gilson, Théologie mystique 
215. 
 
13 Two fraternal and rival forces…upward march until the final union. Myrrha Lot-Borodine, De 
L'amour Profane À L'amour Sacré (Paris: Librairie Nizet, 1979) xii. 
 
14 Courtly romance, and with it all poetry of the Middle Ages… attempts to purify the 
sensibilities in the name of an ideal.  Lot-Borodine 43. 
 
15 Italics mine. Departs from the purely spiritual beginning, that of love… This recasting of the 
sensitive self seems to propose love as the human instrument of the divine plan over creation.  
Lot-Borodine 47.  
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deciding that the lyrics of the troubadours were in fact a part of a divine plan to make creation 
better.  The troubadours are stripped of the ownership of their lyric in order for it to fit into a 
paradigm of divine love.   
While previous scholarship may have left the likes of Anglade and Gilson unconvinced, 
this dissertation will narrow its focus to the texts themselves, the language that is common to 
both troubadours and mystics.  My goal is to do so to demonstrate that it is a common sense of 
self— a common belief in its construction and deconstruction— that provides resonances 
between the words written by worldly troubadours and pious mystics. 
Current Scholarship 
 
More recent discussions that bring together Christian thinkers and troubadours have also 
focused on the thematics of love and desire.  The Lacanian Charles Baladier published a book 
entitled, L’érôs au môyen age: désir et delectation morose, which addresses the possibility that 
the tradition of the troubadours parallels that of theology in that they both “se rejoignent dans 
une certaine façon d’envisager le rapport du plaisir et du désir.”16  Generally speaking, pleasure 
is a product of desiring itself rather than the consummation of a desire.  He claims, as I do, that 
the structure of desire in both troubadours and mystics is the same regardless of the difference in 
love object and this because of the nature of desire: “Pour le désir lui-même, il n’a d’objet que 
nécessairement médiatisé par le fantasme, c’est à dire qu’il n’a pas d’objet qui parvienne à être 
                                                
 
16 Are tied together in a way by their way of understanding the relationship between pleasure and 
desire. Charles Baladier, Erôs Au Moyen Âge: Amour, Désir Et Délectation Morose (Paris: 
Editions du Cerf, 1999) 9. 
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autre chose qu’un semblant d’être, un ‘par’être.’’’17  The point of comparison no longer resides 
on the level of the word alone.  However, perhaps because of this, Baladier does not examine 
what troubadours actually say with any rigor.  For Baladier the message of the troubadours is the 
same as that of monastic theologians, and yet different, because: 
les troubadours, en effet, semblent vouloir réintégrer dans leur 
célébration de l’amour de l’homme pour la femme les commentaires 
par lesquels les auteurs monastiques, spécialistes débridés de 
l’allégorie, avaient détourné de leur sens littéral les versets de 
l’épithalame biblique attribué à Salomon. Il s’agissait, pour ces poètes 
laïques, de rendre en toute justice à Erôs ce qui lui revient.18   
The troubadours thus “literalize” what the monastic authors had rendered allegorical but Baladier 
also suggests that, “des chants courtois semble dès lors se donner pour mission d’expliciter les 
latences et de compléter les lacunes de ces écrits scolastiques touchant l’amour humain.”19  He 
suggests, much like Lot-Borodine that, “la fin’ amor ne serait donc autre chose qu’une forme 
laïcisée et portée à son paroxysme de la délectation morose dont débattait la théologie morale au 
                                                
 
17 For desire itself, there is no object but necessarily mediated through fantasy, that is to say, 
there is never an object that can ever be anything more than a seeming-to-be, a “through-being.” 
Baladier 20.  The placement of par before être allows at once for the idea of a being made 
through something to emerge and also calls to mind the word paraître which means to dissemble 
or seem.   
 
18 The troubadours, in fact, seemed to want to resituate into their celebration of the love of a man 
for a woman the commentaries that the monastic authors, unbridled specialists of allegory, had, 
for example, perverted from the literal meaning of the wedding verses of Solomon.  It is a 
question, for these secular poets, of returning, in full justice, to Eros that which belongs to it.  
Baladier 175.  
 
19 The courtly love song seems then to have given itself the mission of rendering explicit the 
subliminal and of filling in the holes in those scholastic texts with touch on human love.  
Baladier 175. 
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début du XIIe siècle.”20  But Baladier offers no reason why the troubadours did produce a 
“laicized” version of monastic and scholastic concepts.   
In his article, “A Martyr to Love: Sacrificial Desire in the Poetry of Bernart de 
Ventadorn,” Simon Gaunt, like Baladier, suggests that the lyric of Bernart de Ventadorn smacks 
of religiosity because of the nature of desire expressed in his lyrics.  He too makes much of 
Jacques Lacan’s description of desire and self, “it is less the worship of the lady (what Marrou 
calls le culte de la dame) that gives the lyric its quasi-religious flavor, than the importance of 
sacrifice, or what one might call, following Louise O. Fradenberg, sacrificial desire.”21  This is a 
very promising avenue to follow.  Ultimately however, Gaunt thinks the conflation of the 
religious and the secular in the work of the troubadour tradition is to be explained by a different 
sensibility of the division between sacred and profane.  In fact, Bernart’s words are not to be 
taken as meaningful or as part of a coherent pattern that expresses a particular sentiment or state 
of being; instead, Gaunt calls Bernart’s sacrifice “disingenuous”, a “disingenuous sacrificial gift 
of himself.”22 And this ritualized gifting is performed so that he might be recognized, seen by the 
Other, “Paradoxically, the act of self-effacement in the face of the Other’s desire that sacrifice 
entails is precisely what guarantees the subject the recognition he or she craves…”23 For this he 
cites the following lines from “Per melhs cobrir lo mals pes e·l cossire,” “I am my lady’s man 
                                                
 
20 Fin’ amor would be nothing other than the laicized form and one taken to its fullest of that 
“delectation morose” about which moral theology debated at the beginning of the twelfth 
century.  Baladier 185. 
 
21 Simon Gaunt, "A Martyr to Love: Sacrificial Desire in the Poetry of Bernart de Ventadorn," 
Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies 31.3 (2001): 482. 
 
22 Gaunt, “A Martyr” 490. 
 
23 Gaunt, “A Martyr” 491. 
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and friend and servant, and I do not ask for any other type of friendship except that she turn her 
beautiful eyes toward me, for they do me great good when I suffer.”  But Gaunt’s conclusion is a 
statement that counters everything that Bernart says about being a lover.  Bernart claims that he 
does not “crave” but his Lady or even more precisely what his Lady would want from him:  
Bona domna, re no·us deman 
Mas que·m prendatz per servidor, 
Qu’e·us servirai com bo señor, 
Cossi que del gazardo m’an.24 
Good Lady, I ask nothing of you 
But that you take me as your servant, 
That I might serve you as a good lord, 
No matter the prize I obtain.  
 
 He has no subjectivity, no “I” when he looks upon her though his outer shell remains:  
Cant eu la vei, be m’es parven 
Als olhs, al vis, a la color, 
Car aissi tremble de paor 
Com fa la folha contra·l ven. 
Non ai de sen per un efan,  
Aissi sui d’amor entrepres.25 
When I see her, it is noticeable 
In my eyes, in my face, in my color, 
For I tremble with fear 
Like the leaf against the wind. 
I haven’t the sense of a child 
So much am I taken by love. 
 
In order for Gaunt’s assessment to be true we have to assume that some of what Bernart 
says is true (that he craves recognition) and that some of it is not true (Bernart’s offers of 
sacrifice are “disingenuous”).  This seems to me a dangerous game to play.  This points to the 
                                                
 
24 Bernart de Ventadorn, “Non es meravelha,” ll. 49-52.  Bernard de Ventadour, Chansons 
d'Amour. Trans. And Ed. Moshe Lazar. Paris: Klincksieck, 1966. Carrefour Ventadour, 
2001. 
 
25 “Non es meravelha” ll. 41-46.  
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crux of the issues implied in comparing troubadours and mystics. We read troubadours 
differently than we read mystics.  When reading the accounts of spiritual ecstasy left by mystics 
we tend to believe, if not that the event(s) happened as recounted, that at least the subject 
believes it to be a literal, truthful retelling of a lived experience.  When reading love poetry by 
troubadours readers often assume much of what is recounted is to be understood metaphorically 
and even ironically or as hyperbole.  In fact Sarah Kay finds the “most characteristic tropes of 
troubadour composition” to be “irony and hyperbole; metaphor, metonymy and catachresis”26 
much in line with Simon Gaunt’s Troubadours and Irony published only a one year before Sarah 
Kay’s Subjectivity in Troubadour Poetry.  Like Gaunt, Kay finds Bernart’s descriptions of 
submission disingenuous or “unreal” in her terms, “The ‘religious’ metaphor, like the ‘feudal’ 
one, is ironic and ‘unreal’, an acknowledgement of a rhetorical convention.”27     
Instead, for the sake of argument, let us read the troubadours as we read the mystics. 
Allow the words to be meaningful rather than mere literary conventions.  Allow the words a 
function in a process that is fin’ amors.  It is clear that love is seen as a refining process; let us 
then accept that the utterances of troubadour songs speak of this process, perhaps even play a 
role in the process of refinement.  When mystics claim life on earth is death and that to die would 
be to be born to a true life the reader assumes the writer believes in the truth of their words.  
The notion of subjectivity led Gaunt and Kay to a treatment of the historical authors as 
self constructed, in opposition to the society in which he or she moved.  In my case, the question 
                                                
 
26 Sarah Kay. Subjectivity in Troubadour Poetry. Cambridge studies in French. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990) 17. 
 
27 Kay, Subjectivity 118. 
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of poetic subjectivity will be studied on the level of the psychological rather than the social.   I 
focus then on the individual’s psychic transformation as reported by a lyrical piece or a text. 
Fin’ amors has its own views on life and death, submission, and desire.  Fin’ amors is the 
name given to the love of troubadours, especially those of the golden era of troubadour 
production in the twelfth century.  When troubadours speak of the betterment love provides I 
suggest we resist the temptation to see this as only a reference to social climbing.  Instead, I 
suggest we seek to determine what a literal understanding of love service, refinement through 
love, and loss of will in love might mean in the realm of fin’ amors.  One way to understand the 
language of betterment and refinement that permeates troubadour lyric is to recognize that the 
poet can be speaking of social standing.  However, the social is not the only way they suggest a 
lover can be refined and it is not on the social that this dissertation will focus. This focus on the 
inner sense of self is also what accounts for the discrepancy between my own discussion of 
refinement, which is indeed a deconstructing and undoing of self, and that of C. Stephen Jaeger 
who, like Kay, is interested in the individual as inscribed within society.   
When mystics claim to have lost the will and instead to live with abandonment or 
complete disregard for what the self would want, there is a consistency throughout the 
presentations of their experience.  The same consistency can to some extent be found in the 
songs of the troubadours examined here.  Rather than discrete hyperbolic statements about a 
lover's feelings both mystics and troubadours create a portrait of being and of loving that is 
completely coherent in its understanding of the lover as selfless.  
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Justification of the Corpus 
  
The power of love to crush the lover is found in the lyrics of the both trobairitz and the 
troubadours.  This study focuses on those poets whose works contain as full an image as possible 
of the lover.  In general this meant working with poets who had a rather large corpus or whose 
few songs painted a very complete portrait of the lover.  No other poet embodies the modern idea 
of what it means to be a troubadour suffering the amor de lonh more than Jaufré Rudel.  He is 
studied here because the structure of the love relationship he presents seems to have served as 
model for the troubadours who follow him.  Bernart de Ventadorn fills out this structural model.  
Arnaut de Maruelh and Falquet de Romans provide a very clear image of the troubadour self in 
all its precarity because Arnaut, like Bernart, left us a healthy collection of songs, and Falquet an 
intriguing account of the lover in slumber.   
The imaginary, the role of envisioning or dreaming the beloved is tied to the notion of the 
fragmented self as the study of Falquet de Romans and Arnaut de Maruelh will clearly prove.  
The preoccupation with the gaze in the formation of the subject will be traced in the oeuvre of 
Jaufré Rudel.  For all these poets the subjective stance is precarious.  Each author in the first 
chapter of Part II demonstrates the fragile nature of the lover’s self.  And in each case too we 
find that this is a fundamental feature of their desire.  It is this that gives them hope to arrive at 
union with their beloved.  Yet, it is also desire that prevents these three from truly losing the self.   
Bernart de Ventadorn comes much closer to mystical accounts of love or union, or 
experience of the beloved.  He presents love as a state of selflessness and himself as a true fin’ 
amant.  The careful undoing or divesting of each element of selfhood in this poet-lover’s work is 
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examined in chapter five.  Each feature of selfhood presented in the first two chapters of the 
dissertation is a primal node in the structure of love as Bernart envisions it.   
The troubadours never manage to lose the self entirely just as they never manage to arrive 
at the type of union for which they long.  They remain forever caught in a cycle of desiring, even 
when the desire or will is not their own, but their domna’s.  As the notion of such behavior is 
calqued on the structure of desire or will proposed by Augustine in which the subject should 
align his desire with the divine, this troubadour adaptation does not reach high enough, far 
enough: it can be called perverse in layman’s words.  However, this structure of vassal to the 
domna with the will that binds them being the sole property of the domna allows the layman’s 
term perversion to coincide with Lacan’s idea of perversion.  In perversion, “the subject locates 
himself as object of the drive, as the means of the other’s jouissance (S 11, 185)…The pervert 
assumes the position of the object-instrument of the “will-to-enjoy” (volonté de jouissance).28  
Troubadours ultimately arrive at the stage of annihilation equivalent to perversion without ever 
reaching the transcendental state of mystics. 
From the beginning it was clear that there is a great distinction in the nature of the lyrics 
produced by troubadours and their northern imitators.  While the beginnings of the troubadour 
tradition, as with the beginning of any literary tradition, the authors have the sense of freedom 
and experimentation that allows the product to be read as the result of an author’s choice.  Once 
a genre is well established, a formula restricts the author’s choices.  The written product is a 
collaboration between a tradition with its formulae and an author who makes his mark working 
within the confines a tradition implies. As suggests the title of his tome, La technique poétique 
                                                
 
28 Dylan Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis (Routledge UP: New 
York,  1996) 139. See “Kant avec Sade” in Jacques Lacan, Écrits, vol. II (1971) 119-148. 
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des trouvères dans la chanson courtoise, Roger Dragonetti's readings of the trouvères are 
grounded in the notion that the corpus is a series of motifs and formulae composed with a single 
"technique poétique" that can produce the unique "chanson courtoise" of the trouvères.  This is 
the lesson he learns from reading the trouvère corpus as he explains in La Musique et les lettres, 
"La lecture de l'abondante production des chansons courtoises du XIIIe siècle nous montre que 
les motifs lyriques précédemment analysés sont presque constamment repris et traités sinon tout 
à fait dans le même esprit, du moins selon la même phraséologie. On peut donc s'attendre à 
rencontrer chez la plupart des trouvères du XIIIe siècle, les formules lyriques les plus 
traditionnelles..."29 The trouvères are in some ways speaking as much about an inherited literary 
tradition as they are love or the lady.  It is in large for this reason that the trouvère are not 
examined here.  Another area that the dissertation cannot encompass is that of performance. 
Because my focus is on lyrical production I will leave for other studies discussions of joglaria or 
the actual performance and reception of the troubadour lyrics discussed. 
The trobairitz take part in the formation of the fin’ amors tradition and in fact, as Peter 
Dronke notes, Occitan is one of the two European languages of the twelfth century to have 
communicated female thoughts in writing (the other language being Latin).30   However, despite 
this wealth of female textual representation from the period of fin’ amors the amount of material 
left by any single female composer did not provide a complete image of self-negation.  There are 
approximately 2,500 songs composed by troubadours while the number of lyrics by trobairitz 
                                                
29 Roger Dragonetti, La Musique et les lettres (Geneva, Switzerland: Droz, 1986) 25. 
 
30 Peter Dronke, Women Writers of the  Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1984) 84. 
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varies from twenty-three to forty-nine according to the criteria of editors and other scholars.31  
Because no single trobairitz offers a particularly extensive corpus which would lend itself to 
offering up repeated themes and syntactical constructions, the presentation of the Occitan 
tradition of fin’ amors that is presented here is limited to the male troubadours. As Matilda 
Bruckner has said, the task of determining whether the trobairitz are practicing the very 
techniques of the troubadours is not simple, "If we would join the lyric's public of connoisseurs, 
it will be equally important to appreciate where the trobairitz do what troubadours do and where 
they do not, even if sometimes it may be difficult to tell the difference."32  The extant works of 
the trobairitz do not focus on discussions of self, will, dismemberment, and complete 
disintegration of self.  Perhaps one of the reasons this is the case has to do with the unknown 
(perhaps unknowable) process by which the songs of trobairitz were lost. It seems likely that 
more trobairitz songs were composed than we possess today.  It also seems possible that the 
process meant the protection of certain types of songs rather than others.  For example, many of 
the texts we have today that have a female author from the Occitan fin' amors tradition are not 
cansos but debate poems like tensos and partimens.  The tensos and partimens are poems in 
which at least two poets debate two opposing views on a given topic—in the tenso the issue is 
proposed by the first speaker who allows the interlocutor to choose which side he wishes to 
defend while in the partimen the poets seemingly defend what they truly believe.  While the 
canso is an ideal vehicle for exploring the destruction of the self in the love process, the debate 
                                                
31 Liz Bogin's edition includes the fewest number in an edition focusing on trobairitz with her 
inclusion of twenty-three poems, The Women Troubadours (New York: Norton and Co., 1980). 
William Paden finds forty-nine songs to have been the work of female troubadours in The Voice 
of the Trobairitz (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989). 
 
32 From the introduction to Songs of the Women Troubadours, ed. Matilda Tomaryn Bruckner, 
Laurie Shepard, and Sarah White, (New York: Garland, 1995) xii. 
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poem genres are a place where one should be crushing the opponent and coming out glorious and 
strong.  The purpose of the canso in many cases is to destroy the self in an act of sacrifice to the 
beloved while the objective of the debate song is to destroy the opponent's reputation while 
bolstering the ego.  
Given the parameters I have set for myself meant detouring not only the works of 
trobairitz, female composers of love lyric in romance, and male mystics who wrote in Latin, but 
in the process, this circumvents or at least changes the demarcations of the very interesting 
domain of gender in the comparison of fin' amors and mysticism.  The significance of gender in 
the production of lyrics of love is not, however, completely irrelevant for, as we shall see, the 
loss of self includes a step in which all identifiable markers or creators, meaning-makers, of 
selfhood are rejected.  In keeping with the focus of the dissertation, the focus is not on the 
experience of the author as such but on the text’s self, the self that would come into being were 
the text to effect its changes in subjectivity on a subject.33 
 While there are many mystics who produce interesting linguistic accounts of loss of self, 
the dissertation will focus only on three: Angela of Foligno, Marguerite d’Oingt and Marguerite 
Porete.  However, the references to others throughout the discussion demonstrate that many of 
those things discussed here can be found in other religious writers from other periods.  These 
three female mystics were selected because they both expressed themselves in the vernacular of 
romance languages like our troubadours.  They are also closer in proximity and dates than many 
of the other religious figures that could have been studied.   
                                                
33 An article on the nature of self as it functions in the trobairitz corpus is a future project I 
would like to pursue along with another study on the different proportions of cansos to debate 
song between trobairitz and troubadours.  
   
  
 19 
Considering that this study is about the negation of self, the particularity of the notion of 
self and self-negation, my criteria for author selection was based on which troubadours had left 
us a relatively healthy compendium of songs and which amongst these seemed particularly 
interested in one of the elements of self or self-negation, though these elements seem to permeate 
all the lyrics of fin’ amors.34  When choosing mystics to include in this study it was difficult to 
not look to Teresa de Avila as she was a great fan of romances based on the notions of fin’ 
amors.  However, the centuries that separated her from the production of the troubadours made 
her a difficult candidate.  Instead we will discuss another author also concerned with fin’ amors 
explicitly, Marguerite Porete (d. Paris, 1310), who is both geographically and temporally closer 
to the world of fin’ amors lyrics. While the dissertation has largely avoided the importance of 
influence and explicit borrowings in order to arrive at the why and wherefore of linguistic 
similarities, chapter seven broaches the subject of conscious calquing on the fin’ amors of love 
lyric in Marguerite Porete’s Mirouer.  It is the annihilation of the will that most defines 
Marguerite’s work and that likewise calls to mind the work of Bernart de Ventadorn.  Both 
authors strive to arrive at a state where the will of the subject is completely annihilated.  
Ultimately Bernart still has a will, the will of his beloved that is still Other while Marguerite’s 
simple annihilated soul arrives at annihilating, losing the personal will as a flame is lost in fire.  
The similarity between the two authors suggests most clearly that it is not the love-object that 
should concern us but the structure of desire within the loving subject.   
                                                
 
34 Any number of troubadours or trobairitz or even trouvères might have taken a place within the 
section on the troubadours.  Indeed a different organization of the dissertation might have 
allowed for even more troubadours to be examined though there are discussions of quite a few 
who were not given a full chapter to themselves. 
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It is almost as if Marguerite Porete’s work allows us to see what would happen if a 
chansonnier of Bernart de Ventadorn were found by a group of Beguines who wanted to use it as 
their guide to mystical ecstasy.  Also, the images in Marguerite d’Oingt’s Speculum so resemble 
those of Arnaut de Maruelh, the work of this Carthusian who also lived in the last half of the 
thirteenth century and who, like Marguerite Porete, died in 1310.  She also left a number of 
letters allowing us to learn what she thought about the link between her experience, selfhood, 
and writing.  The converted Angela da Foligno (d. 1309) might seem an odd choice given that 
her story is mediated by her confessor. However, the striking similarity between some of the 
images she describes and the way she explains images should be described in the process of self-
negation recalls a number of troubadours who focus on the image of the beloved for meditative, 
self-altering reasons.  
 
Outline of the Dissertation 
 
Part I of the present work will outline the ideas of the self as constructed, the possibility 
of deconstructing the self, and the power of language and music to alter the self as they are 
described by the mystical and fin’ amors traditions.  It is inevitable that the understanding of a 
twenty-first-century reader will be colored by the vocabulary and ideas of all the intervening 
years.  But as Paul Strohm suggests,  “Analysis conducted on the text's own ground limits itself 
to what may be described as knowledgeable reiteration or "respectful doubling" of a text's 
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assumptions.”35  Therefore in this dissertation the discussion of self and the way it is constructed 
and deconstructed reads as a single discourse woven of many strands of thought.   
In chapter one I present the notion of self, outlining the elements of selfhood that will 
serve as the points of tension or activity in the deconstruction of the self as mentioned above. 
While chapter one demonstrates the belief in the self as a constructed and fragile entity, chapter 
two explores the reason mystics and even troubadours would want to destroy the self and how 
they have suggested this can be done.  These two chapters provide a methodological and 
theoretical introduction to the study of the texts and music of the troubadours and mystics I will 
discuss in the second half of the dissertation.  
For each of the chapters in the second half of the dissertation I begin with one element of 
selfhood that seems to stand at the center of the author’s concern. So many troubadours are what 
F.R.P. Akehurst calls “one-hit wonders” or have only a few songs left to us leaving the task of 
determining any sort of coherence in corpus or delineating driving themes or images particularly 
difficult.  I focus on authors with extensive or particularly interesting oeuvre and so, as I 
mentioned above, have not included works by any of the female troubadours of the Occitan 
tradition, the trobairitz, though this is not to say their works are necessarily free of any or all of 
the features examined in the dissertation.36  In chapter three I examine the role of imagining in a 
few troubadour authors, most especially Arnaut de Mareulh and Falquet de Romans. The corpus 
of Arnaut de Mareulh is voluminous which allows for a better grasp of the poet’s thinking, 
loving, and writing as a whole.  His preoccupation with the mystical benefits of the practice of 
                                                
 
35 Strohm, Paul. Theory and the Premodern Text (Minneapolis: U of Minn P, 2000) 166.  
 
36 Indeed the examination of where to situate the language of the trobairitz within a study of the 
features examined here would be an intriguing project to undertake. To have done so here would 
have led us astray and I hope to see this work done by myself or someone else in the future. 
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the imagination and dreaming or envisioning the beloved can be traced throughout the breadth of 
his oeuvre.  Falquet de Romans has a particularly charming and quite long account of what the 
experience of a lover’s dream is like.  It is intriguing in its depth of psychological reflection and 
its presentation of self as other and the paradox this implies.  The purpose of this chapter is to 
demonstrate in what way contemplation, imagining, can lead a subject away from a solid sense 
of self, and in this instance, towards union with the beloved domna.  The oeuvre of Bernart de 
Ventadorn is the subject of chapter five.  Bernart’s lyrics present a poet-lover intent on serving 
his lady and convinced of his own lack of worth when compared with the ideal woman.  While 
Bernart refers to all elements of the self, I show that ultimately the fin’ amant is most defined by 
the annihilation of the will.   
 The troubadour description of self and its relation to seeing, being seen, imagining, and 
contemplating in chapter three is a clear parallel to what we see at work in the texts studied in 
chapters five and six.  The natural inclination to imagine and contemplate the beloved that the 
troubadours felt, became a cultivated practice for mystics and more orthodox religious.  Chapters 
six and seven examine the way language and image are conflated in very different ways by 
Marguerite d’Oingt and Angela da Foligno.  Chapter eight concludes the analyses of authors 
with a look at Marguerite Porete – an amazing woman whose work led her to be watched and so 
eventually condemned as a heretic.  Most interesting for my purpose is her direct reference to the 
fin’ amors of earthly lovers as they would be sung by joglars in lyrics or romances she seems to 
have known.  Her own notion of will and the servitude and eventual annihilation of all and soul 
shows a remarkable similarity to the descriptions of the lover proposed by Bernart de Ventadorn.  
The conclusions offered at the end of the dissertation are a call to continue further study on the 
relation between poetics of experiences from different realm.  
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PART I: CONSIDERING THE SELF 
 
 The mystics and troubadours both consider the self a malleable entity comprised of, 
characterized by, or accessible through those sites in which human experience is lived, 
performed, or felt: cor, arma, and esperitz, physical embodiment; drives, will, emotions; and 
mental functions like imagination, memory, and reasoning.37  This common foundational belief 
can help us understand why there is a similarity between the mystical and troubadour traditions.  
This project examines how we arrive at an understanding of a unified subject through a 
compounding of the elements of which the subject is comprised:  the body, emotions, and mental 
functions including the production of language.   
It is tempting to ascribe the seat of selfhood to its fundamental parts of body, mind, and 
emotions, but on occasion each of these in turn can seem other to the self.  Troubadours speak of 
their own bodies as enemies, obstacles to their goals, in much the way the Christian ascetics, 
mystics, and theologians of the Middle Ages do.  Ultimately, Bernart de Ventadorn and other 
troubadours problematize the body’s situation in selfhood as much as did mystics who sought to 
denounce the bodily seat of selfhood.  Clearly, the situation of self only becomes more difficult 
once the bodily foundation of the self has been thrown into doubt. The emotive aspects of being 
likewise become difficult to equate with a definition of the self, for the will can be weak, desire 
is built upon a lack—something outside the self, and generally the emotions seem to overtake the 
subject rather than constitute it; and finally love is at once the most self-rooted emotion and the 
most selfless as it seeks to bring self and other – two distinct entities— into a unique concord.  
                                                
 
37 This tripartite division corresponds loosely to Plato’s three elements of the soul: the reasoning 
or mental (λογιστικόν- logistikon), the spirited or emotive (θυµοειδές- thumoeides), and the 
appetitive or corporal (έπιθυµητικόν - epithumetikon).  
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The imagination, reason, and memory are creations of a thinking subject and are fully dependent 
on both the embodied and emotive nature of human experience even if they imply interaction 
with an outside world.  In the works of troubadours and mystics it is clear that the authors 
represent the body, the emotions, and the mind, as constituents of the self.  In the words of both 
groups the description of the soul, the “I” or the self takes the form of an entity comprised of 
parts that come together in time to make a meaningful unified being.  As they strive to reach the 
beloved, these sites, quintessential borders between self and other, are rendered problematic, then 
weak, then meaningless.   
Modern readers will likely recognize the elements cor, arma, and esperitz that the authors 
in my dissertation considered the fundamental elements of self for they are the object of current 
investigations into subjectivity and self currently conducted in the disciplines of literary theory, 
neuroscience, philosophy, and various theories of reading and writing and literature itself.   
If this study recognizes the similarities between the medieval authors’ ideas of self, 
subjectivity, and love as they appear in modern theoretical parlance, it is for two reasons: the 
formal or structural similarities themselves warrant mention already, and so many of the ideas of 
modern theorists have been inherited from the classical and especially medieval authors they 
studied. I do not consider my methodology to be born of modern theory.  On the contrary I 
believe modern theory is born out of classical and medieval literature, philosophy, and pre-
modern linguistic and literary theories.  The resonances with psychoanalysis and other modern 
theoretical discourses found herein pay homage to the debt modern theory owes to the historical 
origins of so many of its precepts.  Bruce Holsinger’s The Premodern Condition has 
convincingly argued that current trends in thought and in particular those developed from the 
thinkers of the sixties can be ascribed to a certain medievalism.  He reminds us that many 
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theorists influential today were students of medieval studies and the middle of the twentieth 
century witnessed a “theoretic medievalism” which meant a return to medieval texts themselves 
but more importantly a re-transmission of medieval thought to modern readers in the form of 
“new” theories.38  In a sense modern thinkers speak concepts that were proposed by medieval 
thinkers and have at times even been accepted as truth.39  
 Finally, even without looking to a chain of influence from medieval authors to modern 
theorists one can always see the singular preoccupation with the notion of the self and the 
subject’s desire in particular as common feature of both our medieval authors and modern 
theory.  This project will focus on the formal or structural similarities between troubadours and 
mystics.  Similarities in expression of self and self-negation are to be considered as broad 
phenomena of the human experience rather than themes or discursive currency of literary 
traditions.  
We will discover in Chapter 1 that the self is for both troubadours and their mystic 
contemporaries considered a conglomeration of parts.  We will examine the way the body has 
                                                
 
38 Bruce Holsinger.  The Premodern Condition: Medievalism and the Making of Theory 
(Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2005).  
 
39 The written record of Lacan’s Seminar VII offers an account of just such an encounter.  After 
attempting to convince his students that the ideas of the linguist Benveniste should inspire 
excitement he says that one of the listeners, Father Beirnaert had wanted to say that all he’d 
relayed could be found in Augustine.  Lacan’s response was, “vous parlez d’or” or “that is a 
splendid idea what you have just said.” Lacan goes even further to say that  
And it is quite telling that the linguists…have taken fifteen centuries to 
rediscover, like a sun which has risen anew, like a dawn that is 
breaking, ideas which are already set out in Augustine’s text, which is 
one of the most glorious one could read…Everything I have been 
telling you about the signifier and the signified is there, expounded 
with a sensational lucidity…  
Jacques Lacan, Freud's Papers on Technique, 1953-1954. Trans. Jacques-Alain 
Miller. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1988) 249. 
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been viewed as the space or seat of selfhood even as it is imagined in its wholeness by one who 
cannot see him or herself fully without standing in front of a mirror.  We will also discuss the 
tendency to ascribe to the emotions the power to determine, to make up the entirety of the self in 
classical, medieval, and modern thinking.  Within the emotions, love has oft been considered that 
which differentiates man from other animals.  We will explore in the first chapter some of the 
ways this has been expressed and its importance in the works of both the troubadours and 
mystics.  And finally, one cannot but remember the dictum “Cogito ergo sum” when thinking of 
what allows “self” to be.  We will look at medieval ideas of the mind, the ymaginatio as well as 
modern ideas of the self as a network of brain materials that somehow make being occur.   
The dissertation examines medieval authors and their theories but includes reference to 
the comparable concepts and terms of modern authors which situates the texts of the medieval 
authors within a continuum familiar to non-medievalists interested in selfhood.  I would like to 
think that Bernart de Ventadorn and Marguerite d’Oingt would say I am expressing in new 
language, in my own way, what it is they say and believe themselves: I am making explicit the 
theories that are implicit in their own discussions of love and language and their ties to selfhood. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE SELF ACCORDING TO TROUBADOURS AND MYSTICS 
The Body in the Construction of the Self 
 Nous aurions dû être dispensés de 
traîner un corps.  Le fardeau du moi 
suffisait.  
--Cioran40   
  
In 1935 Paul Schilder published a study on the “constructive energies of the psyche,” 
entitled The Image and Appearance of the Human Body.  After observing disorders like 
apraxia,41 agnosia,42 and subjects with amputated limbs or paralysis, Schilder found that the body 
the patients imagine themselves to have does not always fit the physical body they actually have.  
He concludes that we make use of a “body image” as we carry ourselves in the world. He begins 
The Image and Appearance of the Human Body by outlining the “body image”:  
The image of the human body means the picture of our own body 
which we form in our mind, that is to say the way in which the body 
appears to ourselves. There are sensations that are given to us. We see 
parts of the body surface. We have tactile, thermal pain impressions… 
                                                
 
40 We should have been relieved from the duty of dragging around a body. The burden of the “I” 
is plenty. E. M. Cioran, De L'inconvénient d'être Né (Paris: Gallimard, 1973) 111. 
 
41 Apraxia is characterized by the inability to move the body purposefully though there is no 
question of paralysis. 
 
42 Agnosia is characterized by the inability to recognize objects by use of the senses. 
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Beyond that there is the immediate experience that there is a unity of 
the body.43  
It is this sense of unity that the child finds before the mirror in Jacques Lacan’s mirror stage.  
While Schilder speaks of “sensations” -- the tactile and others-- and sense, Lacan ascribes the 
formation of the complete unity of the body and its connection with the viewing subject to 
something external that is seen by the subject.   
In his model, Schilder resists separating out the functions of the physical and the mental: 
We may call it “body-image.” The term indicates that we are not 
dealing with a mere sensation or imagination. There is a self-
appearance of the body. It indicates also that, though it comes through 
the senses, it is not mere perception. There are mental pictures and 
representations involved in it but it is not mere representation.44   
Schilder hopes to prove that the “body-image” is neither an object of the mind nor a simple 
translation of the body into the language of the mind. Rather, what he proposes is that the image 
of the body or physical self creates a mind able to “lug” the body behind it.   
Earlier, when Edmund Husserl developed the idea of the “living body” he too was 
seeking to unite the physical body with the mental element of the self.  “The living body” as Sara 
Heinämaa describes it in her discussion of Husserl, “is a specific kind of material reality because 
it is the meeting point of the physical and the psychical.”45  The living body is the result of 
                                                
 
43 Paul Schilder, The Image and Appearance of the Human Body: Studies in the Constructive 
Energies of the Psyche (London: Routledge, 1999) 11.  
 
44 Schilder, The Image and Appearance of the Human Body.  
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Schilder’s body image at work.  The living body, the body image, Lacan’s imago du corps 
propre, is created as the (imagined) seat of the self within the world: “La fonction du stade du 
miroir s’avère pour nous dès lors comme un cas particulier de la fonction de l’imago qui est 
d’établir une relation de l’organisme à sa réalité…”46  The body is not self; there is something 
more self than the body alone.  So what is the relationship between body and self?  What is the 
role of the body in the creation of the self?  The body must become meaningful; the body must 
be inscribed within the world and given a particular place within it.  Schilder says, “Body and 
world are experiences which are correlated with each other.”47  Schilder’s statement is a perfect 
transposition of a similar sentiment expressed by Husserl in Ideas Pertaining to a Pure 
Phenomenology: “Nevertheless, consciousness and physicalness are a combined whole, 
combined into the single psychophysical unities which we call animalia and at the highest level, 
combined into the real unity of the whole world.”48  Heinamäa summarizes Husserl’s ideas on 
the body that brings a self into consciousness within a world saying, “the living body is 
distinguished from other material things by three features: it appears as the bearer of the field of 
sensations, as the organ of free movement, and as the center of spatial orientation.”49  The body 
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image comes into being concomitantly with the self to give the self a center—a space with a 
boundary created by the nerves on the skin, and with the ability to move to and fro amongst the 
materials of the physical world.  The team of George Lakoff, a linguist, and Mark Johnson, a 
philosopher, claim to be the first to arrive at Schilder’s and Husserl’s conclusion saying in 1999, 
“The grounding of our conceptual systems in shared embodiment and bodily experience creates a 
largely centered self, but not a monolithic self.” 50 The fact that Lakoff and Johnson seem to have 
come to conclusions similar to those espoused by the authors studied in this work, despite their 
claim to have discovered original phenomena warns us that we should remember that discussions 
of human experience—what it means to be alive and speak the experience—are not going to 
have a starting point in the twentieth century, nor the twelfth; self-reflection and consciousness 
of the experience of living is inextricable from the experience itself.   
The skin forms the limits of the imagined self, the body image or living body51.  The skin 
is the furthest our physical sense of self can reach and yet, even if it is the subject’s domain, it is 
also that space which butts up against the world outside.  The skin provides the self one plane of 
access to what lies beyond.  Just as Schilder suggests the feelings of the skin create the outline of 
the body and so are in a sense the brushstrokes that paint the image of the body, Husserl claims 
the body becomes “a living body only by incorporating tactile sensations, pain sensations etc.—
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in short, by the localizations of the sensations as sensations.”52  We determine the outline of our 
shape by this very friction against the world: both physical and symbolic or social.  Schilder 
finds both necessary for the creation of the image of the body, “The building-up of the postural 
model of the body takes place on the physiological level by continual contact with the outside 
world.  On the libidinous level it is built up not only by the interest we ourselves have in our 
body, but also by the interest other persons show in the different parts of our body.”53  But if this 
contact on the limit of the self constructs the self, to what extent is the limit, the skin, part of the 
self?  What is the role of the outer shell of the body?  To hold someone, to touch someone is as 
close as we can get, but the sensations that come from the contact of the flesh serve as a reminder 
that there is forever a wall of skin preventing one subject from reaching another.  The embrace 
does not join two beings, but instead affirms the inscription within one block of space, 
impenetrable, unique [lonely?] and horribly finite.  Not only this, but Schilder notes that “the 
hands themselves are an outside world for the parts of the body which they touch.”54  There is, 
then, a fluidity to the perimeters of the self within the body.  The self seems to recede into the 
deepest corners as the outside world closes in.  It is this idea that Bernart de Ventadorn wrestles 
with as he laments the discrepancy between outer and inner self.   It is with this idea that Angela 
da Foligno begins her attempt to strip herself of her own body, her own self, rejecting, wishing to 
suggest as blameworthy and so with a separate will, each body part.  The inexactness of the 
boundaries of the self gives rise to anxiety in thinkers like Merleau-Ponty who speaks of two 
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levels of the living body—the corps propre and the corps anonyme or prépersonnel and also 
develops a “gesture theory of expression.”  The same anxiety also shapes the theory of self and 
self-expression that preoccupies the troubadour Bernart de Ventadorn and that makes Marguerite 
Porete’s descriptions of self, body, and the soul anientie so difficult to follow.  
The Emotive Unity of the Self 
 
Ben es mortz qui d’amor no sen 
Al cor cal que dousa sabor! 
-Bernart de Ventadorn55 
 
 
What makes man most himself, individual, a self distinct from God or other things in the 
world are the passions, in particular, allowing the emotive to take dominion over the body, mind, 
and soul of the subject.  The autistic child or schizophrenic person may test the boundary 
between self and world through a repetitive infliction of pain or self-injurious behavior [SIB] to 
the frame of the self—biting one’s limbs or butting the head against the wall for example.    The 
sensorial emotion or feeling, the pain, lets the autistic or schizophrenic self trace the perimeters 
of the self.  As the body image is not available to them it disappears as the sensations subside.  
Indeed, physical sensations as well as emotions allow the subject to recognize his/her own being.  
There is a sensation of being; we get a feeling of what it feels like to exist. It is the pervasiveness 
of this “sense” or “feeling” of being that led to the wildly unexpected popularity of a neurologist 
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who takes on philosophers by pulling them from the fireside to the brain-surgeon’s table.  In 
Descarte’s Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain, Antonio Damasio, expects his work 
“might shed light on one of the most vexing of all questions since humans began inquiring about 
their minds: How is it that we are conscious of the world around us, that we know what we 
know, and that we know that we know?”56 His plan is to write the feelings into the Cogito. 
Though he hopes to reach the realm of the expressive emotions like fear or anger, he begins, as 
one might expect with the contiguous feeling of bodily sensations to reach into valued feelings, 
and ultimately to arrive at a discussion of the emotions. He hooks his reader by suggesting, as 
had Husserl and Schilder, that the senses define the perimeters of the self.  From here he leads 
his readers along to a discussion of the “glory” of humankind by suggesting that “Were it not for 
the possibility of sensing body states that are inherently ordained to be painful or pleasurable, 
there would be no suffering or bliss, no longing or mercy, no tragedy or glory in the human 
condition.”57  Damasio’s work does seek to reach the human experience that includes pain rather 
than mere cognition, but ultimately he only feels justified in doing so by making recourse to 
language of biology— science and body. The “inherently ordained” to which he refers is not 
subjective/interpretive, but is a reference to his understanding of self as a series of synapses and 
vessels and physical materials that somehow create and qualify being.  As Fonagy et al have put 
it, “for Damasio, the self is implied in a neural account of emotion and especially feelings.”58  
The mapping of the self according to Damasio includes the following tenets: 
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(1) The human brain and the rest of the body constitute an 
indissociable organism, integrated by means of mutually 
interactive biochemical and neural regulatory circuits 
(including endocrine, immune, and authonomic neural 
components); (2) The organism interacts with the environment 
as an ensemble: the interaction is neither of the body alone nor 
of the brain alone; (3) The physiological operations that we call 
mind are derived from the structural and functional ensemble 
rather than from the brain alone…59 
As the title suggests, Damasio wants to bring the emotions and the physiological brain, into the 
discussion of that most vexing question of humankind and in so doing dethrone or at least 
debunk Descartes’s supposed distinction between the body and mind; the result would mean, 
“that reason may not be as pure as most of us think it is or wish it were, that emotions and 
feelings may not be intruders in the bastion of reason at all: they may be enmeshed in its 
networks, for worse and for better.”60  Emotions encroach on reason, and reason for the 
twentieth-century neurologist is comprised of “networks.”  The medieval position is quite 
different. Before the explosion of reflection on the concept of the Will in the twelfth century 
there were many who proposed – against orthodoxy—that there were two entities with one 
encroaching upon the other.  Before clarifying the role of sin, the passions, the drives and the 
Will, Augustine too had the impression that the passions “intruded” upon the Will.  Twelfth-
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century theologians tended towards this mapping of Will (as slippery as this concept is and was 
in theology) as opposed to the emotions, passions, impulses, drives.  However, this dichotomy, 
which suggests the self is equal to the Will and attacked by forces without, was ultimately 
rejected.  Augustine and theologians after him realize that the Will is not an object to be 
attacked, but something the self manipulates by choice.  All of which pushes the sense of 
selfhood back to a space that encompasses the Will while not being limited to it.   
In those fields of psychology that extend beyond the realm of the chemico-biological 
variety, an interest in the emotive has allowed for the development of affect logic which claims 
that “directed energies of affects are considered as the essential motors and organizers of all 
action and thought.”  What Damasio suggests is proposed by affect logic as well.  For Damasio, 
“in sum, affectivity ‘affects’ subjectivity so deeply that the two notions may almost appear as 
identical or broadly overlapping.”61 In truth, this is exactly the problem with pinning down the 
nature of the self; we seem to believe today, much as our medieval troubadours and mystics 
thought centuries ago, that the self is a composite comprised of body, mind, and emotions.  Each 
of these seem to offer the temptation to overtake the feeling of selfhood at various moments of 
thought or experience.  
Emotions 
The move from the realm of the sensations, the feeling of the body, into the realms of the 
emotions or the intellect is subtle.  What Plato declared and medievals knew through Calcidius’ 
Commentary has not been abandoned.62  In the last twenty-five years or so, neurologists, 
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psychoanalysts, historians, and literary critics have been attracted to an understanding of the self 
that depends on the emotive qualities of being more than did constructs of the previous decades 
of the twentieth century.   
Here, the emotive element of the self is the experience of self as it is created within the 
cluster of sensations and drives that are the emotions, the will, and desire.  The location of the 
terrain of the emotions within the realm of the self and world invites the (literary) historian to 
“speak without fear”63 about the emotions, and emotional climates of other times. The expression 
of an emotion might indeed be difficult to match to a lived, felt experience as the actor would 
have actually lived it.  But, the study of a particular emotional scene is not the only way to reach 
to the emotional world of a previous period.  While such a study could provide a description or 
sense of the feeling and shape and significance of a particular emotion, love, for example, this is 
not the only way in which the emotions structure and give meaning to human experience.  
As Damasio’s work demonstrates, the emotions or the passions have long presented an 
opportunity for people to probe ontological questions. The structure of the emotive in any 
particular period can be gleaned by looking to the predecessors who have wrangled with 
humankind’s “vexing question.” Mary Garrison assures the historian that we need not fear the 
filter through which the “emotions” reach us, usually textual for “[m]odels and topoi…may be 
able to convey ‘genuine’ statements about experience of the self … in other words, they are not a 
barrier to interpreting emotional experience, but a potentially privileged access.”64 Niklaus 
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Largier goes even further in his discussion of the practice of emotions in mysticism; not only do 
metaphors have the ability to “convey ‘genuine’ statements” about the emotive experiences of 
mystics, but, he claims,  
Although the inner or spiritual senses correspond to the five outer 
senses (in fact they are named in analogous ways), they are not just to 
be seen as analogous or metaphorical. In other words, they are not to 
be seen as a set of allegorical poetic means of expressing and 
representing spiritual experience. Rather, the texts argue, they 
constitute and construct a specific reality of the mind. They form a 
new and previously unknown life of the soul, and they are— as I argue 
and show here—intrinsically linked to the experience and the 
exploration of emotional arousal in medieval spirituality.65  
 
While Garrison focuses attention on the ability of language to express the lived experience, 
Largier notes that the language of emotions in mystical writings might serve a function in the 
construction and exploration of the lived experience and the encounter with the divine in 
particular. If this is the case, and I believe it is, then the study of discussions about emotions in 
song and text can teach us about how language interacts with being—to what extent language is 
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viewed as solely a means of self-expression, or whether it can indeed be considered a means of 
self-construction.66   
When Bernart de Ventadorn claims, 
Ben es mortz qui d'amor no sen 
al cor cal que dousa sabor! 
E que val viure ses amor 
mas per enoi far a la gen.67 
He is certainly dead who does not feel any 
sweet savor in his heart! 
And what is it worth to live without love 
But to cause annoyance to people 
 
it is tempting to attribute this declaration to the troubadour’s great affinity for hyperbole. Despite 
any possible question of topos or hyperbole, the lines should not be altogether dismissed as 
uninformative. This declaration speaks about what it means to Bernart to live as a human being, 
what it means to be alive. Glynnis Cropp’s attempt to compile and categorize the language of the 
troubadour courtly ideology in Le Vocabulaire des troubadours de l’époque classique 
demonstrates the primacy of the emotive in the human experience as understood by these poet-
lovers.  Their lyrics are dominated by words of intense emotion: words of desire like talen, of 
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melancholy, affliction, and suffering, like damnatge, pena, tristesse, ira, rancura, marrimen, but 
also of joy and pleasure, joi, plazer, esbaudimen, alegransa.68  Cropp’s study shows the depth of 
the language of emotion as well as the breadth for he traces this vocabulary throughout the 
oeuvres of a good number of composers active before 1175.  For troubadours, the emotional 
quality of life overwhelms; they choose at times to represent this as an image or proof of their 
essence as the ideal or true lover and at other times suggest that love and desire, even jealousy 
and anger, arrive from somewhere outside in order to attack the self.   
The Will as Self or Entangled with the Emotions 
You are not flesh or hair, but you are will. 
Epictetus69 
Medieval conceptions of culpability and the nature of sin as progressive likewise reveal a 
willingness, even theological necessity, to situate the emotions or passions outside the self, 
which is after all an entity created by the divine and in his own image.  In this way, as Knuutila 
explains, “the importance of the theological question of culpability was one of the factors that led 
to the emergence of the logic of the will in the twelfth century.”70  Though the question of 
culpability brought new ideas into the discussion of the will, the conversation had been alive for 
quite some time.  While not credited with the concept itself, it was Augustine who, as Sorabji 
stresses, “did more than anyone to crystallize” the conception of the will.71  Ruth Stark claims 
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“in his conversion, Augustine discovers a paradigm of the human will in action.”72  Augustine 
had sought out the stuff of wickedness.  Instead of discovering an essential material—the essence 
of evil— he finds only will affecting matter.  It is not an entity or a substance, but the direction 
of the will that makes evil:  
I inquired what wickedness is; and I did not find a substance but a 
perversity of will twisted away from the highest substance, you o 
God, towards inferior things, rejecting its own inner life… and 
swelling with external matter.73  
It is through the will that the sinner moves away from God or the penitent toward God.  
To live a life in accord with the divine one should direct one’s will toward the divine will so that 
they are the same. Not to do so leads to indulgence in the self as an enjoying subject and “the 
consequence of a distorted will is passion.”74 To direct one’s gaze towards God frees the subject 
of the emotional torments with which Augustine struggled until (and even after) his conversion 
was complete.  He saw two sorts of wills inside himself for he was both “partially willing and 
partially unwilling” in a split that will be unified only in the moment that a final choice of action 
is made.  As Saarinen paraphrases Augustine, “although the will is first divided in its inward 
struggle, it again becomes one and complete in the final choice.”75  However, Augustine 
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identifies with both wills as Judith Stark explains in her “Dynamics of Will in Augustine’s 
Conversion.”  Stark suggests we imagine “the self can stand over against these two wills to 
render them subject to approval or disapproval.” 76  Somehow the will is to be equated with the 
self, and at the same time as subject to the decisions of the self.   
Simo Knuuttila examines the intersection of emotion, will, and sin in his book Emotions 
in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy.  He notes that the twelfth century monastics, “favoured 
drawing fine distinctions between various movements of the heart and between the degrees of 
their sinfulness.”77  Knuuttila then paraphrases the stages of sin as described in a commentary on 
Matthew attributed to Geoffrey Babion (d. 1110):  
After the suggestion (suggestio) there is a pre-passion (propassio), 
‘a sudden movement which does not involve deliberation about 
good and evil and which is venial sin.’ This is followed by a 
passion (passio), which is the mortal sin of taking pleasure either 
in cogitation about the sinful act without an intention to act or the 
same together with such an intention.78  
Knuuttila’s presentation clearly indicates to what extent there are inner-outer elements or even 
moments of passion and sin in the medieval system.  And yet, at the same time the ability to 
choose to follow the suggestio is indeed the result of the God-given gift of free will.  In 
discussing the notion of freedom, Slavoj Žižek finds that “‘freedom’ is not simply the opposite of 
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deterministic causal necessity, as Kant knew, it means a specific mode of causality, the agent’s 
self-determination.”79 Freedom to cogitate, as opposed to not, the freedom to choose to enjoy 
what can be enjoyed in reflection and imagination, the freedom to pursue and make real the 
imagined, all of this “freedom” given by God through free will, when used – and it cannot but be 
used in one way or another, that is towards or away from the will of God—constitutes the actor 
and the sin.  The self determines at once his own essence and that of the suggestio in the single 
moment of choosing his move.  This freedom that is not liberating, but ensnares the actor within 
his own self, as an entity that wills, an entity that moves away from God, as it wills for itself 
rather than following God’s will, cuts the subject from the divine.  
The nature of a soul will be determined by its choice to will with or away from God.  The 
soul who has lost all sense of self in the divine will have no will and so naturally wills in accord 
with the divine.  It is therefore willing that creates the divide between man and divine; will 
creates difference and so identity.  What Žižek says of freedom can certainly be applied to free 
will, “’Freedom’ is thus inherently retroactive: at its most elementary, it is not simply a free act 
which, out of nowhere, starts a new causal link, but a retroactive act of endorsing which 
link/sequence of necessities will determine me.”80  The freedom to will, willing creates the 
possibility of, the space for, an “I.” Neither the “I” nor the evil exist without the subject’s 
willing.  
The will also allows the subject to live within God’s own path, which, as Knuuttila 
reminds us, is the Christian’s objective: “[t]he aim of the Christian life is similarity to God, who 
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is free from passions…”81 to arrive at this similarity of wills that is called the mystical rapture or 
ontological union, as Michael Sells describes, “Rapture entails complete abandon—abandon of 
will, of works, of reason, of self-vulnerability…the soul annihilated in love of the divine no 
longer exists in the formal sense as a subject that wills and acts – the only will and act are the 
will and act of the deity.”82  The space of difference between divine and earthly can be erased: 
“such a Soul, says Love, swims in the sea of joy, that is in the sea of delights, flowing and 
running out of the Divinity.”83 The soul can be lost like a drop of water in the sea of the divine.  
To lose the difference of will is nothing more than to love, to love truly, purely, and powerfully.  
Love and Self: Will or Emotion? 
If I speak in the tongues of men and 
of angels, but have not love, I am a 
noisy gong or a clanging cymbal. 
And if I have prophetic powers and 
understanding…but have not love, I 
am nothing. 
1 Corinthians, 13:1-3, 13 
 
 The possibility of willing in accord with the beloved is the manifestation of a love so pure 
and refined that it transforms and purifies the lover who follows its path towards the beloved, the 
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journey itself effecting the betterment of the lover as he or she seeks to arrive at the beloved, to 
join, dissolve into the realm of, the other —though we should be careful to note, not to possess or 
enjoy the beloved for that would imply a completely subjective stance.  The consistency of this 
claim throughout the oeuvres of so many mystics and troubadours renders possible the 
comparative analysis of the language of love in their works; the language is not to be 
misinterpreted as only models, topoi, as Garrison said, or as simple labels, “etiquettes” as Moshé 
Lazar named them in his warning to modern scholars that “certains topiques qui reviennent sans 
à satiété dans la lyrique provençale ne doivent pas devenir pour nous des simples ‘étiquettes’ 
vidés de sens et dénuées de vitalité.”84   
The understanding of love for troubadours and mystics is remarkably similar and what 
F.R.P. Akehurst claimed as reason to study the troubadours as a group the fact that  “les poètes 
d’amour ont tous un point en commun, grâce auquel on peut les juger et les comparer: ils 
chantent tous l’amour, c’est à dire qu’ils sont tous engagés dans une relation amoureuse réelle ou 
imaginaire.”85   Akehurst's claim that the troubadours can be studied as a group serves also as a 
grounds for comparison.  Akehurst sees that the structure of the érotique of the troubadours can 
be compared to authors from Antiquity to our day and cites Donatus, Jean de Salisbury, and Ibn 
Hazm as he begins his study of the stages of love in the works of Bernart de Ventadorn: "Et 
d'après ce qu'ils disent de leur amour, on peut déceler une structure de la relation amoureuse, 
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structure qui a été traitée d'une façon assez uniforme depuis l'antiquité jusqu'à nos jours."86  
While Akehurst focuses on the stages of love in Bernart de Ventadorn, this dissertation focuses 
on the language used to move the lover along the path of love.  The troubadours and mystics we 
will examine each claim first that love is essential to the fully lived human life, second that 
following the laws of love, often spoken of in terms of a path or road, refines and purifies the 
lover.  Each seems to care much more about the nature of the love object than themselves as 
loving subjects. In fact, the end of love is to arrive at a loving so perfect that all selfishness or 
trace of the self disappears—the accident of its being or being as accident recedes into the 
perfection that is the beloved’s being.  
 Without love there can be no human consciousness or life, suggests Bernart de Ventadorn 
in the very popular song “Non es meravelha s’eu chan.” In another piece he suggests that the 
song can be no good if love is not its motivating force: “Chantars no pot gaire valer, / si d’ins dal 
cor no mou lo chans.”87  Both sentiments find their precedent in 1 Corinthians.  Language 
without love, says Paul, renders the speaker nothing more than a “noisy gong or a clanging 
symbol.”  Meaning, or the expression of consciousness, can only come if love resides in the heart 
of the speaker. In fact, just as Bernart claims he who loves not is surely dead, Paul too says that 
without love one is nothing.  In the beginning of this chapter we saw that both the bodily frame 
as well as the emotions in their totality can seem the quintessential feature of being and the stuff 
of selfhood.  As we move through the chapter it becomes clear that a variety of elements of the 
self can seem to the subject to stand as the essence of the self.  However, more powerful than any 
                                                
86 And, from what they say about their love one can discover a structure to the love relationship, 
a structure that has been treated in a more or less uniform way since Antiquity until the present 
day. Akehurst, "Les Etapes de l'amour" 134. 
 
87 Singing could hardly be worth it if the song does not come from inside the heart.  
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of these other components, troubadours like Bernart and in keeping with the Christian tradition 
and its writers suggest that love is the essential element of being.   
 John Moore points out that the “Bible gave love a primacy in human affairs unmatched in 
any other philosophical or religious tradition,”88 and “the values of love, friendship, and courtly 
behavior were as real in courts from the twelfth century on as truthfulness and honesty in our 
universities” though “just as much violated also.”89  
Studies smacking of a “scientific objectivity” strive to prove the necessity of love in the 
development of homo sapiens and other animals.90 In his study on love and culture, Charles 
Lindholm’s survey of sociobiologists who follow on the heels of evolutionary theorists, as well 
as the biochemical revolution of Damasio, Ledoux, et al, characterizes the sociobiologist 
argument in the following way, “[sociobiologists] have argued that romantic attraction to an 
idealized other is a mechanism genetically encoded in human beings as a consequence of the 
inexorable efforts of nature to optimize reproduction and the nurturing of offspring.”91  The 
results of studies conducted in this area of research in the last fifty years invariably suggest that 
love is universal.  
                                                
 
88 John C. Moore, Love in Twelfth-Century France (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
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89 C. Stephen Jaeger, Ennobling Love: In Search of a Lost Sensibility, The Middle Ages Series 
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90 In particular the studies which center on feral children—children who somehow were left to 
develop on their own or with the help of animals with whom they were able to bond.  The 
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subject:  Joseph Amrito Lal Singh, Robert M. Zingg and Paul Johann Anselm Feuerbach, Wolf-
Children and Feral Man, Contributions of the University of Denver; 4 (New York, London: 
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Gerald Bond’s study of the theories of love held by medieval writers at the turn of the 
twelfth century, points to “the emerging conviction that amor is an integral part of nature to 
which all humans were subjected,” though here he highlights a feature perhaps not shared by all 
modern theorists for, “in its most optimistic and idealistic form, this dominion of nature derived 
directly from God.”92 Ultimately the claims of twelfth-century and current theories agree that 
love is inextricably bound to the human experience; there can be no development of self without 
love. Love, love language, theories of love, all provide a space to examine, explore, and 
manipulate notions of self and states of selfhood. 
When the anthropologist Charles Lindholm seeks to determine “how culturally and historically 
specific is the experience of romantic love?” it is once again the question of selfhood that 
dominates his sociologically-grounded enquiry and findings.  Like the medieval and modern 
theorists who suggest love is inherent in all human life, Lindholm likewise finds love to be 
unbound by a number of possible restrictors.  He finds that the:  
 
ethnographical material demonstrates that romantic love is not necessarily the prerogative 
of a leisured class; it does not require a complex society; it is not solely heterosexual, nor 
does it always lead to marriage; it is not intrinsically linked to capitalism, small families, 
sexual oppression, a cult of motherhood or a quest for identity; it is neither a disguise for 
lust nor evidence of evolution at work.  93 
The evidence does suggest that the nature of romantic attraction is built on the relation 
between selfhood and society.  Love enables the individual to transcend, to escape the particulars 
of self—that would be the modern constructed subject—through attachment to the love object. 
Lindholm defines romantic love in opposition to all of the above saying, “[r]ather, romantic 
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attraction is an attempt to escape from certain types of social contradictions and structural 
tensions through the transcendental love of another person,” and interestingly enough he 
comments that “as such, it is experientially akin to the experience of religious ecstasy.”94 The 
particular focus on the love-object which leads to a disinterest, even a hostility towards the 
loving subject which needs to be transcended resonates with the literature under investigation in 
this dissertation.  Both mystics and troubadours seek to reach the Other despite the fact that this 
entails disinhabiting the self.  Love is at once the proof of a self as well as a means to flee the 
self.  
In his study Love, Emotion, Myth and Metaphor, Robert Solomon remarks that “we 
should expect to find romantic love arise in precisely those epochs and cultures where self-
identity is in question, when traditional roles and relationships fail to tell a person ‘who I am’.”95  
When the self waivers, or is under attack, love provides a means of understanding and valuing 
the self.  Love replaces or eclipses self-identity, or the function of self-designation, as Lindholm 
explains, “the romantic dream of an erotic bonding to an idealized and unique beloved is 
understood to serve as a substitute for outmoded loci for identity, offering an experience of self-
transformation, personal choice, a meaningful future and sensual expansion.”96  Lindholm 
qualifies the decision to come together as the attempt of lovers to, “find meaning and emotional 
warmth in the mutuality of romantic relationships.”97 Gerald Bond’s The Loving Subject 
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demonstrates to what extent twelfth-century figures were keen to use romantic love as described 
by Lindholm for self-(re)invention.  Like the lovers Lindholm describes, it is through love that 
troubadours and mystics realigned themselves vis à vis society.   
In the case of the “first” troubadour, Guilhem IX98, it would seem that he retreats from 
societal pressures by seeking the pleasure of female company.  As Ruth Mazo Karras points out, 
sexuality in the medieval period does not lean on the notion of mutuality as it does in the present 
day.99  Bond notes the connection between the hostility within the courts as well as the Church’s 
charges against him both of which begin mounting after Guilhem’s defeat at Antioch and the 
duke’s liaison with Maubergeonne (Dangerosa) and accompanying lyrical accounts of his 
amorous encounters.  While Guilhem IX did hold a position (or two) of power, it did not save 
him from attacks on his exercising of that power in the pursuit of his desire. The romantic or— at 
the least— sexual adventures he undertook afforded him the possibility to transcend the 
parameters of identity his critical onlookers had prescribed for him. The lyrical accounts of his 
sexual exploits offer an image of sex in medieval understandings, as a thing one does to another, 
as Mazo Karras has suggested, but in doing this thing to another he does find the opportunity to 
                                                
 
98 This is the Occitan designation for the count who is named William in English and Guillaume 
in French.  
 
99 And indeed we have in referring to Mazo Karras’ observation a few manicula pointing out the 
precarious nature of our position as scholars of the 21st century attempting to speak about actors 
of the twelfth.  It is not only her point that “mutuality” is a concept and a term valued by the 
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of sex and sexuality is constant throughout a discussion of love and represents one of the pitfalls 
in the attempts to discuss both troubadour eroticism, love, desire, and language as well as the 
eroticism, love, desire, and language of mystics. Ruth Mazo Karras, Sexuality in Medieval 
Europe: Doing Unto Others (London: Routledge Press, 2005). 
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transgress the limits of his identity – to experiment with self construction as Bond has shown.  
The lyrics of the duke and count offer innovative ways to conceive of and manipulate the self 
through a dependence on or attachment to an idealized, romanticized, or sexualized female 
figure.   
 Attempts by clerics and courtiers to constrict and construct the identity of the duke of 
Aquitaine were not simply a response to the particulars of his person/a; Poitiers and Aquitaine 
were not alone in attracting the attention of the traveling Urban II at the end of the eleventh 
century nor was his criticism of the clerical and courtly practices the only attack lodged on the 
ideals of the region.  The urban centers of Toulouse, Barcelona, Montpellier and Avignon had 
values and social structures differing from those of nearby courts.  There is no center holding the 
vast space between the Loire and the Pyrenees to a single structural value system.  In attempting 
to introduce the courtly culture of what she calls “Occitania,”100 Ruth Harvey stresses that “such 
diverse conditions gave rise to a variety of traditions, customs and socio-political institutions.”101 
The attacks on power positions through military, marital, cultural, or religious means were lateral 
at this time; that is to say, the tugs-of-war for power and dominance occurred mainly between the 
courts and towns in the region. This created a society of the kind described by Lindholm above: 
“extremely fluid social relations marked by mobility and competition” and indeed promised little 
security as courts regularly changed hands through war and manipulative marriages.  It is then an 
                                                
 
100 Occitania was not the common designation for the region now named as such by Occitanistes.  
The collection of territories, courts and urban centers, where, to borrow Dante’s definition, the 
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environment ripe for promoting relationships of escape. While Lindholm and Solomon 
romanticize the character of relationships that provide escape to the loving subject imagining 
them to always be warm and reciprocal, the truth is that reciprocity is not a prerequisite to the 
attempt, to the act of seeking or indeed committing one’s self to the transcendental love affair.  
 Itinerant troubadours dependent on the court’s opinion and the lord’s generosity were 
also in a position where the social structure’s judging gaze meant adapting to the trends as they 
moved.  The court is a closed social system in which the positions of power constantly shifted.  
The art of the wandering performer demanded constant attention be paid to the tastes of many 
courts.  The allegiances between courtly figures from one court to another and between the 
Church or cities and the court needed to be considered as well.  The troubadour’s own identity 
needed to constantly be checked against his ever-changing environment.  This situation would 
inspire the desire to experiment with pushing the boundaries and the value of selfhood.   
 While the wandering poet-lovers of the courts explored the shape of the self through love 
lyrics, the ever-present message of Christianity offered its own path to transcendence.  This way 
to reach beyond the confines of the earth-bound self became particularly attractive to women 
after the twelfth century.  As Bernard McGinn says regarding Western female piety, “the 
religious opportunities open to women greatly increased during the course of the first half of the 
thirteenth century.”102  Despite Kroll and Bachrach’s claim that the West only had recourse to 
physical pain as a means to transcendence, both the desire to transcend or “break down the 
boundaries of consciousness and selfhood” as McGinn puts it,103 and a great variety of practices, 
including play with apophatic language were available to men and women of medieval 
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Christianity.  The women mystics included here stepped out of the worldly court or city to enter 
into the religious community.  A continuation of this extirpation of the self is made possible, 
even fostered in the religious communities after 1200.  This is not to say that taking up the 
position of female mystic was particularly easy from the thirteenth century on but instead that the 
desire to escape the strictures of all that the social structure implied, including those based on 
gender would be all the more appealing.  
 The goodness of love and the refining power of loving are for troubadour and mystic the 
means through which one arrives at a transcendental state of being.  The act, the process and 
progress of loving are present even when the love object remains unattainable.  
Love reaches the very center of selfhood, as Augustine says of divine love in his 
Confessions, “You pierced my heart with the arrow of your love, and we carried your words 
transfixing my innermost being.”104  Love penetrates through all the layers shielding the self.  
The idea and the image persist from Antiquity through the medieval period but have not lost their 
resonance today.   
Not only does love reach the innermost being of the self, but love has the power to 
overtake the nature of the self, transforming it completely.  Robinson demonstrates that in the 
thinking of Marguerite Porete, “the Holy Spirit possesses all that God possesses, and the Holy 
Spirit, as Love, transforms the human soul into this nature in love.”105 That entity so often 
identified with selfhood, the will, manifests the purification or transformation effected by love, 
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as Bernard of Clairvaux points out “Love truly converts the souls because it makes them 
willing.”106 Marguerite Porete’s figura of Love puts it this way,  
Or est un commun vouloir, come feu et 
flambe, le vouloir de l’amant et celluy de 
l’amie, car Amour a muee ceste Ame en 
luy.  Hee! Tres doulce pure divine Amour, 
dit ceste Ame, comment c’est une doulce 
muance de ce que je suis muee en la chose 
que j’ayme mieulx que moy! Et tant suis 
muee, que je en ai perdu mon nom pour 
amer, qui si pou puis amer: c’st en amour 
car je n’ayme fors que Amour”107  
Love: Now there is one common will, as 
fire and flame, as the will of the lover and 
the one who is loved, for Love has 
transformed this Soul into Love herself.   
Ah! Very sweet Pure Divine Love, says 
this Soul, how it is a sweet transformation 
by which I am transformed into the thing 
which I love better than myself!   
And I am so transformed that I have lost 
my name in it for the sake of Love, I who 
am able to love so little: It is through love 
that I love for I cannot love outside of love.  
 
All elements of selfhood have been overshadowed by love.  Love has completely altered the 
nature of the Soul.  Indeed how could the name remain when there is no entity onto which to tag 
it?  The name as marker of unique identity is completely lost.  The emotion that seems in some 
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ways the most representative of selfhood in fact does nothing more than destroy the very essence 
of difference, of self-will, of all that creates a boundary around a being, delineating a difference 
between self and other.  Instead of bolstering the walls of the self, love destroys them allowing 
difference to be shed, and difference between self and other in particular.  Such is the power and 
purpose of love.  
 When speaking of the power of love to alter the self, in the literature produced from 
Antiquity through the present, but particularly in the period between 900-1300, mystics, lyricists, 
prose writers speak in terms –be it in the vernacular or Latin— of betterment; love refines, 
purifies, and ennobles the lover.  The history of the tradition as well as its appropriation in the 
medieval period has been outlined in Jaeger’s Ennobling Love.  In tracing those sources which 
spoke of an ennobling love that most attracted the lay, clerical, noble, and monastic cultures of 
the period which fostered the troubadour tradition, Jaeger stresses the significance of the social 
structure.  It is a social system that privileges love and a purifying and self-altering love in 
particular.  Jaeger suggests that the idea of the ennobling and “virtue-giving” element of love is 
not the only defining element in the make-up of courtly love, but a single strand, and he says, “it 
is this strand that is charged with the morally refining, purifying, educating purpose of 
aristocratic love and that is inseparably connected with the social concerns that loom large in 
clerical circles and are the primum mobile of court society,: rank, standing, reputation and 
prestige.”108  Thus, the social strictures and tensions that Lindholm says give rise to the 
“transcendental love of another person” have here indeed given rise to a discourse and 
appreciation of love, but the phenomenon of courtly love as it is discussed and to whatever 
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extent we have traces of its having been lived, stresses the significance of the act of loving itself 
as that transformation which brings the self to transcendence.   
Like Angela da Foligno who claims the steps towards transcendence or union with the 
divine are slow and difficult, Giraut de Borneil speaks in military terms of his slow advance 
toward the end his gaze never abandons: 
E son aixi frescs e tenders 
que per malpas ni per raixe, 
si be·m va len ni de pas,  
no·m laix a virar l’engejn 
si que·l plus de mos afars 
puscha tornar a nosojn 
que lai vir la forz’e·l gejn.  
O·ls huils e·l coratge tejn. 109 
And, in like fashion, I too burgeon with 
new life so that, though I go slowly, step by 
step, no difficult ford or flood stops me 
from turning the engines of war [towards 
my goal], so that I may disregard almost all 
my other concerns; for I turn my strength 
and my skills to that place where I direct 
my eyes and my heart. 
 
Ruth Verity Sharman points out Giraut’s tendency to superimpose geographical metaphors 
which allow him to lay out his love and will onto imagined territories: “He now gathers his heart, 
previously scattered afar over many lands, and directs it to one place. He will not allow it to 
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deviate from its path for any ford or flood…”110 Throughout the troubadour corpus, poets 
consistently claim, like their mystic counterparts, that they follow the path of love; that there is 
indeed only one right path, a single dreicha via. The lovers sing of those who have fallen off the 
path as false lovers and assure their listeners that their own heart, eyes, will and body are turned 
toward the beloved.  Guilhem de Montanhagol sings,  
Ben devon li amador  
De bon cor servir amor,  
Qar amors non es peccatz,  
Anz es vertutz qe-ls malvatz  
Fai bons, e·ll bo·n son meillor,  
E met hom'en via  
De ben far tot dia! 111   
Well should the lover serve with good heart 
Love, for Love is not a sin, but rather a 
virtue that makes good the wicked and 
better the good person. And he puts man on 
the path to acting well every day. 
 
The nature of the self is malleable according to such proclamations; one can become better and it 
is love that improves the self.  Peire Rogier, much like Bernart de Ventadorn above, attributes all 
that comprises his self-identity to love saying: 
Tant ai mon cor en ioy assis,  
Per que no puesc mudar no·n chan,  
Que ioys m'a noirit pauc e gran!  
So much do I have my joy placed in love 
That for this reason I cannot silence my 
singing that joy has nourished me with both 
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E ses luy non seria res,  
Qu'assatz uey que tot l'als qu'om fay  
Abaiss'e sordey'e dechai,  
Mas so qu'amors e ioys soste.  
little and great! 
And without it I would be nothing, For I 
see it well that all else that one might do 
debases, worsens, and deceives but love 
sustains joy. 
 
It is indeed love alone that allows the self to direct the will towards the good ; the quality of self 
depends entirely on love.  Such is the claim of Gaucelm Faidit in his song “Tot mi cuidei”: 
Nuills hom non pot ses amor far que pros 
Si non enten en joi et esperans sa 
Que·l jois d’amores tant fis e tant bos 
Q’en contr’aicel non es mais benanssa.112  
Without love no man can act nobly for 
he’ll not turn his mind/spirit/soul towards 
joy and hope; the joy of love is so good and 
so perfect, that in comparison with her, 
there is no well-being. 
 
 The loving that at first seems so necessary to the fulfillment of human experience in fact 
would seem to imply a movement away from selfhood and towards the good and the perfect.  As 
Kierkegaard says of love, “The emotion is not your possession but the other’s. The expression of 
it is his due, since in the emotion you belong to him who moves you and makes you conscious of 
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belonging to him…”113  Love therefore does not lead us deeper into the self unless through the 
other.   
 
The Cognitive Functions and Selfhood 
Cogito ergo sum. 
-Descartes 
God created the soul before the body 
 and gave it precedence in time and value, 
 and made it the dominating 
 and controlling value.  
-Plato114 
 
 In the cogito we have an equation comprised of two verbs: thinking and being. For 
whatever reason, being, the “sum” has never proved completely satisfying and so many variables 
have been plugged into the other side of the equalizing “ergo.”  Thus far we have examined in 
what way the physical body serves as marker of a subject’s being and have also seen the great 
ease with which the emotions also can plug into the equation as a proof, a requisite, a fabricator 
of being.  Augustine says, “I do not myself grasp all that I am,”115 the verb “grasp” directs our 
attention is brought to the missing but implied subject of the cogito equation.  One side of the 
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equation always has, as we have quoted it from Plato, “precedence in time and value”; one 
depends on the other—one can only imagine it to be temporally the case if it is materially the 
case.  And yet, though we would seem to have a unique subject—“I”—, it is evident that in fact 
we have one “I” capable of grasping and another “I” that handles the “being” on some other 
plane.  The “I” or subject that concerns us at the moment is not the “I” that thinks or grasps the 
“I” that is, but our concern is with the self, the entity that simply is. We, and our mystics and 
troubadours, would thus seem relieved of the duty of defining consciousness.  Alas, “being” and 
subjectivity, the self, cannot be reached, experienced or examined either one without mental 
activity, without consciousness. It would seem impossible to break the self free of its mental 
functions. And yet, to what extent are these mental functions fully subject-centered or subject 
focused? Where is the mind, or the esperitz, to be situated?—what would be called the Cartesian 
Theater. What is the functioning of mental functions? What is the process of thought and where 
in it do we discover the self? 
 
Ymaginatio 
 Lacan’s idea of the mirror stage is in fact a theory of self-consciousness that translates 
Schilder’s notion of the body image in such a way as to privilege image and minimize the 
physical, material, or the bodily in the construction of the subject.  While Schilder suggested that 
the body itself, its nerve-endings, its physical shape, weight, boundedness, is registered by the 
moving conscious subject who remembers and “imagines” the outlines in an imaginary map, 
Lacan concentrates on the “imagining” and the image. In fact, rather than consider the myriad 
ways that the body boundary offers the subject a means of recognizing a shape to equate with 
him or her self, Lacan speaks of image and imagining almost exclusively, “La seule fonction 
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homogène de la conscience est dans la capture imaginaire du moi par son reflet spéculaire et 
dans la fonction de méconnaissance qui lui en reste attachée.”116  While the skin’s nerve-endings 
define the outline of the self in one way, consciousness through the mental function of the 
imagination provides another.   
 Imagining falls under the auspice of mental activity; analytical thought and meditative 
contemplation can both depend upon the capacity to call up an image in the mind or push one’s 
mind into abstract considerations.  Augustine’s declaration of self-ignorance, “I do not myself 
grasp all that I am,” is found in his discussion of memory, language, and images.  It is clear that 
self-reflection or examination of selfhood inevitably brings us to the imagination and the 
manipulation through time of images that is the memory.  For him, reasoning is nothing more 
than using the storehouse of sensory memories to determine what the future might be: “I 
combine with past events images of various things, whether experienced directly or believed on 
the basis of what I have experienced; and on this basis I reason about future actions and events 
and hopes, and again think of all these things in the present.”117  But all plans for the future come 
through language, a language that is dependent upon the images stored in the memory: “I say 
these words to myself and, as I speak, there are present images of everything I am speaking of, 
drawn out of the same treasure-house of memory.  I would never say anything like that if these 
images were not present.”118  The dependence of reason upon mental imagining is a debate held 
through the centuries amongst philosophers.  Though many—Aristotle, Hobbes, Hume, Kant—
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would suggest that thinking is somehow possible without imagining and holds a supremacy over 
imagining, there is a good deal of modern discussion suggesting just what Augustine believed: 
images and memory of those images stored in the mind and only linguistically possible if the 
imagination precedes are fundamental to the capacity of man to reason.119   
Douglas Kelly’s Medieval Imagination demonstrates to what extent this mental faculty is 
appreciated and cultivated in the medieval world.  Though he claims that the “notion of 
Imagination has not been studied in its theoretical and practical applications to courtly 
literature,”120 it is not because material is lacking.  Kelly’s study allows him to declare in unison 
with Augustine and other phenomenologists that the “Imagination is a mental faculty. It governs 
the invention, retention, and expression of images in the mind.”121  Even if Aristotle and thinkers 
who follow him do not give precedence to the imaginary capacities of the mind, Kemp reminds 
us that it is nonetheless a part of the mental process of thinking as he explains of Aquinas saying, 
“Aquinas follows Aristotle believing that thinking is impossible without an image of some kind, 
and the production of these images is the province of the inner senses,”122 and that “intellect 
acquires understanding by abstraction from these sensations and images.”123  Though the 
                                                
 
119 For more current discussions and accounts of previous thinking see E.S. Casey, Imagining: A 
Phenomenological Study (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), R. Kearney, The Wake 
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at the way the imaginary informs life see Vincent Crapanzano, Imaginative Horizons: An Essay 
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120 Douglas Kelly, Medieval Imagination: Rhetoric and the Poetry of Courtly Love (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1978) XI. 
 
121 Kelly, Medieval Imagination XI-XII.  
 
122 Simon Kemp, Medieval Psychology, Contributions in Psychology, No. 14 (New York: 
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declaration “cogito ergo sum” is in some sense a sentiment present in medieval philosophy and 
the thinking of the mystics and troubadours we study here, the imagining that leads one to 
thought and consciousness or awareness of self is equally capable of pulling the contemplative 
out of the self completely, as was the purpose of some meditative practices which incorporated 
the contemplation and creation of images both real and mental.  Indeed Jaroslav Pelikan notes 
that Descartes' cogito is one that leads to selfhood as opposed to the mystics that precede him: 
In Bonaventure, the Augustinian method of introspection within the context of 
divine grace led, through experience and reflection, to a transcendent 
Goodness than which nothing better could be imagined, the God whose 
mercy, made known in Christ, made it possible for one to sound the depths of 
his own experience and to affirm himself in nature as well as in grace.  In 
Descartes, on the other hand, despite its undeniable ancestry in Augustine, 
Anselm, and Bonaventure, the "cogito" led through doubt to thought and from 
thought to the affirmation both of the self and of God.124 
 I would suggest that our troubadours and mystics seek, like Bonaventure, to reach beyond the 
confines of an affirmed selfhood. 
In providing a succinct yet complete portrait of the mental apparatus of medieval 
monasticism, Jean Leclercq explains that while our own modern imagination has become weak 
and lazy, such was not the case in the Middle Ages, “[b]ut in the men of the Middle Ages it [the 
imagination] was vigorous and active. It permitted them to picture, to ‘make present,’ to see 
beings with all the details provided by the texts,” and notes that “[t]his strength of the 
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imagination had great consequences in the field of iconography, and in literary expression as 
well.”125  Various authors who study visionary literature and those who study devotional art 
remind us that Christians were instructed to use the imagination as they attempted to understand 
the Word.  Denise Despres reminds us that “[w]hen they were listening to the Gospels, 
individuals were encouraged to Imagine or recreate those scriptural scenes in detail to experience 
salvation history in an omnitemporal present.”126 Jeffrey F. Hamburger studies a series of images 
associated with the female community of St. Walberg and so demonstrates the tie between 
imitatio Cristi and artistic representations which allowed the nuns to come closer to the divine 
through meditation upon actual images.  He notes that in fact, “[w]ith a view to the mystic’s 
ultimate goal, the beatific vision, sight itself becomes not only the end, but also the means, of 
achieving union with God,”127 a sentiment which the work of Angela da Foligno reaffirms.  
Indeed the link of literature and image with the power of imagination in the practice of 
contemplation and meditation demonstrates the importance of the imagination in the quest to 
take leave of the self in search of the divine.  
 Hugh of Saint Victor explains that what begins in reading can lead to meditation by 
directing the gaze towards beneficial images and in so doing the soul can reach a state similar to 
that of the divine: 
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Meditation takes its start from reading but is bound by none of 
reading’s rules or precepts.  For it delights to range along open 
ground, where it fixes its free gaze upon the contemplation of 
truth, …The start of learning, thus, lies in reading, but its 
consummation lies in meditation; which, if any man will learn to 
love it very intimately and will desire to be engaged very 
frequently upon it, renders his life pleasant indeed, and provides 
the greatest consolation to him in his trials. This especially it is 
which takes the soul away from the noise of earthly business and 
makes it have even in this life a kind of foretaste of the sweetness 
of the eternal quiet… From this it follows that in meditation is to 
be found the greatest delight.128 
Hugh’s instructions would seem to structure the praxis of Angela da Foligno and Marguerite 
d’Oingt, who both endeavor to allow their gaze to lead them to the divine.  Angela begins with 
actual representations of the passion and the crucifix and Marguerite with an abstraction of the 
body and the text that allows the concepts of image, body, and text to conflate into a single entity 
that leads the penitent toward union with Christ.  Marguerite Porete, on the other hand, attempts 
to produce a language that follows the “free gaze” while allowing it to roam without language’s 
“rules or precepts” and produces a text that is at once text and beyond text at the same time.   
In her enquiry into image-making, thinking, and meditating in medieval scholastic and 
monastic societies Mary Carruthers offers her modern readers an interpretation of the cognitive 
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and doctrinal theories of these intertwined practices.  She concludes that the “craft of 
monasticism” is what Hugh of Saint Victor describes and is what is practiced by the mystics to 
be discussed here.  As she explains in the introduction to her Craft of Thought: 
The craft of making prayer continuously, which is the craft of 
monasticism, came to be called sacra pagina in Latin, the constant 
meditation based on reading and recollecting sacred texts. The 
early desert monks called this set of practices mneme theou, ‘the 
memory of God.’ This kind of ‘memory’ is not restricted to what 
we now call memory, but is a much more expansive concept, for it 
recognizes the essential roles of emotion, imagination, and 
cogitation within the activity of recollection. Closer to our term 
‘cognition,’ the construction of thinking.  Monastic meditation is 
the craft of making thoughts about God.129 
The eye that has gazed upon the image of the divine comes to carry the image within; the great 
schism between the earthly sinner and the divine is brought together; spatial difference is 
overcome through imagining.  Bonaventure, the Franciscan mystical theologian who stresses the 
significance of the imago, the image of the world and of man as being made in the image of God 
and meditating upon the image to see God, begins his work, Itinerarium mentis in Deum 
claiming that, "prayer, then, is the mother and the source of the ascent."130  Ruth H. Cline in her 
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article “Heart and Eyes” claims that two motifs—the motif of love penetrating the heart through 
the eye and the motif of the beloved being carried within the heart of the lover— “cannot be 
strictly separated.”131  Bernard of Clairvaux, Origen, Augustine, and Hugh of Saint Victor are 
among those cited in her discussion.  However, though the practice of imagination and 
meditation we have been discussing seems limited to the monastic or mystical practices, the 
following lines she offers from Bernard of Cluny could just as easily be attributed to Bernart de 
Ventadorn or one of the other troubadours: “the eye within, the keen vision of the mind, beholds 
thee…Because I cannot with the body, I often make way to thee in spirit.”132  While the religious 
practicant seeks transcendence, the troubadour seeks at least to transcend his own position in an 
attempt to reach his beloved, who so often is depicted as unreachable.  
   
Conclusion  
 
Both troubadour and mystic consider the self a construction of parts that come together in 
time, much as current trends in psychoanalysis propose. The definition of the “mental apparatus” 
provided by Luc Ciompi attests to as much, “the whole ‘mental apparatus’ (Freud) can be 
understood as a partly innate but mostly acquired flexible hierarchy of operationally integrated 
experience-based feeling-thinking-behaving programs that constitute the essential ‘building 
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blocks’ of the psyche.”133  Each of the elements of selfhood can at times take over to suggest that 
consciousness or the limits of the self are defined by one more than the others; the body provides 
the easiest means of demarcating the space of the self in the world; the emotions overwhelm the 
subject and seem to be what gives meaning and drives actions; the mental functions—imagining, 
thinking, meditating—seem at times to be the very stuff of self as Descartes’s famous 
declaration, “cogito ergo sum,” demonstrates.  And yet, the fact that the feeling of self-
consciousness can be shifted between these three entities already hints at the fragility of the 
construction.  It leaves us with the words of Augustine, cited earlier, who says of that the 
hodgepodge of images, past events, memories and experiences, that it might be a great power, 
but, “[t]his power is that of my mind and is a natural endowment,” but cannot allow the self to 
“grasp the totality of what I am.”134  There is too much to grasp, too many parts, and there are 
two in the self that examines itself: the “I” that grasps and contemplates and the “I” that simply is 
and allows itself to be grasped. This division and the possibility of situating one of each of the 
three elements of selfhood—cor, arma, and esperitz—on one side of the divide is what allows 
the determined individual to begin to chip away at the self.  The reasons troubadours and mystics 
would seek to transcend the self and their means of doing so will be the focus of the next chapter.
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The writings of great lovers, divine and secular, offer many lessons on how to behave as 
a humble servant to the beloved.  The lyrics of troubadours and the texts of medieval mystics 
provide definitions of the perfect lover, declarations of love’s power to transform the lover, and 
instructions on how to join the beloved.  In order to highlight the similarities between these two 
discourses this chapter will provide a brief introduction to the issues by placing the words of 
troubadours beside the words of mystics.  In this chapter we will examine the explicit references 
both lovers make to the love’s power to transform the lover.  The chapters on authors in parts II 
and III will focus on the preoccupations of the authors individually. 
Love as Transformative  
 
In the long history of attempting to understand human existence love has consistently 
appeared as an element that can explain not only what man is from the outset but how he can 
arrive at the goal the universe has set for him.  Love in many instances is presented as a force 
which changes the lover, for better or for worse.   
Love, loving, and the beloved transform mystics and troubadours alike. For each, love 
has the power to make the lover arrive at the ideal: for the mystic it is self-annihilation and 
complete integration with the divine, for the troubadour perfection of character and complete 
submission to the lady.  The beloved transforms the lover into someone better says the poet-lover 




Tot jorn meillur et esmeri   
car la gensor serv e coli   
del mon—so ·us dic. 135   
Each day I become better and more refined 
because I serve and revere the most 
gracious lady in the world, this I tell you. 
 
Gaucelm Faidit tells his beloved, “car m’etz enans e respiegs, e guirensa, / gaug e delitz, caps et 
comensamens” and for this reason “en amar be meillur outra poder”136  And Raimbaut 
d’Aurenga emphasizes: “Si ben en amar leis m’esmer”137  Bernart de Ventadorn goes so far as to 
proclaim that “Ben a mauvais cor e mendic / qui ama e no·s melhura”138  The theme is a common 
one in the lyrics of the troubadours and courtly romances, but it has clear counterparts in the 
declarations of mystics. Like the troubadours, Jacopone da Todi, writing in Italy in the thirteenth 
century—where most of the troubadour songbooks we have today were being compiled139—
composes a song praising divine love in which he addresses her saying, “Amor che dai forma / 
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ad omnia cha forma / la forma toa reforma lom che deformato.”140  Man is a deformation, is 
material that has lost its shape until Love returns it to an original form.  The original form is that 
of Love itself, who gives its own shape to whatever it overpowers.  De-forming happens through 
the process of willing.  De-forming allows for a different form to be produced.  Man should 
remain in God’s image and Love’s form.  If he has strayed by willing, introducing difference and 
so constructing an entity distinct from God and Love, he should strive to return to an 
intermingled state, a union that means a dissolving of difference.  Like in Jacopone, Marguerite 
Porete proclaims this the power of Love: 
Ce don [of his love] occist ma pensee   
du delit de son amour,  
lequel delit 
me soubhaulce et mue par union 
en la permanable joye d’estre de divine 
Amour.141 
This gift of his love kills my thought by the 
delight of His love, which delight lifts and 
transforms me through union into the 
eternal joy of the being of divine love. 
 
 
The fin’ amant, the annihilated soul, to use the names Marguerite Porete provides, becomes the 
thing itself, eradicating the difference that makes a separate subject.  Love, loving, and 
beloved—divine or earthly—seem for these lyrical poets to elicit a common type of change in 
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the lover-poets. Just as troubadours often repeat the words “esmeri” or “refining” and other verbs 
of bettering and transformation, Marguerite Porete returns to the idea of the soul changing or 
transforming with her consistent use of the word “muer” in her description of the soul.   
To love fully the self must be transformed.  Further exploration reveals that in fact both 
troubadours and mystics describe a process that is less a trans-forming and more a de-forming or 
deconstructing of the kind described by Jacopone above, an un-forming of the subject.  As 
Augustine explains in his Sermon, the self must be left behind entirely, forgotten, “For she [the 
soul] is less than God; yea, less by far, and by so much less as the thing made is less than the 
Maker.  It was God then That ought to have been loved, yea in such wise as ought God to be 
loved, that if it might be so, we should forget ourselves.”142  In her study of the concept of love 
in the work of Augustine, Hannah Arendt determines that in forgetting the self, the subject has to 
give up its very being, “Dans cet oubli, il cesse d’être lui-même, un être particulier.”143  The 
elements or very thingness of the self must be shed to reach God.   
The lover places at the feet of the beloved the lover’s will, pleasure, and body parts; that 
is, all the various elements of the self.  One of the most obvious gifts of self the lover can offer is 
the heart.  Arnaut de Maruelh no longer holds his own heart; it is now in the hands of the lady, 
“Domna valens ab avinens lauzors, / Ren de mon cor non ai mais la bailia / de vos lo tenh...”144  
The heart consistently represents the self in troubadour lyric.  Bernart de Ventadorn situates his 
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identity, his being, in the heart, describing a self that is at its most condensed and solid in the 
cor.145 In “Can la freid’ aura venta” Bernart de Ventadorn offers both his will and his heart to his 
lady “per amor de la genta /  vas cui eu sui aclis, on ai meza m’ententa /  e mo coratg’ assis…”146 
but in “Non es meravelha” he offers up a more complete inventory of self: “Cor e cors e saber e 
sen /  e fors’ e poder i ai mes.”147  The features of individual identity have been handed over to 
the beloved.  While it is common to expect troubadours to speak of physical union, their words 
indicate that a loss of self-love is also a priority.148 
 In the text that led Marguerite Porete to the flames, Mirouer des simples ames anenties et 
qui seulement demourent en vouloir et desir d’amour, Marguerite creates a dialogue which gives 
a voice to the allegorical figures of Reason, Love, the Soul. Here too the figures speak of a soul 
who relinquishes the will, for Love says of the Soul,  
car son vouloir n’est mie a elle ne en elle, 
mais ainçoys est en celui qui l’ayme, et ce 
for her will is no longer her own nor in her, 
but instead is in the One who loves her, and 
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146 For love of the noble one towards whom I gravitate, where I have placed my affection, and set 
my heart… ll. 5-8 
 
147 heart and body, wisdom and mind and strength and force and power I have placed in it(love). 
ll. 5-6 
 
148 The question as to why troubadours might seek to escape the self can have answers on a 
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n’est mie son oeuvre ainçoys est l’oeuvre 
de toute la Trinité, qui oeuvre en telle Ame 
a sa voulenté…149 
it is not at all her work but is the work of 
the Trinity who performs work in this Soul 
as It wills. 
 
Marguerite uses the image of flame and fire to explain the conflating of wills that happens and 
means transformation for the simple soul: 
Or est ung commun vouloir, come feu et 
flambe,  
le vouloir de l’amant et celluy de l’amie,  
car Amour a muee ceste Ame en luy.150 
Now there is one common will, as fire and 
flame, the will of the Lover and the one 
who is loved, for Love has transformed this 
Soul into Love itself. 
 
As the lover gives his or her parts to the beloved, the distance or difference, between 
lover and beloved weakens. Lover and beloved pull closer together.  Distance and difference are 
overcome with this transforming, muer, that turns the lover not only into someone different, but 
someone better. Further the Soul says “tant suis muee” that all individuality and unique, separate 
identity is lost.  She can have no name for she has disappeared into the union with the beloved:  
Et tant suis muee 
 que je en au perdu mon nom pour amer, 
qui si pou puis amer.151 
And I am so transformed that I have lost 
my name in it for the sake of love [loving], 
I who am able to love so little. 
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Self is lost entirely; only Love, the divine, exists.  The name as marker of unique identity 
is completely lost. Such is the power and purpose of love.  
In the compilation of texts left by Angela da Foligno, the mystic recounts the story of her 
transformation to the Fra Arnaldo who transcribes her words.152  She provides an outline of, “the 
degree of transforming love” in which she too emphasizes that the transformation is in fact a 
deconstructing of all the elements that make a self resulting in a selflessness that is that is the 
loss of the lover’s individual identity: 
Et alora la vertù de l’amore  
Transforma l’amante ne l’amato  
e l’amato ne l’amante.153 
Then the power of love transforms the 
lover into the beloved and the beloved into 
the lover. 
 
A transformation takes place, demolishing all boundaries between loving subject and 
beloved object. The two entities become blurred through this process. Self is lost; the beloved 
too has been described as turned into the lover, "e l'amato ne l'amante."  In order for the space 
between divine and human to be narrowed, dissolved, all one needs is to acknowledge the 
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pervasive nature of divine being.  For the individual to persist in existing as a unique entity is to 
deny God the power to be all.  It is in this sense a deconstruction, an un-forming of self.  
Mystics and troubadours agree that some sort of transformation takes place in the loving 
subject. The process is one of deconstruction and it is this common goal—for it is a goal and not 
a passive result—that brings these two lovers to speak of love with similar words. Love and 
loving alone do not effect change of mental state, but alterations in the components of being a 
loving subject. The goal of love according to troubadours and mystics is a state in which there is 
a total eclipsing of the self, and the role of language in deconstructing the self is the common 
link between these two types of lovers. It is a paradox of language that moves these lovers: they 
struggle within the confines of language and yet employ speech and writing to push the 
boundaries of world and self.  Their love and loathing of words and facility with language games 
allow mystics and troubadours to become perfect lovers.  
Losing the Self for Love 
  
For both mystics and fin’ amants of earthly domnas, to strive to become the perfect lover 
is to lose all selfish preoccupations, to disappear.  If the construction of the self happens in the 
world, through language, and a move towards a sense of the body, as well as feelings, so too 
does the deconstruction of self. The deconstructive tools of which we find traces in the works of 
the mystics and the troubadours center on three particular fields of play: the body, the 





The Body and Loss of Self 
Attempts to deconstruct the self by devaluing the body begin with acts—in speech and 
body—which paradoxically enough put the human form center stage.  Both extreme asceticism 
and self-inflicted wounding offer clear examples of subjects whose desire to minimize the 
importance or role of the body and the bodily in the construction of self-identity leads them to a 
grand preoccupation with all things corporeal.  Pain would seem to draw attention to the body as 
a self.  Instead, self inflicted pain holds a prominent place in practices of self-destruction, as 
Gavin Flood notes: “Pain, willingly accepted, becomes the method for the body’s transcendence.  
This is a common feature of ascetic traditions.”154  While hagiographies and the texts of mystics 
indicate that lovers of God do undertake some of the other methods a subject employs to destroy 
the self, some accounts by troubadours suggest that self injurious practice is adopted by those in 
love with a human on earth.  This is true because these practices have nothing to do with the 
character of the beloved but everything to do with the complete destruction of the loving subject.   
Ariel Glucklich tracks the mystifying question of why one would expect pain to lead to 
identification with God in his study Sacred Pain.  He does not make too much of the uses of 
language though he does include prayer and chanting in the list of practices he says mystics use 
to “unmake their own profane selves.”155  Glucklich presents his objective in the following 
terms: 
Sacred Pain argues that religious individuals have hurt themselves 
because the pain they produced was meaningful and is not only 
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subject to verbal communication but also figures in our ability to 
empathize and share. In other words, the symbolic and experiential 
efficacy of pain derives from the way it bridges ‘raw’ sensation 
with our highest qualities as human beings in a community of other 
humans.156 
 
By claiming that pain is key in connecting humans with symbol, he sets himself up against the 
very well-known declaration by Elaine Scarry in The Body in Pain which posits that pain is 
“language-destroying.”157  Not only this but he is situating himself within the prickly question of 
how to speak about, understand, or even simply witness or identify the mystic or ascetic’s 
experience.  We only have texts as a window onto the experiences of mystics of old is text alone.  
However, are texts nothing more than the pure account of an experience?  Is writing itself a part 
in the process of self-negation and so more about the writer’s act in writing than any message 
conveyed?  Is the language we find today left by or about a religious figure the product of the 
intent to speak to us?  Glucklich does seem to think that language is a communicative tool rather 
than one that can change the speaker/writer or listener/reader's experience in any way.  Glucklich 
says “the hurting body does not suffer silently. It offers a potential voice, if one has the tools to 
make the soul listen.”158  He suggests that “religiously-conceived pain” can “potentially be 
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University Press, 1985) 11.  Glucklich takes on Scarry explicitly stating, “her fundamental 
axiom, that pain eludes language and is therefore completely subjective and objectless, is 
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transformed into good pain: educational, healing, bonding with God.”159  However, many are the 
mystics who claim that language falls away along with all things worldly when union with God 
is achieved and Glucklich himself recognizes that the shaking off of all things earthly is the goal 
and the reason they employ techniques of various kinds: “Ascetics and mystics know that they 
possess effective techniques, short of raw pain, for unmaking their own profane selves: First is a 
rigid diet, then isolation, sleepless nights (vigils,) ongoing prayer or chanting, hard physical 
work, and other psychotropic techniques.”160  When union with God is achieved, a “potential 
voice” is no longer necessary.  Union renders mediation, communication through voice, sign, 
through anything, completely unnecessary. 
While I do not agree that the purpose of ascetic practices or even self-inflicted pain is not 
to “find a voice,” as Glucklich says, it is true that the visual image of these acts can convey 
something to onlookers.  That cannot be denied.  Bruce Holsinger’s chapter, “The Musical Body 
in Pain” in Music, Body, and Desire in Medieval Culture attempts to widen his scope to “a 
number of approaches to the musical body in pain.”161 His discussion of the flagellants suggests 
that the objective of the flagellants was indeed to “produce painful music as public, civic 
spectacle” though Holsinger does recognize that the musicality in devotional practice could also 
serve to alter the experience of the practicant.162  In fact Gavin Flood suggests in his work, The 
Ascetic Self, that “asceticism is always performed, which is to say always in the public domain 
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(even when performed in privacy).”163  For the subject that inflicts pain upon the self, the goal is 
not only to speak to a public but also to test the possibility of escaping selfhood even when 
surrounded by onlookers, even when their existence brings the eyes of others upon them. The 
loss of self that can come with pain is accompanied by the loss of language.  As Scarry’s work 
suggests, self and language are in symbiosis and lost simultaneously.  
Hurting the body with God in mind is about devaluing all the elements of individual 
selfhood through the assortment of means available. Jerome Kroll and Bernard Bachrach have 
recently proposed another reason for the widespread use of self-inflicted pain in the religious of 
the Western Christian tradition in their book The Mystic Mind. They posit as their fundamental 
hypothesis “that one major and heretofore overlooked motivation for medieval heroic ascetic 
behaviors is the effectiveness of self-injurious behaviors in bringing about an altered state of 
consciousness.”164  While Glucklich stresses the effects of pain within community and with God, 
and Holsinger the meaningful spectacle, Kroll and Bachrach focus on mental states; self-induced 
pain serves a very intimate purpose working on the mind of the subject. Kroll and Bachrach 
build their book upon the idea that mystics of the Western Christian tradition, at least during the 
Middle Ages, “employed harsh self-injurious practices as a method of inducing altered states of 
consciousness,” and this because “Western Christianity during much of the Middle Ages did not 
have available, … as strong a tradition of meditative practices as those found in Eastern 
religions.”165  If pain was used by so many of those seeking to destroy the self, it is because they 
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had limited means available to them.  However, familiarity with monastic practices cannot but 
challenge their claim.  Caroline Walker Bynum suggests that the “peculiarly bodily” focus of 
spirituality in the Middle Ages was because “theology and natural philosophy saw persons as, in 
some real sense, body as well as soul.”166 Not only, then, is pain a method available to medieval 
ascetics, but the body itself holds meaning in a particular way for the medieval subject.  
While descriptions of extreme asceticism and self-inflicted physical pain—the bodily 
means of altering the state of the religious practicant—are more readily found in hagiographies 
than in the writings of mystics this is to be expected as hagiographers have an agenda that 
necessitates a focus on the worldly.  Even so, traces of the significance of the body in the 
construction of selfhood surface in mystical texts and even troubadour lyric. Angela da Foligno 
in her book of visions describes an experience prompted by looking at the crucifixion which 
leads her to distance herself of her body parts: 
 
Ma in questo cognoscimento de la 
croze m’era dacto tanto fuoco che, 
stando apresso de la croxe, me 
spolgiai tute le vestimente e tuta me 
ofresi a lui. Et avegnaché con 
tremore, ma alori promisi a lui de 
observare castitade perpetua, e de 
non ofender a lui con algun di mie 
Nonetheless, this perception of the 
meaning of the cross set me so afire that, 
standing near the cross, I stripped myself of 
all my clothing and offered my whole self 
to him. Although very fearful, I promised 
him then to maintain perpetual chastity and 
not to offend him again with any of my 
bodily members, accusing each of these 
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menbri, e accusando li peccati de tuti 
i membri.167 
one by one.  
      
Her bodily members she doffs one by one by giving them a name and in so doing an identity 
apart from her own. Angela da Foligno strips herself of all that had been draped on her by 
denying them to be acting under or in accord with her new willing which is in accord with 
God’s; once stripped, she offers herself completely to God. She explains that she was  
“iluminata e fòme insingnata la via de la 
croxe in questo modo, zioè ch’io mi 
spolgiàse e fosse piui liziera, e nuda a la 
croxe andàse, …168 
inspired with the thought that if I wanted to 
go to the cross, I would need to strip 
myself of my very self in order to be lighter 
and go naked to it…;  
 
She would need to rid herself even “of my very self.”  The clothes, then the shell that is the body, 
must be lost.  In a laude known through the provocative title, “Self-Annihilation and Charity 
Lead the Soul to What Lies Beyond Knowledge and Language,” Jacopone da Todi admits that he 
had once foolishly thought that the rational and the bodily through the senses offered a means of 
finding God:  
Auerte cognosuto  I used to think  
                                                                                                                                                       
 
167 Ludger Thier and Abele Calufetti, Il Libro della Beata Angela da Foligno: Edizione Critica, 
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Credeua per intellecto 
Gustato per affecto 
Uiso per simiglianza 
Credendo auer tenuto 
Ti cosi perfecto 
Prouato quel dilecto 
Amor de smesuranza 
Or par me che so fallanza 
Non ei quel chio credeua 
Tenendo non auea 
Ueritate senza errore.169 
That through the intellect I knew You,  
Had a taste of you through feeling  
I saw you in similitudes,  
I believed I held you, knew You in Your 
perfection. 
I know now that I was wrong, 
that that truth was flawed. 
Tasted the delight of  
Love without measure 
Now, it seems that this was false 
It is not what I believed  
I did not have the truth without error. 
 
In this laude, the opening suggests that for one who has truly arrived, joined the beloved, all 
intellect, sensory perception, sense of self and self-consciousness, “are swept into infinity.”170  
The state and space of union is devoid of all a self can produce or access. As he says in opening 
the laude, “Love beyond all telling, Goodness beyond imagining.”  Love, the divine, is beyond 
the mental capacities of the individual. 
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Mental functions and the Loss of Self 
 In claiming that this experience of love is “Sopra omne lengua amore / bontate senza 
figura”171 Jacopone highlights the two other means of self destruction commonly used by good 
lovers stemming from the mental elements of selfhood: language and imagination. The 
importance of meditation upon images will be a large part of the discussion presented in part III.  
Angela da Foligno explains that one day she heard God say “Io te voglio mostrare la mia 
potenzia,”172 and explains she was able to see a vision through the eyes of her soul.    Angela 
discovers the mental phenomenon of a vision can affect change upon her being.  She learns the 
power of imagining; the imagination as a method of focusing her attention on her smallness, her 
tiny place within an immense creation; her own worth is comparable to only the smallest grain 
for she continues saying, “E conprendea tuto lo mondo quaxi una picola cosa.”173 She has lost 
herself in the immensity and grandeur of the imaginal, of the contemplation of an image of the 
divine which encompasses and suffuses all leaving nothing outside the perameters of God’s 
being.  Angela loses herself less by crushing her physicality, as would an ascetic, than by 
creating and focusing on images of the divine. The book we have today is a collection of visions 
and reflections Angela da Foligno dictated to the Franciscan Brother Arnaldo. Imagining as we 
see it in the descriptions provided by Angela da Foligno but also other mystics and even some 
troubadours is a type of concentration that summons visions.  
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Angela’s preference for imagining rather than writing as a means of arriving at the 
feeling and experience of the divine is demonstrated by reluctance to speak of God and the 
frustration she feels when she tries to express her experience.  The image is the way to reach the 
divine, experience union, words are nothing the expression, faulty and weak, of a strong and 
perfect experience.  As Angela da Foligno recounts what she has seen, she, paradoxically, 
consistently claims the impossibility of speaking her visions by adding preambles or postscripts 
to the descriptions of her visions: 
Ancora me disse a me, frate scriptore, essa 
fedele de Cristo, exponiéndome tute 
queste cose scrite, che tanta pasione vide 
l’anima sua, che quantonque santa Maria 
ne vedèse più che nulo santo in molti modi 
como essa asegnava, inpertanto essa 
intendeva che per nessuno modo Ella la 
potesse dire, né santo alcuno.174 
[At this point, Christ’s faithful one, in an 
explanation of the above, told me, brother 
scribe, that her soul had seen so much of 
the passion that it understood that even 
though the  Blessed Virgin had seen more 
of it and mentioned more of its details than 
any other saint, still she herself could not—
neither could any other saint—find words 
to express it. 
 
The passion is shown to her in such a way that the power of the image goes beyond the power of 
the tongue, “Questo dolore acuto, fo sì grande che lingua no zi basta a dire nì cuore a 
pensare...”175  Language ceases to have any power: Love is beyond telling:   
                                                
 
174 Il Libro della Beata Angela 293.  
 
175 This acute pain, so intense that the tongue cannot express it nor is the heart great enough to 





E vego et intendo che quelle operazione 
divine e quelo profondissimo abisso, nullo 
anzolo e nula criatura è sì larga e capaze 
che la possa comprenderé; e tuta queste 
cosse cue ora dico si può sì male dire e 
meno dire, che sono biastemare quelle.176 
I am convinced that there is no saint, angel, 
or creature which has anywhere near the 
capacity to understand these divine 
workings and that extremely deep abyss. 
And everything I am saying now is so 
badly and weakly said that it is a 
blasphemy against these things. 
       
Angela da Foligno dictates her visions to Brother Arnaldo but her ecstasy comes from the 
moments of her rapture, the moments when she “sees” the glory of God, the suffering of Christ. 
Angela seems much more interested in the imaginary than in the rhetorical.  Indeed her 
reluctance, at least as we hear it through the words penned by her confessor, might in some part 
explain why her account was written by this mediator.  For other religious figures writing is a 
part of religious devotion.  Both Marguerite d’Oingt and Marguerite Porete associate their 
religious experiences with the acts of the word, both reading and writing.  It is always necessary 
to remember that we only have accounts when an experience was put into words, either by the 
practicant or someone else.  In fact, all we have are words.  The text is a phenomenon in and of 
itself, apart from the experience that may or may not be described by a work or even inspired by 
writing.   
The manipulation of the law of language, of the signifier-signified relationship, is the 
means of re-examining the solidity of the self and its place in the world  chosen by at least some 
                                                
 




troubadours like Arnaut Daniel, Raimbaut d’Aurenga, and Bernart de Ventadorn and numerous 
mystics from  Jacopone da Todi, Marguerite Porete, Teresa de Avila to Thérèse de Lisieux.  
Because the subject comes into being through language, because the world is accessed by a 
subject through the symbolic, tinkering with language in such a way that the link between the 
world and the word, the signifier and the signified is thrown into doubt, affects not only the 
stability of the symbolic, of language  and grammar, but the frame of reality and the stance of the 
self as well.  For this reason attempts to explore selfhood and the space beyond can involve play 
with language.  To speak of the divine is to leave entirely the world of the sayable.   
Even Marguerite d’Oingt, whose Speculum focuses on the image of an intricately 
decorated book placed in the heart and covered with letters, mirrors, and colors, believes the act 
of writing directs the heart and the mind to God: “Je n’ai escrit ces choses manqué por ce que 
quant mes cuers seroyt espanduz parmi le munde que je pensaso en cetes choses, por ce que 
puisso retorner mon cuer a mon creatour et retrayre du mundo”177  She claims that she who has 
had visions wrote them all in her heart until it was so full she was unable to eat or sleep and so 
“elle se pensa que s’ela metoyt en escrit ces choses que sos cuers en seroyt plus alegiez.”178 The 
need to speak, to write, to make some utterance before the ineffable has less to do with 
successful and truthful communication than it does with the effect of love. For Marguerite 
Porete, one of the effects of love is the desire to speak about it: 
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Mais j’en vueil parler et n’en sçay que 
dire. Non pourtant, dame Amour, dist 
elle, mon amour est de tel arbiter, quie 
j’aime mieulx a oïr chose mesdire de 
vous, que que on ne die aucune chose de 
vous. Et sans faille ce fais je: j’en 
mesdis, car tout ce que j’en dis n’est fors 
que mesdire de la bonté de vous.179  
But I want to speak about it and I don’t 
know what to say about it. Nevertheless, 
Lady Love, she says, my love is so certain 
that I would prefer to hear something 
slanderous about you than that one should 
say nothing about you. And without fail I 
do this: I slander because everything I say 
is nothing but slander about your goodness. 
 
When facing the beloved, language fails. Speech, all speech, is slander. It is to mis-speak, 
speak wrongly, mesdire.  The relationship signifier-signified cannot stand as it does for cow or 
chair, or horse; God is simply too much for any signifier to fully signify.  And no signifier can 
avoid pointing in some way to the all-encompassing divine.  In Mystical Languages of Unsaying, 
Michael Sells finds there are three linguistic options open to the one who faces “the primary 
dilemma of transcendence” which is the fact that anything that is beyond, that transcends, is 
beyond language, and yet to speak of it, to talk about it or point to it, one immediately is pulled 
back into the confined nontranscendent realm of language.180  In illustrating the first response, 
silence, Angela admits that “e ziò ch’io dico me pare dire niente, over dire malle. E poi dìsseme: 
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parme de biastemare”181 and ultimately decides there is no way to talk about God or union with 
the divine:  
 
E perciò non si può dire nulla 
assolutamente, e perché non si può 
trovare nessuna parola che esprima 
queste cose divine e nessun pensiero e 
nessuna intelligenzia può estenderi ad 
esse, tanto soperchiano ogni cosa, como 
Dio per chivele non si può comendare, 
inperzioché Dio al postuto non si può 
comendare. E dizea la predita fedele de 
Cristo con grandísima certeza e dava at 
intendere che Dio non si può per 
nessuno modo comendare.182    
Therefore, there is absolutely nothing that can 
be said about this experience, for no words can 
be found or invented to express or explain it; 
no expansion of thought or mind can possibly 
reach to those things, they are so far beyond 
everything—for there is nothing which can 
explain God. I repeat there is absolutely 
nothing which can explain God. Christ’s 
faithful one affirmed with utmost certitude and 
wanted it understood that there is absolutely 
nothing which can explain God. 
   
And yet Angela speaks to her confessor for hours; Marguerite Porete disseminates her 
doctrine so resolutely that it leads to her being condemned to burn; Marguerite d’Oingt writes for 
her correspondent and herself.  It would seem the need to speak is tied to human experience and 
the will to utter exists even when the words do not.  The language produced in an attempt to 
speak the unsayable is apophasis.  The features of apophasis, the language that signifies without 
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pointing beyond itself, appear in texts from all periods though Michael Sells notes that “the 150-
year period from the mid-twelfth to the beginning of the fourteenth century constitutes the 
flowering of apophatic mysticism.”183   
The intensity of the drive to speak that comes from encountering the primum mobile is 
not foreign to the troubadours.  Troubadours consistently stress that they cannot help but sing.  
Peire Vidal swears to this drive: “Quan n’ aug dir bon resso,/ Gaugz entiers mi somo/ Qu’ en 
deja far chanso.”184  Arnaut de Mareulh finds in the qualities of his beloved not only his desire to 
sing but the knowledge or skill to do so as well: 
La grans beutatz e.l fis ensenhamens 
 E.l verais pretz e las bonas lauzors 
E.l cortes ditz e la fresca colors 
Que son en vos, bona domna valenz,  
Me donon gienh de chantar e sciensa,…185 
The great beauty and the perfect education, 
the true worth and the beautiful praise and 
courtly words and the fresh color that you 
have, noble lady of worth, give me the art 
and the skill to sing... 
 
The words are not prompted by the singer, but by the lady herself—her perfection demands 
praise.  Peire Rogier says much the same thing, even going so far as to suggest that because it is 
inspired by the perfect lady the song itself cannot be flawed, “Ges non puesc en bon vèrs falhir / 
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nulh’ora que de midons chans.” 186  The intense love for the beloved, her very nature as an ideal 
being, inspire song—the suggestion is that he who looks on her cannot but begin to praise her.  
The transposition of such a thought into the register of the divine in Mariology, songs about the 
Virgin Mary, is not difficult to understand.  
Troubadours singing of earthly ladies claim the lady is so great that song comes naturally; 
that she is so great there are not enough words to convey her greatness; that one could never go 
wrong in saying positive things about her for all good is in her; that it is right and good to sing 
the lady’s praises. All of these claims are present in the corpus of marian songs written in 
Occitan by troubadours arriving late on the scene when tastes had become far more pious.  Often 
the exordia of marian songs are the same as those in the lyrics of earthly fin’ amor:  The 
thirteenth-century troubadour Folquet de Lunel creates an opening stanza to a prayer to the 
Virgin Mary that cannot really be distinguished from the openings of songs written in earlier 
centuries for courtly ladies.187 Folquet begins “Tant fin’ amors totas horas m’afila” saying: 
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Tant fin’ amors totas horas m’afila 
Ma voluntat, qu’ieu de lauzar m’afil 
Midons ; qu’en re tan mais no s’assubtila 
Mos cars sabers, qu’ieu no·n ai ta subtil 
Que pogues dir l’una parte de las mil 
Lauzors qu’om pot de lieys dir ; que d’ans/ 
mil a 
No nasqueth homs la pogues dir, non guil, 
Ni lunhs per lieys lauzar non pot dir guila.188 
 
So much does fin’ amor at all hours refine  
My will, that I through praising my lady 
refine myself; for in a thing so great my 
precious sabers cannot have the subtlety 
needed—for I have not so refined a one--  
That I could speak a fraction of the thousand 
praises that could be said of her; that in a 
thousand years no man born could say them, 
without lie,  and no one can speak a lie while 
praising her. 
 
In this poem the poet uses the term “midons,” –a term earlier troubadours borrowed from feudal 
vocabulary to speak of their earthly woman— to speak of the Virgin.189  Love again here 
overtakes the will of the composer who wishes to sing praise to “midons” but knows that his 
words, no matter how much he writes or sings, will never speak even a fraction of the thousands 
of glories that could be said of her.  What Folquet sang in his song for the virgin had been said 
by troubadours who came before him, such as Arnaut de Maruelh, who says of his lady, “hom 
non pot lauzan mentir, ni del be que·y es dire·l tertz”190 and again in his tornada for “Aissi cum 
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mos cors es” says, “Gen Conquis, la lauzor/ e·l bos esseignamens, que Dieus vos a donat,/ en un 
jorn de pascor no serion comtat.”191  Bernart de Ventadorn claims his own beloved is of an 
essence that cannot be captured by any signified or even all signifieds put together, “Om no·l pot 
lauzar tan gen/ com la saup formar Natura.”192   
 Despite the repeated notion that words cannot fully reveal the perfection of the lady—
earthly or saintly— troubadours and trouvères singing of their beloved Domna or the Virgin 
cannot resist the urge to sing, inspired by the Lady and Love: “Fine amor et bone esperance/ me 
fait un noviau chant chanter/ de cele qui touz ceaus avance / qui de cuer la vuellent amer”193 
begins an anonymous French song.  Bernart d’Auriac recognizes the great distinction between an 
earthly lady and the heavenly Virgin, even as the formula for the start of his song does not: 
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Be volria de la mellor 
de totas far chanso plazen, 
 quar d’autra chanter non enten 
  mas de la verge de doussor; 
 qu’estiers non puesc mielhs mos bons 
motz despendre 
 qu’en la doussa dona de paradis 
on Dieus pauzet totz los bes e·ls assis;  
per qu’ieu li prec que·l plassa mon chant 
prendre.194 
Well I’d like to make a lovely song of her 
who is the greatest of all, for I cannot 
intend to sing but of the sweet virgin.  
For I cannot spend my words better than 
on the sweet lady of paradise in whom 
God placed and all good, for this reason I 
pray that it please her to accept my song.   
 
The poet recognizes that he could sing for an earthly woman but he chooses to sing for the 
Virgin.  The language to speak of the one is the same as the discourse to speak of the other.  
The second response to an encounter with perfection, after silence, is to scientifically and 
surgically filter the entity into parts: elements of common nontranscendence and others of 
transcendence.    
The third response to the ideal beloved is that which assists us as we try to understand the 
incongruous lists of words produced by linguistically playful mystics of negative theology: “The 
third response begins with the refusal to solve the dilemma posed by the attempt to refer to the 
transcendent through a distinction between two kinds of name. The dilemma is accepted as a 
genuine aporia, that is, as unresolvable; but this acceptance, instead of leading to silence, leads 
                                                




to a new mode of discourse.”195  Language can be used to speak of God and the ideal lady, just 
not of the ideal, the divine. Signs can no longer fully capture the power of reference necessary to 
refer to a signified once we enter the realm of perfection.  Bernart de Ventadorn, like many 
troubadours, says so explicitly196: 
Qui be remira ni ve 
Olhs e gola, fron e faz, 
Aissi son finas beutatz 
Que mais ni menhs no i cove, 
Cors long, dreih e covinen, 
Gen afliban, conhd’e gai. 
Om no·l pot lauzar tan gen  
Com la saup formar Natura. 197 
For whosoever looks and observes her 
eyes, her neck, her forehead and face, her 
beauty is so fine that neither more nor less 
would be appropriate to add, her slender 
body, straight and attractive, nobly 
adorned, charming and joyous. No person 
can praise her so well as Nature made her. 
 
 
The sign cannot work as it does for the common, mundane thing; a word of human speech 
simply cannot depict the perfection that nature created. We must remember that there are two 
discourses to keep track of here: that which speaks of or about the bankruptcy of language in the 
realm of the ideal beloved and the actual discourse produced from this bankruptcy of language 
which mocks the linguistic or symbolizing process such as can be found in the very non-holy 
                                                
 
195 Sells 2. 
 
196 We must remember that there are two discourses to keep track of here: that which speaks of 
or about the bankruptcy of language in the realm of the ideal beloved (which is what we discuss 
here in this chapter and the next chapter) and the actual discourse produced from this bankruptcy 
of language which mocks the linguistic or symbolizing process such as can be found in the very 
non-holy fratras but also the poetry of negative mysticism.  
 




fratras but also the poetry of negative mysticism.  Angela da Foligno describes a scene in which 
the divine Himself appropriates the sign as He refutes the efficacy of the everyday sign or word 
with its divorce from its signified, and indeed the whole nature of signifying—the standing in 
for, and pointing toward something outside. God responds to Angela’s wish for a sign saying, 
“Questo che tu adimandi è uno segno che te darìa senpre letizia quando lo vedèsi e tocàsi, ma 
non te trarìa de dubio e in cotale segno poresti esser inganata.”198  Instead of “such” a sign, God 
proposes that He place inside her heart a sign of his kind: 
E questo è lo segno lo quale laso entro ne 
l’anima tua lo quale è melgio che quelo lo 
qualle adimandasti: Làsote uno amore di 
me per lo quale l’anima tua continuamente 
serà calda di me.199 
Here then is the sign which I deposit in the 
depths of your soul, one better than the one 
you asked for: I place in you a love of me 
so great that your soul will be continually 
warmed with me. 
 
 
 Love is what He places in her heart—the thing itself, the “authentic sign”—His presence 
itself is more than sign, it is the thing, and yet at the same time, He says, a sign of it. The divine 
sign is different from a regular sign that speaks, that signifies, points to something not there—
something that might have been there, but is no longer. The sign is fleeting, dependent on those 
moments when she “sees” or “touches” it, that is, uses the tools of the imagination or the body.  
What God bestows upon Angela is congruent with the feeling of it and is also eternal.  In this 
                                                
 
198 This which you are asking for is a sign which would always give you joy whenever you see it 
or touch it, but it would not take away your doubt. Furthermore, in such a sign you could be 
deceived. Il Libro della Beata 205. 
 




scene God describes the “meaning event” as defined by Sells: “Meaning event indicates that 
moment when the meaning has become identical with existence, but such identity is not only 
asserted, it is performed.”200   The type of sign God speaks of no longer points to the signified, 
but is truly the thing itself—as one would expect. 
 Writing is a cure for the cluttered mind, the confused heart.  Marguerite d’Oingt describes 
an experience with the divine that moves from visions to writing: the visionary wrote all of the 
visions in her heart until it was so full she was unable to eat or sleep and so “elle se pensa que 
s’ela metoyt en escrit ces choses que sos cuers en seroyt plus alegiez.”201  The need to speak, to 
write, to make some utterance before the ineffable has less to do with successful and truthful 
communication than it does with the effect of love. 
One means of conceptually/linguistically breaking down the spatial distance necessarily 
implied between fallen man and the divine being can be found in a declaration that functions like 
Russian matryoshka dolls, which hold smaller dolls inside, but, as M.C. Escher might have 
depicted them.  Just like Escher’s staircases that turn on themselves leading always upward 
thanks to the artist’s skillful mastery of optical illusion, words can lure us into places logic 
cannot find.  In words, in grammar, each container can turn into the content—something not 
possible in the finitude of the physical world. Again and again we hear troubadour and mystic 
evoke a variation on the same impossible image. As Michael Sells notes, this is one of the 
hallmarks of apophatic writing, while his comments are describing “Classical Western 
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201 She thought that if she wrote those things down that her heart would be freed of the burden. 




apophasis” and his book on unsaying and apophasis speaks only of mystics it is clear that the 
following declaration is true of both our mystics and our troubadours: 
In apophatic discourse, the overflow develoves into a series of logical 
and semantic dilemmas. The dualisms upon which the language of 
“flowing out” is based, such as the distinction between vessel that 
receives the flow and the content it receives, are ultimately fused into 
paradoxes (the vessel is the content) as the apophasis unravels its initial 
premise about the source of emanation” 6-7 
 
Arnaut de Maruelh refers frequently to visions of the beloved, and even to her image 
carried inside his heart, “Amors, que mi a pres, / m’en fai plus enveios, /  que· m te vostras 
faissos /  dedinz e mon coratge.”202   Arnaut is imprisoned inside love but then his love, his 
beloved is carried within his heart.  Peire Vidal also claims Love has forced him to place the lady 
in his heart, “Qu’ins en mon cor m’a fait Amors escrire / Sa gran beutat, don res non es a dire, / 
E son gent cors ben fait e ben assis!”203  Yet in the song, “Una chanso ai faita mortamen” the 
poet-lover explains that he is the one whose heart is not in his possession at all. “Qu' anc nueg ni 
jorn, de ser ni de mati, /  Non tinc mon cor ni nulh mon pessamen!”204  The heart is both 
                                                
 
202 Love, which has taken hold of me, makes me desire, for it has put the image of your face 
inside of my heart, “franq e norrimens,” ll. 24-27, Johnston ed., Les Poésies Lyriques du 
Troubadour Arnaut de Mareuil. 
 
203 For Love has made to be written inside my heart her great beauty, about which there is 
nothing to be said, and about her noble body well-formed and well-set “Per mielhs sofrir lo 
maltrait e l' afan,” ll. 18-18 Peire Vidal, Anglade, Les Poésies de Peire Vidal. 
 
204 For no night nor day, nor by evening nor by day, do I have my heart nor by any means my 




conatiner and contained.  Love is what carries the lover but at the same time émanâtes from the 
lover.  Bernart de Ventadorn is penetrated to the cor(e) by his beloved:  The lady reaches the 
lover through his eyes in “En cossirer et en esmai”:  
Negus jois al meu no s' eschai, 
Can ma domna·m garda ni·m ve, 
Que·l seus bels douz semblans me vai 
Al cor, que m' adous' e·m reve!205 
No joy can reach mine when my lady looks 
at me and sees me. Then her sweet 
beautiful image goes to my heart and 
softens and revives me. 
 
He claims in “Lancan  folhon bosc e jarric” that this image remains in his heart always, 
“e port el cor, con que m’estei, /  sa beutat e sa fachura.”206 Raimbaut d’Aurenga enjoys carrying 
his beloved in his heart:  
Dompna, d' als non ai a parlar 
Mas de vos, dompna, que baisar  
Vos cuig, dompna, quand aug nomnar 
Vos, dompna, que ses vestimen 
En mon cor, dompna, vos esgar; 
C' ades mi·us veig inz dompn' estar 
Vostre bel nou cors covinen.207   
Lady, of other affair I have not to speak, 
but only of you. For I think I am kissing 
you, lady, when I hear your name 
mentioned, you, lady, whom I watch 
without clothing in my heart.  For now I 
see your beautiful, attractive, pure body. 
 
                                                
 
205 ll. 41-44. 
 
206 ll. 39, 40. and I carry in my heart, wherever I am, her beauty and image. 
 




To allow one’s self to feel the beloved inside one’s heart renders geographic distance—that 
fretful obstacle to both adulterous and divine encounters—completely insignificant. 
 The notion that it is possible to carry another in one’s heart is fundamental to Christian 
belief. Christian theology, and in particular that of the twelfth century, stressed the tenet that man 
is made in the image of God.  Medieval Christianity is in large part also defined by its belief that 
through the sacrament of the Eucharist one can actually ingest the body of Christ. 
The mystic, however, reaches more fully the union implied in the apophasis of container 
as what is contained.  Again, while the troubadour can defeat the physics of space and 
containment, they are stuck staring within at their beloved or being held captive by the domna.  
They are Narcissus staring, trapped in unfulfillment—situating themselves, their image inside the 
form or image of the other, but without melting one into the other.  As we will see with Bernart 
de Ventadorn, the stage of narcissus is the end for the troubadour and without any chance for 
union.  The mystic, as discussed earlier, allows the logical conclusion of this paradox of 
container as contained to reach its full meaning: union, singleness of identity though they too 
take steps along the path of container/contained and the narcissistic stage to arrive at union.  
Angela da Foligno adds further dimension to the image saying, “pensàndome poi che Dio 
m’aveva fate le predate cose ch’el mio cuor senpre fosse nel cuor de Dio e lo cueor de Dio 
senpre fosse nel cuor mio”208 The heart holds inside it the thing that holds inside it the heart. This 
is not only a linguistic puzzle but a visual or imaginary one as well.  And yet, this is an image 
favored by both mystics and troubadours.  Teresa d’Avila also takes up both the position of 
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container and the contained in her poem “Muero porque no muero”, which begins “Vivo sin vivir 
en mí”: 
Vivo ya fuera de mí 
Después que muero de amor 
Porque vivo en el Señor 
...  
Esta divina prisión  
Del amor con que yo vivo  
Ha hecho a Dios mi cautivo 
Y libre mi corazón; 
Y causa en mí tal pasión 
Ver a Dios mi prisionero, 
Que muero porque no muero 
I already live outside of me 
After I die of love; 
For I live in the Lord, 
...  
 This divine prison 
Of the love with which I live 
Has made of God my prisoner, 
And freed my heart; 
And it causes such great pity 
To see God my prisoner, 
That I die because I do not die.209 
 
However, Teresa d’Avila’s poem proceeds further down the path of aporia as it 
introduces a play in linguistic possibility.  The poem offers lines that function as a diptych with 
contradictory halves. How linguistically bold to declare “que muero porque no muero.”  While 
what usually follows the word “porque”, or because, is a reason or a summing of the parts that 
equal the thing that precedes it; here the reason is simply a negation of what came before.   
These passages broach what Sells calls the “high end of the scale of performative 
intensity.”210  These are moments in which “the mystical discourse turns relentlessly upon its 
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own propositions and generates distinctive paradoxes that include within themselves a large 
number of radical transformations, particularly in the area of temporal and spatial 
relationships”.211  In a remarkable passage, Marguerite Porete explains “Comment ceste Ame 
noe en la mer de joye” or How this Soul swims in the sea of joy.  The division between 
container/contained blurs in yet another example of the way language can be called into question 
when possibilities of being afforded by experience of the divine are put into words.  The 
linguistic logic – a container cannot be its contents linguistically or even physically on the 
mundane plane—is challenged by the infinite possibilities afforded by Godliness. 
Telle Ame, dit Amour, nage en la mer de 
joye, c’est en la mer de delices fluans et 
decourans de la Divinité, et sin e sent nulle 
joye, car elle mesmes et joye, et sin age et 
flue en joy, sans sentir nulle joye, car elle 
demoure en Joye, et Joye demoure en elle; 
c’est elle mesmes joye opar la vertuz de 
Joye, qui l’a muee en luy.212  
Such a Soul, Love says, Swims in the sea 
of joy, that is in the sea of delights, flowing 
and running out of the Divinity. And so she 
feels no joy, for she is joy itself. She swims 
and flows in joy without feeling any joy, 
for she dwells in Joy and Joy dwells in her. 
She is Joy itself by the virtue of Joy which 
transforms her into Joy itself. 
 
What contains the soul resides inside her. The permeability between the Joy that envelops 
the soul and the inner essence of the soul means there is no skin to sense the division. The 
essence without is that which is within. The boundary simply becomes meaningless, it 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
210 Sells, Mystical Languages of Unsaying 3. 
 
211 Sells, Mystical Languages of Unsaying 3. 
 




disappears.  Without distinction between the essence of the object that possesses and the essence 
of the thing possessed there is no way to recognize the move from one into the other; in losing 
the distinction between container and contained, difference dissolves.  
The troubadour Arnaut de Maruelh returns again and again to the motif of either beloved 
as holder of his heart or his own heart as lockbox for his beloved.  He does not consider himself, 
his essence, those elements so often taken to be very stuff of selfhood—the will and desire, this 
troubadour claims are foreign to his self: 
Qu' aissi m' ave, dona.l genser que sia, 
Qu' us deziriers, qu' ins en mon cor s' abranda, 
Cosselh' e.m ditz qu' ie·us am e·us serv' e·us 
blanda, 
E vol que·m lays d' enquerr' autra paria 
Per vos en cuy an tug bon ayp repaire! 213  
 
Like this it happened to me, most 
gracious lady that exists, that a desire 
which in my heart sparked advises 
and tells me to love you and to serve 
and woo you, and it wishes that I 
cease pursuing other companions for 
you in whom all good finds its home. 
 
The lover admits that it was desire that inspired his love and cortezia but it is not his, but 
“us deziriers.”  It is a fluid and unattached abstract figure. He cannot claim it as his own. It is this 
unclaimed and unspecified desire that inspires the love that he has for his lady. This desire enters 
into his heart with a spark or flame and “cosselh e·m ditz” (counsels and tells me) what he should 
feel, what he should do, and how he should behave. The matryoshka doll in infinity breaks down 
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not only the physical laws of space, but, as shown in these passages, it also raises questions 
regarding the property rights of identity and the place of the will in the self.  
The idea of the will or desire that burns inside though not one’s own is a concept 
perfectly understood by Marguerite Porete if not all of her audience.  She provides many 
passages within her Mirouer that attempt to explain the phenomenon.  
The problem, the difficulty is presented as a linguistic one rather than simply a 
metaphysical one.  A lengthy passage presents Reason seeking a lesson in language from Love.  
Marguerite Porete’s Reason, confused by the paradoxes of mystical discourse, asks Love: “Et 
que peut ce estre, dame Amour, dit Raison, que ceste Ame peut vouloir ce que ce livre dit, qui 
desja a dit devant qu’elle n’a point de voulenté?”214 Reason here expects the world and words to 
function according to the standards and rules she knows, as does Hugh of Saint Victor who 
writes: “The divine deeper meaning can never be absurd, never false. …the deeper meaning 
admits no contradiction, is always harmonious, always true.”215  The linguistic and grammatical 
laws can be respected in mystical discourse even as the laws of logic are abandoned. To do so, 
however, means to resort to quite a bit of play. And so Love answers in this way: 
Raison, dit Amour, ce n’est mie sa voulenté 
qui le vieult, mais ainçoys est la voulenté 
de Dieu, qui le vieult en elle; car ceste 
Amen e demoure mie en Amour qui ce lui 
Reason, says Love, it is no longer her will 
which wills, but now the will of God wills 
in her; for this Soul dwells not in love 
which causes her to will this through 
                                                
 
214 And how can it be, Lady Love, says Reason, that this Soul can will what this book says, when 
before it said that she had no more will? Romana Guarnieri and Verdeyen, 26, ll. 17-19. 
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face vouloir par nul desirer. Ainçoys 
demoure Amour en elle, qui a prinse sa 
voulenté et pource fait Amour sa voulenté 
d’elle, et adonc oeuvre Amour en elle sans 
elle, par quoy il n’est mesaise qui en elle 
puisse demourer.216  
desiring something. Instead, Love dwells in 
her who seized her will, and Love 
accomplishes Love’s will in her. Thus 
Love works in her without her, which is 
why no anxiety can remain in her. 
 
 
The physical and metaphorical heart as container has been traded for the will. Love 
attempts to explain to Reason how it is that the soul at one with God and Love can at once “will” 
when without a “will” at all. How can a being without the capability to will perform the act of 
willing?  A split is introduced between “to will” the predicate, and the “will” as thing. The 
linguistic split allows for a union of souls. The soul joined with the Godhead has no will, for as 
Love reminds Reason, and us, over and over, this soul has nothing, “n’a nyent.”  Nor can this 
soul act in any way that distinguishes her from God—there is no distinct self to act. Thus Love 
clarifies the paradox by using the language of container / contained in regard to will.  In so 
doing, we are able to see the significance of containment in the process of deconstructing the 
self. Once the physical boundaries have been penetrated, determining where the will begins and 
ends becomes more difficult.  The certainty in the centered self which is the building block of the 
construction of self has been shaken.   
Selfhood is a construction built of a “sense” of self, that is, it relies on a “sense” of one’s 
body as distinct; a “sense” of one’s feelings as unique and tied to an “I” that cannot be touched 
by others; and a “sense” of a mind that thinks—an intellectual mechanism tied to the sensation of 
                                                                                                                                                       
 




being and necessarily detached from all outside.  These sensations of a centered “I” that feels and 
perceives and contemplates the world are the centerpiece in the construction of the self. As the 
certainty of the distinctiveness, that is the truth or meaningfulness of these sensations wavers, the 
self is deconstructed.  The line of demarcation can be erased from both sides, that of the mystic 
or lover or that of the beloved.  Definitions that allow the lover to extend their being into the 
territory of the beloved bring the lover closer to union with the beloved.  As Angela da Foligno 
says to God, “tu sii io e io sia tu.”217  
Just as all words are not enough to signify the divine, so too, for the lover, do all signs 
point to the beloved.  When Arnaut de Maruelh thinks he is contemplating something else, he 
finds his mind looking once again upon his lady:  
Can cug pensar en autra res, 
De vos ai messatje cortes, 
Mon cor, q’es lai vostr’ ostaliers ;  
Me ven de vos sai messatgiers, 
Qu·m ditz e·m remembre’e·m retrae 
Vostre gen cors cuende e gay, ...218 
When I think I am contemplating 
something else, I have a courtly message 
from you, it’s my heart, that is your guest 
there, that comes to me as a messenger, to 
tell me, to remind me, to return my mind to 
your noble body gracious and joyous. 
 
    
The lover is enveloped in the realm of the beloved. Nothing else can pull the troubadour’s eye 
away from the lady. He is consumed by her completely.  
                                                
 
217 I am you and you are me; Il libro della beata Angela 581. 
 





For troubadour and mystic, the beloved, love, and loving are all that matter. The words of the 
lover do not serve a communicative function so much as they allow for the lover to exercise the 
limits of the self, and ultimately destroy difference, the most significant of obstacles separating 
lover and beloved. The common goal of troubadour and mystic is to arrive at a selfless state, and 
the use of words to reach this state of selflessness explains the common usage of uncommon 
wordings.  A lover is one who relinquishes all preoccupation with the self in recognition that the 
existence alone of the beloved makes the world perfect.  The lover is superfluous and even 
detracts or represents a movement away from perfection. 
Many of the most interesting emotionally charged and semantically complex moments of 
mystical or (fin’ amors) literature certain examples of language no longer following the laws of 
grammar, logic, or linguistics. Mystics and troubadours fall into a practice of apophasis: “rather 
than pointing to an object, apophatic language attempts to evoke in the reader an event that is—
in its movement beyond structures of self and other, subject and object—structurally analogous 
to the event of mystical union”219 and so beyond the laws of language, beyond grammar. 
The common link between these two different types of lovers is the goal of love: a total 
eclipsing of the self and the role of the bodily, the emotive, the imaginative, and the linguistic in 
deconstructing the self is the common link between two different types of lovers. Love of words 
and language games are what allow mystics and troubadours to become perfect lovers.  
Distinction and difference must be overcome; all the products of difference, all those things 
which make up the self, play a crucial role in the lover’s aim to deny difference and reach the 
beloved.  This manipulation of the law of language, of the signifier-signified relationship, is the 
method of self destruction chosen by at least some troubadours and numerous mystics. 
                                                
 




To become the ideal lover selfishness must be replaced with selflessness. The solid 
identity of the lover as unique, as distant in quality, space, and potentiality from the beloved 
must be overcome.  Distinction and difference must be overcome; mental, emotional, and 
physical boundaries, the product of difference, must be abolished in order to transcend the self 
and reach the space of the Other.   
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PART II:  THE TROUBADOURS 
 
Throughout Part I we have shown the explicit references troubadours make to the tie 
between the body, emotions and will, and the intellect and selfhood.  We have also seen their 
exploration of the possibility and even the need to weaken and undo the strength of the sense of 
self through disengagement with its elements.  The following two chapters deepen the idea of 
self as permeable and fragmented as it is presented by select troubadours: Arnaut de Maruelh, 
Jaufré Rudel, Falquet Romans, and Bernart de Ventadorn.  The extant corpus of troubadour, 
trobairitz, and trouvère lyric provides abundant material for study.  The authors' oeuvres 
included here are robust enough to provide ample material for study and in their works best 
represent the themes and motifs that highlight the notion of the subject and the idea of the lover 
as selfless.   
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CHAPTER 3: COSSIR E REMIRE: SEEING, DREAMING, AND CONTEMPLATIVE 
ENVISIONING IN THE TROUBADOUR’S PROCESS OF LOSING THE SELF 
 
 The role of the visual in the experience of love has been depicted by innumerable creative 
accounts and images of paths between eyes and heart.  The subject as the one who sends his gaze 
across the boundary of the self to rest on an object.  This love object contemplated and imagined 
demonstrates the paradox of the love relationship: the subject seeks to arrive at the other and yet, 
to reach this other the self must be left behind.  The abundant iconography of lover’s eyes or 
gaze personified reaching the beloved suggests as much.  Scholars have followed these scattered 
images to create studies that explain a great deal about how love, seeing, images, dreaming, and 
perception were understood from antiquity to the present.  For the reader of medieval literature, 
it is a commonplace that love happens when the eye of the lover is pierced by an image of beauty 
that strikes him straight in the heart.  However, much like the trajectory of the term and so the 
concept of “courtly love,” the idea of a single schema for amorous optics might very well prove 
to be, not only more complex, but a notion on which troubadours had much to say.  Modern 
scholarship has as yet failed to outline this tradition as the precursor to the literary creations that 
followed.  Studies that discuss optics and Love in the Middle Ages inevitably concentrate on 
romances and other literary inheritors of the troubadour tradition.  Any discussion of the 
troubadours in these accounts seems to come after the theories of later texts have been presented 
as the solid schema for all medieval authors.  In this chapter I intend to demonstrate the role of 
the visual – seeing, dreaming and envisioning, and contemplating on an image—in the quest of 




Antique Sources and Contemporary Theories of Optics 
 
Generally, scholars recognize the debt medieval literary models owe to the theories 
proposed in Aristotle’s De Anima and Plato’s Timaeus as to how seeing works and the images of 
how gazing breeds loving.  Indeed most studies of the connection between eyes and heart like, 
“Love’s Looks,” and The Arrow of Love, point out the medieval trappings that adorn a classical 
model of seeing.220  So it seems that the chronological starting point of these studies is situated in 
antiquity, first with Plato’s schema of seeing which proposed that the eye sends forth a fire as 
explained in his Timaeus.  In Plato’s description the eyes possess a light or fire that shines 
outward until it touches something else and transmits a sensation back to the soul of the 
onlooker.221 
Those authors writing after the introduction of Aristotle’s De Anima in the twelfth 
century could make use of a completely different notion of seeing, one in which a thing “has 
within itself that which causes it to be visible.”222  Generally, studies begin with the idea that the 
                                                
 
220 The most relevant studies on the subject of love and sight follow this same pattern, though 
Simon Gaunt does inject the formula with the added layer of a Lacanian transcription with 
emphasis on the significance of gender. The texts I have in mind are: Michael Camille, The 
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influences on courtly texts of the twelfth to fourteenth centuries come primarily from Plato and 
Aristotle and a few other central texts. Cline’s article “Heart and Eyes” provides a very helpful 
catalogue of the influences of optical theories providing the popular themes and their sources: 
“Summing up, one finds that the heritage of the twelfth century from Latin literature in respect to 
the five motifs at issue includes, (1) love at first sight, largely through Ovid, (2) the strife 
between the heart and eye through early Christian and Augustinian philosophy, and (3) through 
the same philosophy, the conception of the divine being as indweller in the heart and of the heart 
that might leave and return to the body.  This leaves only one source for the motif of the eye as 
an active agent in the affairs of love and its attendant metaphor, the eye that sends a dart into the 
heart of another through the eye.”223  Though Cline does introduce works from the medieval 
period, these are not scientific or even philosophical texts but theological ones written by 
monastic authors or erotic pieces by Arabic poets in al-Andalus and beyond. 224  Medieval optical 
theories did exist, but perhaps they have been given less prominence in the scholarship because 
the texts holding these were not readily available to literary scholars.  David Lindberg says as 
much in his introduction to his Catalogue of Medieval and Renaissance Optical Manuscripts: 
“Although optics was one of the more highly developed branches of science during the Middle 
Ages and Renaissance, its literature has never been sufficiently organized to permit scholars to 
study its development in detail.”225  Though medieval optical texts exist, and though antiquity 
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represents the chronological beginnings of the optical theories evidenced by medieval literary 
texts under investigation by Stewart, Cline, and others, these scholars usually begin their studies 
with references to Andreas Capellanus or a romance.  Perhaps this is so because, as with “courtly 
love,” it is Andreas and Chrétien de Troyes who synthesize and express in very concrete terms 
and clear narrative form the ideas of their predecessors from as far as Antiquity and as near as 
the troubadours.   
One of the most explicit descriptions of the relationship between seeing and loving 
provided by a medieval author comes from Andreas Capellanus in the very start of his exposition 
on the art of love.  He defines love in a way that emphasizes the sense of sight saying, “Love is a 
certain inborn suffering derived from the sight of and excessive meditation upon the beauty of 
the opposite sex, which causes each one to wish above all things the embraces of the other and 
by common desire to carry out all of love's precepts in the other's embrace.”226  It is with an 
epithet from this definition of love by Capellanus that Michael Camille begins his chapter 
“Love’s Looks” in his book-length study of the images and objects of medieval love.   
 Chretien’s romances present concepts with such crystalline precision that Cline is able to 
look at one passage of Cligès and create a list of the ideas about eyes and heart in the twelfth 
century:  
In one long passage there appear a number of conceptions known 
to earlier literature, but new to the mid-twelfth century to Provence 
and Northern France…  
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1. Love is sudden and powerful, usually occurring at first sight. 
2. In forwarding love, eyes serve not only as perceivers of beauty 
but also as agents. 
3. As agents the eyes strike through the eyes of the beloved into the 
heart. 
4. A strife exists between the heart and the eye 
5. The heart may escape from the body in order to be with the 
beloved.227 
James Schultz will claim these general ideas as “common knowledge” in his own 
synthesis of medieval amorous optical theory: “As any reader of medieval romance can tell you, 
it begins when the lover sees the beloved, the image of the beloved enters through the eyes, 
lodges in the heart, and takes the lover captive.”228  Ultimately however, Schultz will decide that 
the important actor in the schema of both lyric and narrative is not the gaze, but the body: 
“Courtly bodies are more active: the image of the body enters through the eye and lodges in the 
heart and causes the beholder to fall in love.”229  The bodies are significant; he goes so far as to 
give them a name, “aphrodisiac bodies.”   The gaze on the other hand is incidental for Schultz as 
he claims that the courtiers, “go about their business, welcoming guests, jousting at festivals, 
performing courtliness until they are taken by surprise, until some particular attribute of a 
particular individual impinges upon them, penetrates them to the core of their being and causes 
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them to be captivated by love.”230   For Schultz then, the eyes, the subject’s seeing, gazing, or 
imagining, are not of particular significance in falling in love.  It is the beloved’s body itself that 
makes courtly love happen.   
In Dana E. Stewart’s The Arrow of Love the author begins with reference to the 
commonplace of the Arrow of Love and its source in antiquity and then explains that late 
medieval depictions will present the arrow as passing through the eyes.  While she writes a study 
that “examines depictions of gazing in medieval love poetry,”231 she recognizes the influence of 
troubadours on the authors she will study—Chrétien de Troyes, poets from the court of Frederick 
II of Sicily, Guido Cavalcanti, and Dante—she does not offer a chapter on the troubadours.  This 
is not to say that she does not refer, and frequently so, to the troubadours in her study of these 
later authors.  She does.  However, she points back to them as though her readers are already 
familiar with the complexities of amorous optics in the troubadour tradition.  She only provides a 
brief introduction to the troubadour ideas regarding vision in the introduction to her book.  In 
these few pages she refers to only two songs which suggest that sight of the beloved inspires joy 
and love in the heart of the onlooker.  In Stewart’s study, the troubadours stand as in so many 
others on any number of themes, as a point of reference for later literature.  But what are we 
pointing back to? Stewart herself suggests that the works of the troubadours are not as clear on 
her topic of interest as are later authors.  Even as she refers to the troubadours to discuss the 
romance Cligès she implies that what stands as a major foundational tradition for her author is 
not precisely expressed; it is hazy, “What remains vague in the troubadours is elucidated by 
Chretien who draws upon scientific as well as poetic discourses to amplify this figure. The 
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wounding by the arrow is portrayed in precise terms as perception, and the arrow is soon 
specifically identified as the image of Soredamors.”232 For her, as for Huot and Camille, the 
troubadours need to be translated, explained, made explicit.  Literary scholars of medieval 
romance seem convinced that the Ars amandi of Andreas and courtly romances offer us a guide 
to what the troubadours would have said had they expressed themselves more clearly.   
This chapter demonstrates that seeing, dreaming, and contemplating the image of the 
beloved are fundamental to the being of fin’ amors.  Furthermore I suggest here that each of 
these activities brings the troubadour closer to the beloved at the expense of  his own 
subjectivity.  The genesis and fostering of the fin’ amors sung by the troubadours both rely 
heavily on three types of visual experience: seeing (and being seen), dreaming, and 
contemplative imagining or envisioning.  Interestingly, each of these experiences is also 
fundamental to the experience of selfhood.   
The Subjectivity of Seeing and Being Seen  
 
Opening the eyes and seeing one’s self situated in the world, in space, allows a person to 
see him or herself as a unified whole distinct from his or her surroundings.  It is this idea that 
Lacan’s famous “mirror stage” proposes: “La seule fonction homogène de la conscience est dans 
la capture imaginaire du moi par son reflet spéculaire et dans la fonction de méconnaissance qui 
lui en reste attachée.”233   Likewise, being seen gives the subject a sense of being a unit that is an 
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object for another; we exist or take up our position in the world when the other acknowledges 
our presence with their gaze.  This is the natural corollary of Lacan’s mirror stage which 
suggests the child sees himself in the mirror as an other but then recognizes that other as his 
place, his image as it is situated in the world and seen by others.  The great interpreter of Lacan, 
Bruce Fink puts it this way, “According to Lacan, self-consciousness arises in the following 
manner: By internalizing the way the Other sees one, by assimilating the Other’s approving and 
disapproving looks and comments, one learns to see oneself as the Other sees one, to know 
oneself as the Other knows one.”234  Dreams offer the subject an opportunity to become that 
other with the objectifying gaze.  They are also the moment when desires are fulfilled in ways 
that cannot be in reality.  As such they fulfill the subject’s deepest desires even as they stand to 
point out the sometimes-harsh truth of the waking subject’s life.  Daydreams, envisioning, or 
imagining provide the lover with an opportunity to focus on the Other in such a way that all of 
the psychic energy of subjectivity is lost in this endeavor.  Imagining is the start of thinking, that 
which seems to be the stuff of selfhood.  The anthropologist and theorist Vincent Crapanzano 
recognizes the importance of the imago or imaginaire in the creation of the self as proposed by 
Lacan’s mirror stage, but stresses the reflection, contemplation, or consciousness that allows the 
image to become meaningful as image but also in creation of a self.  He reminds us that “the 
imagination is always the first faculty to develop in the individual.  From a phenomenological 
point of view, attention is closely related to consciousness, and may in fact represent an 
elementary form of it. Simultaneously, the focus of attention constitutes the very 
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phenomenological center of subjectivity.”235  The ability to imagine, to meditate upon an image 
real or carried in the mind (or heart the troubadours would say) is nothing less than concentrated 
or deliberate manipulation of consciousness. 
 The troubadour corpus demonstrates a great variety of ideas on vision.  In fact, one need 
not look to two different authors to find more than one function of the visual. Indeed in a single 
piece, “No·m laissa ni·m vol retener” by Aimeric de Belenoi we are presented with a reference to 
each of the experiences of the visual we have defined.  The poet begins his song with an analogy 
of the dream: 
No · m laissa ni · m vol retener 
Amors, ni non li puesc fugir; 
Ans me fai enaissi languir, 
Cum selh que cuyda d'aut chazer 
Quant en somnhans ve en son cor 
Sa mort, si chai, et a son for 
No conoys que · lh valha raubirs; 
Aissi · m fai Amors e sospirs 
Languir, quar nulhs joys no · m refranh 
L'afan de · l ric joy que · m sofranh.236 
 
It does not leave me, nor does it want to 
keep me, Love, nor can I escape it. 
But instead it makes me languish, 
Like he who imagines he is falling  
When in dreaming he sees in his body  
His own death, falls, and in his state 
Does not recognize that it is a dream.  
In this way Love makes me sigh and 
Languish, for no joy keeps me from 
The anxious desire for the rich joy that they 
keep from me. 
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Aimeric describes perfectly the strange sensation of a dual existence implied in the state of 
dreaming. One watches one’s self, one’s body as though it were another. And yet, the body (and 
the mind that could “conoyser”) seem to remember that this body that is being seen from outside 
is the same as the one that is seeing—the body of the dreamer starts, moves, and stirs as the self, 
the body being dreamed, experiences different phenomena in the dream.   
It is for this reason that when Lacan goes in “search of the subject in so far as it takes 
itself into account” he ends up in the unconscious.237  He is after what many a philosopher has 
sought, the self unsheathed, free of the filter of the ego.  While Lacan asks “When does the 
individual in his subjective function take himself into account-- if not in the unconscious?”238  
Guillaumin narrows the parameters of the question saying, “nulle expérience mieux que le 
rêve…ne peut mieux faire percevoir cette substance vivante de l’identité.”239  In dream, the self 
that was subject is made object; but if this is so, who watches this object-self?  The self splits 
into the subject who views and the same self-now-object who is being observed.  As Jean-Claude 
Schmitt asks, “je rêve de moi, mais est-ce bien moi ?”240  What of the world of dream is indeed 
real?  In attacking the stability of the self, one inevitably will shake the foundations of a solid 
faith in reality.  What is unique about this particular reference by a troubadour to this strange 
state of selfhood experienced in dreaming, is that he equates this sensation with that of being in 
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the grips of love.  While many dream sequences in troubadour songs give the poet-lover an 
opportunity to reach the beloved’s bedchamber, and thus only tangentially approach the question 
of the fragile dreaming subject, Aimeric focuses on the very split and confused notion of self in 
dream only to liken it to loving.  This stanza assures the reader that the significance for selfhood 
implied in those songs of dreaming lovers is not merely coincidental; it is rather the nature of the 
lover’s experience.  
 Aimeric’s “No ·m laissa” also includes the familiar topos of the sight of the beloved 
inspiring love and frequent gazing deepening it: 
Dieus, qui o poc anc mais vezer ? 
Qu'on plus m'en luenh, plus la dezir, 
E plus l'am, on plus la remir: 
Quar tan la · m fai Valors valer 
E Beutatz abelhir, qu'e · l cor 
La tenc, e tot quant es defor; 
Qu'a leys creys vezers e auzirs 
Grat de · ls pros, et a mi sospirs. 
Per qu'ieu muer quan de leys m'estranh, 
E muer quant ab leys m' acompanh.241 
God, who could have ever seen this? 
That the more I distance myself from her, 
the more I desire her.  And I love her more, 
the more I gaze upon her: 
For so much does Valors make her 
valuable to me and Beauty make her 
pleasing to me, that in my heart I hold her, 
and all else is outside.  
For seeing and hearing make grow the 
recognition of her worth, and my sighs as 
well.  
For I die when I distance myself from her, 
and I die when I give myself company with 
                                                
 






The question that opens this third stanza of Aimeric’s song calls the reader/listener’s attention to 
the relation between imagining and seeing as it asks who could have possibly seen, and so be 
capable of imagining what he is about to describe.  He explains that the further away from her he 
is, the greater his desire for her. What is more, his love grows with seeing her or hearing about 
her.  While in line twenty-seven he uses the verb “vezer” to suggest the straightforward action or 
sense of seeing, what he describes is more complex.  Upon seeing or hearing about his beloved, 
her worth and really his “grat” or awareness, recognition of it grows.  In this sense seeing would 
seem to be tied to consciousness.  The verb remir prepared this emphasis on the relationship 
between seeing and contemplating or admiring through the inclusion of the prefix “re.”  The verb 
mirar alone can be translated as to see, to admire, to gaze upon, or to contemplate.242  However, 
to truly contemplate an object or its outline, the onlooker must not only see but consider and 
reflect upon what is being seen; to contemplate is to look with consciousness.   
Imagining and Dreaming the Other and Losing the Self 
 
Indeed, the significance of the imagination in medieval literature has been clearly 
demonstrated by Douglas Kelly’s Medieval Imagination in which he examines twelfth-century 
authors and their use and discussions of the imagination.  Kelly reminds us that the link between 
imagination and cognition is not a modern invention of recent philosophy as one often finds 
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suggested but says of his own period of interest, “the hierarchy of cognitive functions includes 
Imagination as the perception and retention in the mind of the forms in visible things. Twelfth-
century writers in particular elaborated a new poetry by the projection of Images formed in the 
Imagination.”243  Mary Carruthers reiterates again and again the important role of the 
imagination for medieval thinkers like Hugh of Saint Victor; the imagination is where or how 
thinking begins and the way of meditation.244  “Meditation is sustained thought along planned 
lines: it prudently investigates the cause and the source, the manner and the utility of each 
thing,”245 says Hugh of Saint Victor as he explains what one was supposed to do while reading.  
Like the poet’s repetitive gazing, imagination requires a constant re-turning of focus back to the 
object in question.  In his phenomenological examination of imagining Edward Casey notes the 
importance of a consistent repetition in order to sustain a directed consciousness:  
An imagined object does not remain present to us in an abiding 
manner, as do many perceptual objects; to keep it before our 
mental gaze, we must constantly re-imagine it, and even then it is 
difficult to say whether we are continuing to imagine exactly the 
same object again and again.246    
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Love grows when the lover focuses his gaze upon the lady and constantly re-focuses his mind, 
and if possible his eye, on the perfect domna.  The connection between contemplating the lady 
herself and the imagining or envisioning of the lady’s image while apart from her physical 
presence reveals itself clearly in this stanza.  Aimeric claims his love grows when he sees her 
“quar” through this or because of this perpetual re-seeing, Valors and Beutatz make him 
appreciate and desire her.  They do this “tan,” so much, that the lady becomes situated inside his 
heart and pushes out anything else that might have tried to reside there. This sentiment is 
reiterated in the fourth stanza of the song, 
…Qu'anc, pueys qu'Amors  
la · m mes e · l cor 
No la trays nuls pessars a · l or.247 
Since Love placed her  
in my heart 
No other thought do I have but her. 
 
Aimeric de Belenoi’s song of Love’s torment demonstrates to what extent the experience or art 
of loving is an art of visual contemplation.  The image or “courtly body” as Schultz would call it, 
does indeed inspire the lover’s affections, but in this song it is the lover’s directed and 
conscientious gaze that cultivates the appreciation of the beloved’s worth.  All thought goes to 
the lady, consciousness centers on her alone.  The end of such careful contemplation, the feeling 
of love, is akin to the split or fractured self experienced in dreaming.   
 Many troubadours have wandering spirits who in dream make the trek to the beloved’s 
bedroom:  
…·l ser mos esperitz … my spirit goes to her at night, in the 
                                                
 




 I vai, en luec de messatge, 
Son estatge 
Vezer, quan sui adormitz,248 
guise of a messenger, to see her 
bedchamber while I am asleep 
 
Thus attests Gaucelm Faidit while Rigaut de Barbezieux too speaks of a traveling spirit, his with 
physical qualities which make the visit all the more enjoyable:  
 
E la nueg, quant eu cug dormir, 
 L’esperitz vai ab lei iazer: 
 Entre mos bratz la cug tener 
 E del ioi c’ai planc e sospir,249 
And at night when I close my eyes to sleep  
My spirit goes to have pleasure (iazer) with her. 
In my arms I think I hold her 
And from the joy that I have I shiver and sigh 
 
As Aimeric noted, the dreamer becomes confused: what happens to the image of the body in the 
mind calls forth sensations in the dreamer’s physical body.  
 If dreams are supposed to be fulfillment of the subject’s wishes, what happens when the 
dream world takes over?   A wish implies a wishing subject and yet, the troubadours have 
managed to create a paradox; living without consciousness in dream forever cannot but deflate 
subjectivity.  Though the troubadour and the audience of the canso are offered by the dream 
sequence a brief respite from the perpetual frustration characteristic of the troubadour canso, the 
lover-poet manages to use this lyrical pause to introduce an image of a split self.  It is a 
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characterization that in fact, can be found throughout troubadour lyric, not only in the dream 
sequences.  As Aimeric de Belenoi’s first stanza in “No ·m laissa” suggests, the feeling of love 
mimics the strange decentered sense of self experienced in dreaming.  The dream thus allows the 
poet to see himself as other, and suggest that this is the state of the true lover, wake or dreaming.   
A number of troubadour songs focus on the physical, for the soul, spirit, or mind is 
sometimes embodied in, or replaced by a body part.  Raimon Jordan for example laments that 
though he turns his eyes often, vir soven, to the country where his lady resides, he only has “such 
distress!”250  “But,” he says, “en aisso m’asegur/ per un messatgier qu’ieu n’ai,/ mon cor que 
soven la vai  in."251  When the troubadour looks in his lady’s direction but finds his view 
blocked, his heart takes the journey his gaze cannot.   
Oddly enough the figurative dismemberment that allows the poet to send his heart or 
other body parts to his lady occurs not only in dream; the motif is quite a common one and leads 
to the well-known vida turned roman turned novella of the coeur mangé.  The vida of Guilhem 
de Cabestanh recounts the tale of a knightly troubadour’s tragic fate.  Guilhem shared a love with 
Sordemors, the lady of a jealous husband who discovered their love.  
E qan venc un dia, Raimons de Castel 
Rossillon trobet passan Guillem de 
Cabestaing ses gran compaignia et aucis lo; 
e fetz li traire lo cor del cors e fetz li taillar 
And so, one day Raimon de Castel 
Roussillon found Guillem passing by 
without much company, and he killed him. 
And he had the heart taken out of his body, 
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la testa, e·l cor fetz portar a son alberc e la 
testa atressi; e fetz lo cor raustir e far a 
pebrada, e fetz lo dar a manjar a la moiller. 
E qan la dompna l’ac manjar, Raimons de 
Castel Rossillon li dis: “sabetz vos so que 
vos avetz manjat?” Et ella dis: “Non, si non 
que mout es estada bona vianda e 
saborida.” Et el li dis q’el era lo cors d’En 
Guillem de Cabestaing so que ella avia 
manjar; et a so q’ella crezes mieils, dompna 
vic so et auzic, ella perdet lo vezer e 
l’auzir. E qand ella revenc, si dis: “Seigner, 
ben m’avetz dat si bon manjar que ja mais 
non manjarai d’autre.” E qand el auzic so, 
el cors ab s’espaza e volc li dar sus en la 
testa ; et ella cors ad un balcon e laisset se 
cazer jos, et enaisi moric.252 
and had it taken to his house and the head 
too.  And he had it roasted and seasoned, 
and had it served to his wife to eat. 
And when the lady had eaten, Raimon de 
Castel Rossillon said to her: “Do you know 
what you just ate?” And she said: “No, but 
that it was a very good and tasty meat.” 
And he told her that it was the heart of En 
Guillem de Cabestaing that she had eaten, 
and that she had thought was so good. And 
when she heard and saw that, she lost her 
sense of sight and hearing. And when she 
came back to herself, she said, “Lord, you 
have given me such good food, that I shall 
never eat another thing.” And when he 
heard that, he ran with his sword intending 
to strike her on the head. And she ran to the 
balcony and allowed herself to fall down, 
and thus she died. 
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Though the tale depicts a literal exchange—the dead lover has bequeathed his heart to his 
lady to tragic ends, as with so many vidas, the idea originates in the troubadour’s lyrics in which 
the heart is offered to the beloved metaphorically and not in dreaming at night alone but,    
Can mi membra sos bels olhs e sos vis, 
A pauc non mor, can de leis me partis; 
Partis no men eu ja ni me partria, 
Anz es mos cors ab leis e noit e dia.253 
When I think on her beautiful eyes and her 
face, I almost die when she parts from me.  
I do not and will not leave her, so is my 
heart with her night and day.  
   
Just as the mind and spirit became split in the dream allowing some element of selfhood to leave 
the poet to reside with the lady, in these occasions the lover surrenders the physical parts of his 
self to his lady.   
 While the vida offers a later author the opportunity to build upon the thematics of a 
troubadour’s musical repertoire by translating it into narrative prose, troubadours at times also 
sought to explore certain motifs in fuller depth than the confines of the canso would allow.  The 
genre of the salut takes the form of a letter addressed to the lady directly and is much longer than 
the canso, allowing the poet to speak in very different terms to the lady and to us.  Falquet de 
Romans writes such a piece, which is usually given the name “Comjat” but whose first line is, 
“Domna, eu pren comjat de vos.”  In the salut, the troubadour addresses his domna directly with 
his declarations, his complaints, his desires, and his plans.  Falquet takes leave of his lady which 
                                                
 
253 ll. 29-32, “Mout m’alegra douza votz per boscatge,” Francis Huffer, Guillem de Cabestanh; 




aggrieves him and makes him, “angoissos”254 Falquet de Romans’ salut explains that the lady 
had stolen his heart:  
Q’ab bel semblan, 
 franc e cortes,  
aveç mon cor laçat e pres…255 
For with beautiful,  
courtly, and affable looks  
you have laced up and taken my heart. 
 
Already in the first lines Falquet admits his heart is no longer his but has been taken by his 
beloved.  The salut then offers a lengthy description of another way Falquet ends up in the 
domain of his domna.  In this salut, Falquet openly describes his night-time flights to his lady.   
Qe la nueit, qan sui endurmiz  
S’en vai a vos mos esperiz 
-domna, ar agues eu tan de ben 
 qe, qan resveil e m’en soven, 
 per pauc no·m voil los oilz crebar 
 qar s’entremettent del veillar;  
e vauc vos per lo leich cerchan 
 e, qan no·s trot, reman ploran; q’eu 
volria toç temps dormir  
q’en sonjan vos pogues tenir,256 
For at night, while I am asleep, 
My spirit goes to you 
-lady, would that I had such happiness- 
so that, when I awake and I remember 
I can hardly keep from wanting to gouge my eyes 
out  
For they go off and take to being awake  
And I go looking around the bed for you 
And when you are not found, I am left crying 
So I’d like to sleep all the time 
So that in dreaming I could hold you (have you).  
                                                
 
254 ll. 2, Falquet de Romans, L'oeuvre Poétique de Falquet de Romans Troubadour, ed. Raymond 
Arveiller and Gérard Gouiran (Aix-en-Provence: Publication du C.U.E.R., 1987). 
 





 In the moment when the lover loses consciousness, his mind goes to his lady.  His spirit 
or mind, he claims, enjoys the company of the lady so much so that he wishes his soul could be 
him.  But who else is it if not him?  His heart had already been relinquished to the lady and now 
his mind’s.  He doesn’t even recognize this fundamental element of selfhood as his own, but 
rather envies the experience of this strange entity as though it were completely divorced from 
himself.  When he awakes his eyes too seem not only not of his own ego, but an enemy to him.  
His eyes, against his will, are awake or impose the waking state on him.  They “s’entremettent 
del veillar,” that is, his eyes interrupt his experience of union with his beloved.  His complaint 
stresses the split nature of his selfhood.  He closes the account of his nights saying he wishes he 
could remain asleep forever so as to have his lady in his dreams.  It is a wish many a troubadour 
makes.  The poet-lover thus suggests that this state of selflessness or at least of ambiguous 
selfhood is both what he prefers and what brings him closer to the domna.  
Arnaut de Maruelh would agree, for he says,  
 
Soven m’aven, la nuoch can soi colgaz  
Que soi ab vos per semblan en 
dormen ; Adonc estau en tan ric 
jausimen,  
Ja non volri’ esser mais residaz,  
Often times at night it happens that while I’m lying 
down 
I am with you in semblance while sleeping 
And thus I am in such intense enjoyment 
That I don’t want to ever again be woken up 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
256 ll. 21-30.  We have mentioned this text in the first chapter of the dissertation as well. 
 




Sol que·m dures aquel plazens pensatz  
E can m’esveill, cuica murir desiran,  
Per qu’eu volgra aissi dormir un an.257 
Just that those pleasant thoughts remain 
And when I awake, I think I’ll die of desire 
For that reason I would like to sleep like that a 
year.258 
 
Troubadour love lyric is filled with supplicating lovers who want to see, to touch, and embrace 
their lady.  The songs themselves are often a plea to approach the domna, to be shown mercy, 
given a reward.  And on and on these lovers lament and complain and rant that their pleas are not 
heeded by their lady.  Rare indeed is the satisfied and contented troubadour.  In the dream 
however, he has all he asks for and more. The dream or vision sequence in the troubadour canso 
allows the structure of reality, of the love relationship, proposed throughout the troubadour’s 
corpus to be reversed.   
Que tan l’am de bon coratge 
Qu’ades, s’eu entredormis 
Ab lui ai en guidonatge  
Ioc e ioi e gaug e ris… 259 
For I love her so intensely 
That always, if I fall asleep 
I have with her as guide 
Fun and joy and pleasure and laughter  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
258 Soven m’aven, la nuoch can soi colgaz /Que soi ab vos per semblan en dormen ; Adonc estau 
en tan ric jausimen, Ja non volri’ esser mais residaz, Sol que·m dures aquel plazens pensatz /E 
can m’esveill, cuica murir desiran, Per qu’eu volgra aissi dormir un an  “Aissi cum cel c’am’ e 
non es amaz,” ll. 29-35. 
 
259 Peire d’Alvernha, “Rossinhol, el seu repaire,” ll. 81-84.  Peire d'Alvernha, Peire D'alvernha, 




What the poet-lovers so desire, Peire d’Alvernha receives because of the strength of his love.  
The power of love, the result or gift of love is the entry into the dreamstate where the solidity of 
the subject might be lost but union with the domna might be won.  
Lover and beloved are joyously united, if only in dream.  Not only is the lover’s wish 
fulfilled in these dreams, but these lines fill out the image of the lovers for the listener.  We see 
an interaction between the two we can only have in the irreal space of dream or fantasy.   
Cossirar: Contemplating the Beloved and Losing the Self 
However, the lover-poets often suggest that the experience of enjoying the lady’s 
presence need not be confined to nocturnal dreams but can overwhelm the consciousness of the 
waking lover.  Bernart de Ventadorn claims he loses all consciousness when contemplating his 
lady, so much that:  
Que manhtas vetz en cossir tan: 
 lairo m’en poirian portar, 
 que re no sabria que·s fan. 260 
many times for being in such 
contemplation, thieves could carry me off 
and I would not know what they were 
doing at all.  
 
The experience of intense reflection is an odd one that at once demands focused concentration, a 
directed consciousness, but pulls the consciousness away from the subject.  Bernart in this 
passage suggests lovers spend much of their time in this odd state.  The  verb “cossir” then is as 
much the verb of the poet-lover as amor.261 
                                                
 
260 “Can l’erba fresch’e ·lh folha par,” ll 10-13. Moshe Lazar, ed., Bernard de Ventadour, 





Gaucelm Faidit touts the power of his own contemplation of his lady saying  
 
Maintas sazos s’esdeve 
 qu’en pens tant foro e cossire, 
 qe non auch qui parl’ab me,  
ni fatz mas tremblar e frire, 262 
Many times I am so deeply lost in thoughts 
of her and I am so preoccupied by her that I 
don’t hear what someone is saying to me, I 
do nothing more than tremble and shiver.   
 
Again the poet explains that his mind (or heart) is so overrun by thoughts, imaginings, worries 
that it is as though his own self has been abandoned.  His consciousness is his lady’s as much as 
his heart.  These trance-like states induced by contemplation allow the poet to experience union 
as best he can.   
 The érotique of Arnaut de Mareulh depends heavily on the lover’s constant 
contemplation of the domna.  He offers himself completely to his lady and offers his heart as 
well as his thoughts: 
                                                                                                                                                       
261 In Donald Sutherland’s examination of the lover’s meditation in courtly literature he draws 
attention to the emotive meanings that coexist with the notion of imagining or contemplating in 
the verb “cossir,” “Already in early Old Provençal cossirar not only conveys thought coloured by 
emotion, but emotion itself, with little or no intellectual activity accompanying it; it means (to be 
anxious, grieved, worried, depressed', all of which states may be taken to have a slight element 
of reflection in them, as they all imply a reaction to or consideration of their cause, but they 
stress the emotional state produced; they mean 'to be sad, unhappy, plunged in gloom', with the 
emphasis entirely on the emotion involved.”  D. R. Sutherland, "The Love Meditation in Courtly 
Literature," Studies in Medieval French Presented to Alfred Ewert (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1961) 172-73. Raynouard provides the following entries for the semantic field of cossirar:  
cossirar, v. lat. Considerare, considérer, rêver, imaginer. 
Consir, cossire, s.m., chagrin, rêverie, pensée, souci. 
Consirier, cossirier, s.m., souci, pensée. 
Consiranza, s.f., inquiétude, souci. 
 
262 “Si tot m’ai tarzat mon chan,” ll. 37-40.  Faidit, Les Poèmes de Gaucelm Faidit, Troubaodur 




Domna valens ab avinens lauzors, 
Ren de mon cor non ai mais la bailia ; 
De vos lo tenh don tot lo mon tenria, 
S’el era mieus. E car soven no·us vei, 
Lai on vos es, contrasta·l mieus temers, 
qu’inz263 e mon cor vos mi fasson aital,  
Com s’era lai als plus plazens vezers.264 
Noble lady, of gracious praise,  
Not a bit of my heart do I control any 
longer. I have it on loan from you, whom if 
I had I would own the whole world. And 
because I do not see you often there where 
you are, my fear resists, 
So that within, you and my heart make me 
feel as though I were there in the greatest 
                                                
 
263 The last lines of our reading differ slightly from that proposed by Johnston, “Et parce que je 
ne vous vois pas souvent, là où vous êtes, ma crainte ne me permet pas de vous imaginer dans 
mon coeur comme si j’étais là-bas, jouissant de l’extrême plaisir de vous voir.” R. C. Johnston 
ed., Les Poésies Lyriques du Troubadour Arnaut de Mareuil (Paris: E. Droz, 1935) 75-76.  While 
Johnston understands the “qu’” of “qu’inz” in the sense of  “que” or “that,” which suggests the 
lover’s fear “temers” is opposed, “contrasta” to that which follows, “that in my heart …”, the 
variant readings listed at the bottom of the page suggest that the meaning, car or “for” was 
understood by at least some scribes who chose to write, “q[u]ar” (NOQSUc) while D has “qant.”  
Not only is the possiblity that “qu’” means “so that,” or “for that reason,” in one of its known 
uses as cited by Jensen, but other variants from the same line likewise suggest the lady is 
certainly inside the heart or placed in the heart according to the alternate suggestions for “mi” 
found in FAD. UcQSNCD all offer stronger verbs suggesting certainty rather than only 
possibility as the subjunctive fasson implies in Johnston’s choice.    
 
264 “L’ensenhamens e·l pretz e la valors” ll. 29-35.  The last lines of our reading differ slightly 
from that proposed by Johnston, “Et parce que je ne vous vois pas souvent, là où vous êtes, ma 
crainte ne me permet pas de vous imaginer dans mon coeur comme si j’étais là-bas, jouissant de 
l’extrême plaisir de vous voir.” R. C. Johnston ed., Les Poésies Lyriques du Troubadour Arnaut 
de Mareuil (Paris: E. Droz, 1935) 75-76.  While Johnston understands “que” in the sense of  
“that,” which suggests the lover’s fear “temers” is opposed, “contrasta” to that which follows, 
“that in my heart …”, the variant readings listed at the bottom of the page suggest that the 
meaning, car or “for” was understood by at least some scribes who chose to write, “q[u]ar” 
(NOQSUc) while D has “qant.”  Not only is the possiblity that “qu’” means so that, for that 
reason, in one of its known uses as cited by Jensen, but other variants from the same line 
likewise suggest the lady is certainly (UcQSNCD all offer stronger verbs suggesting certainty 
rather than only possibility as the subjunctive fasson implies in Johnston’s choice)  inside the 




pleasure of seeing you. 
 
 
Arnaut refers to the lady’s beauty in keeping with the topos of the beautiful lady who inspires 
love as defined by Stewart in Arrow of Love, “In particular, the beloved lady is often established 
as powerful and dominating, and the lover as helpless and languishing, by means of the 
tremendous potency of her piercing gaze or of her intensely beautiful image. 
Tot autre joi desconois et oblida  
Qui ve·l sieu cors coind’e cortes e gai, 
Qu’enaissi sap d’avinen far e dir 
Ab purs plazers tot so qu’ill ditz ni fai,  
Qu’om no·n pot mal dire senes mentir ;265 
All other joy one forgets and ignores 
He who sees her fine body so courtly and 
delicate, For she knows well how to speak 
and act graciously with pure pleasure all 
she does and says so much so that no man 
can say a bad word about her without lying. 
 
In another song we find the idea that imagining is a type of seeing so that even seeing within the 
mind or the heart can lead to love.  Arnaut de Mareulh says of his lady in “Si cum li peis an en 
l’aiga lor vida,”:  
Tant es valens que, quan ben m’o cossir, 
M’en nais orguoills e·m cries humilitatz;  
Mais si ·ls ten joins Amors e Jois amdos, 
Que ren no·i pert Mesura ni Razos.266 
She is so noble that, when I reflect well 
upon her Pride is born and Humility grows 
in me, but Love and Joy maintain them 
                                                
 





both together so well that Mezura and 
Razos lose nothing.  
 
The real body of the domna, her physical presence however is not necessary for the poet-lover to 
contemplate her figure and so benefit from her many fine qualities.  When she is beyond the 
lover’s reach he carries her image inside his heart. 
 
Ves lo païs, pros domina issernida, 
Repaus mos huoills on vostre cors estai 
E car plus pres de vos no·m puosc aizir, 
Tenc vos el cor ades e cossir sai 
Vostre gen cors cortes, qui·m fai languir, 
267 
Towards the country, dear distinguished 
lady, 
Where you reside, I settle my eyes.  
And since closer to you I cannot manage 
I have you in my heart always and here-in I 
contemplate 
Your gracious, courtly body that makes me 
languish. 
 
Arnaut presents his situation clearly; since he cannot get any closer to his lady where she exists 
in the geography of reality, he turns to his image of her which he carries within his heart.  Inward 
reflection brings this troubadour closer to union with his beloved.  He, like Bernart and others, 
look inward only not to find the self, but to lose self-consciousness and find the Other.  
                                                                                                                                                       
266 ll. 5-8, Johnston ed., Les Poésies Lyriques du Troubadour Arnaut de Mareuil. 
 




Meditating on, or daydreaming of the beloved fulfills the subject’s desires even as it denies the 
subject his self-consciousness.   
The Visual Creation and Destruction of a Subject 
The vida, or biography, of Jaufré Rudel is perhaps the best-known troubadour love story.  
It literalizes the notion that a look can kill. As the tale goes, Jaufré falls in love with the countess 
of Tripoli whom he’s never seen and eventually becomes a crusader in order to see this amor de 
loing and falls ill as he crosses the Mediterranean.  In the arms of his beloved, Jaufré opens his 
eyes, sees her, and dies.  The beautiful vida of which there is more than one version, surely finds 
its root in the troubadour’s songs about a lady he has never seen.  Jaufré builds his identity 
around the lady rather than himself thus defining himself negatively; he is, as he says, the one 
about whom “Nuils hom no·s meravill de mi/ S' ieu am so que ja no·m veira.”268  He is different 
from most lovers, he is to be marveled at, set apart because of something that is not him, is not 
his, in fact a thing he has never seen.  His entire identity is tied to this distant object.  In 
“Lanquan li jorn son lonc en may” the poet’s identity and his love in general are based on the 
distance that keeps his beloved from his sight.  The poet of the amor de loing experiences the 
world de loing: the song he hears in the lonc days of May, come from “d’auzels de loing,” distant 
birds.  And yet, despite the fact that “our countries are too loing” (trop son nostras terras loing) 
making him the “drutz loindas,” the long-distance lover, the lady’s worth is such that her equal 
cannot be found ni pres ni  loing.  While the poet is defined by distance, the lady is defined by 
her reputation being both pres and loing.   While many a troubadour longs to have physical 
                                                
 
268  No one should marvel, even if I love that which I have never seen, “No sap chantar qui so no 
di,” ll. 7,8. Jaufré Rudel, The Songs of Jaufré Rudel, ed. and trans. Rupert T. Pickens (Toronto: 




contact with his lady, when Jaufré says “never will I have pleasure in love if I don’t receive 
pleasure from this amor de loing,269” he consistently associates his joy with sight.  Seeing her is 
his greatest desire.  He speaks of being imprisoned by the Saracens so as to see her.  Yet he also 
sighs “Ai! car mi fos lai peleris,/ Si qe mos fustz e mos tapis/Fos pelz sieus bels huoills 
remiratz !”270  But, he says, “non sai coras la·m veirai,” when will he, himself, see her there, or, 
when will he see himself there.  In this tricky line the ambiguity leads to two possible meanings.  
Either he is emphasizing his own position, m veirai, When I will see, myself with my own two 
eyes etc., or the line implies a split self so that there is a poet who sees and a poet who is being 
seen there.  For the moment, it is clear that seeing is the key to the desire of the lover, and to the 
questions of subject and object.  While this chapter suggests that the significance of three types 
of visual experience are fundamental to the érotique described by a variety of troubadours, 
Simon Gaunt focuses his attention on the significance of the gaze of the lady upon her 
troubadour: “I suggested [in “Subjectivity and Desire”] that the gaze in troubadour lyric is often 
evoked as part of a fantasy of being looked at, a fantasy that is quite literally vital in that the 
poet's life seems to depend on his haughty lady's gaze.”271  While I do agree with the general 
schema Gaunt provides, borrowing it as he does from the troubadours and Lacan to demonstrate 
that they are in fact one and the same, I do think more careful distinction between the 
preoccupations of the individual poets might have proved more helpful.  He claims that, “for 
Bernart and Arnaut, the desire to be seen by the object of desire is often as strong as the desire to 
                                                
 
269 ja mais d’amor no·m gauzirai/ si no·m gau d’est amor de loing, ll. 29-35. 
 
270 oh if only I were a pilgrim there so that my staff and robe could be by her beautiful eyes 
reflected!  “Lanquan li jorn son lonc en may,”  ll. 12-14 (ms version AB) 
 




see her.”272  While this might very well be true, the lady’s gaze seems to preoccupy Jaufré Rudel 
far more than it does Bernart de Ventadorn or Arnaut de Maruelh.  Gaunt’s conclusion, however, 
is the very one I am suggesting all three types of visual experience have on our poet-lovers:  
“One effect of this is that subject/object distinctions are troubled.”273  The end result of seeing, 
dreaming, and envisioning as they are understood by the poet-lovers under examination is the 
destabilizing of the self and the abandonment of the subject’s position.  It is only the Other who 
remains. 
In Jaufré’s érotique the lady is so all-important that the divine himself is dependent upon 
her.  Jaufré says he will only recognize God through the beloved as the identification of God 
becomes dependant on the sight of his beloved: “Ben tenc lo siegnor per verai/per q’ieu vierai 
l’amor de loing, 274”(!)  God is not God or the true God until He allows Jaufré to see this distant 
love he has yet to encounter.  Thus, all identifications seem to depend on the beloved, and 
seeing: Jaufré defines himself as he who loves who he has not seen, the lady is the one whose 
goodness is seen far and wide, God is the one who will let Jaufré see his beloved.   One has to 
admit the troubadours tend to speak in terms that would make them candidates for the definition 
of obsessive voyeurs to Laura Mulvey, “whose only sexual satisfaction,” she claims “can come 
from watching, in an active controlling sense, an objectified other.”275  However, whereas 
                                                
 
272 Gaunt, "The Look of Love" 85. 
 
273 Gaunt, "The Look of Love" 85. 
 
274 I hold that God as real through (or because of) whom I will see the amor de loing “Lanquan li 
jorn son  
lonc en may” ll. 29, 30. 
 
275 Laura Mulvey, "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema," The Sexual Subject: A Screen Reader 




Mulvey’s pin-up girls and strippers are the woman who “holds the look, plays to and signifies 
male desire” the domna is, in “Lanquan li jorn,” certainly, the one who creates not only the 
desire, but the entire subject who is defined through her.  Even God is defined through her.  This 
is not a passive objectified image.  The voyeur has no control and does not seek control even as 
he wishes to gaze at the comtessa.  He wishes to be subsumed, made servant (as his wish to 
become pilgrim or hostage indicates).  He wants to see her to fall even further under her power.  
This image, this sight, is the source of being for the poet-lover.276   
 Jaufré fantasizes about arriving in her land, “E, s' a lieys platz, alberguarai/  Pres de lieys, 
si be·m suy de lonh: /Adoncs parra·l parlamens fis/ Qand drutz loindas er tant vezis/ C'ab bels 
[digz] jauzira solatz.”277  In this fantasy his identity is swapped, for the drutz lonhdas becomes 
vezis.  Jean-Charles Huchet characterizes the description of another dream, that of Iseut in 
Béroul’s Tristan saying, “il exhibe sa particularité en obligeant le récit à changer de perspective 
et le récitant à raviver l’attention de l’auditoire (oiez des endormiz) à l’orée d’une séquence dont 
l’importance se trouve ainsi soulignée.278”  The role of the dream in lyric is no different.  In the 
                                                
 
276 Mulvey inscribes the image of woman into a structure which seems to differ from what we 
see here.  She says "The scopophilic instinct (pleasure in looking at another person as an erotic 
object), and, in contradistinction ego libido (forming identification processes) act as formations, 
mechanisms, which this cinema has played on.  The image of woman as (passive) raw material 
for the (active) gaze of man takes the argument a step further into the structure of representation, 
adding a further layer demanded by the ideology of the patriarchal order as it is worked out in its 
favourite cinematic form-- illusionistic narrative film.  
 
277 And if it pleases her, I would stay near her though I be from far away: so fine will the speech 
seem to her when this long-distance lover is so close and by whom, with beautiful words, she 
will be entertained with pleasure. This is taken from ms AB, Pickens version I. 
 
278 it demonstrates its particularity by forcing the story to shift its perspective and the declaimer 
to revive the listener’s attention (oiez des endormiz) at the beginning of a sequence whose 
importance is thereby highlighted.  Jean-Charles Huchet, Littérature Médiévale Et Psychanalyse: 




moment of fantasy the reality of Jaufré’s position—his distance—is only underscored by his 
daydream of union as Charlotte Gross puts it.  The “unreal time” in Jaufré’s lyrics actually 
“widen the distance” between poet and his love object.279  If “Lanquan li jorn” presents a 
definition of poet and lady, a characterization of the love itself as “amor de loing,” the dream 
sequences in Jaufré’s songs reverse all that is presented in “Lanquan li jorn.”   
These somnambulic reversals equal fulfillment: the amor de loing is no longer loing.  
What the poet cannot do during the day, he cannot stop himself from doing at night: “Anc tan 
suau no m’adurmi,/ mos esperita tost no fos la,/ ni tan d’ira non ac de sa,/ mos corsa des no gos 
aqui.”280  In “Pro ai del chan essenhadors” he again speaks of his spirit or mind going to lie with 
his beloved while he sleeps: “Et en dormen sotz cobertors/ Es lai ab lieies mos esperitz! 281”  His 
own will abandons him to undertake this nocturnal pilgrimage.  “Ma voluntatz s' en vai lo cors,/ 
La nueit et dia esclarzitz,/ Laintz per talant de socors!”282  And his heart: “Lai es mos cors si totz 
c' alhors/ Non a ni sima ni raitz,.283”  In the dream his wish is fulfilled: his mind, his desire or 
will, and even parts of his body are there with his beloved.  In his waking moments his identity is 
bound up with distance, with boundaries “Assatz I a portz e camis”—plenty are there of gates 
                                                
 
279 Charlotte Gross, "Studies in Lyric Time-Structures," Tenso: Bulletin of the Societe Guilhem 
IX 2.1 (1986): 24. 
 
280 I never went to sleep so peacefully (that) my spirit was not immediately there, and I never had 
so much sorrow here (that) my heart would not be there at once. “No Sap chantar qui so non di,” 
ll. 19-22 
 
281 And in sleeping under the covers/ it is there with her that is my spirit (or mind)  ll. 35, 36.   
 
282 My will leaves my body/ at night and in lighted day/ there through desire for her body.  ll. 41-
43.  
 
283 There (with the domna) is my heart, so entirely that it has neither top nor root, elsewhere. ll. 




and paths—which are transcended by his heart, soul, and will in the dream state.  The lady is not 
only envisioned; through fantasy she is reached. The poet can finally “see himself there” as he so 
wished in “Lanquan li jorn.”   
 While the dream offers the lover the opportunity to reach his beloved, it at the same time 
throws into doubt the stability of the self.  The dreamer cannot be the one who is inside the 
dream and the one who can recount the dream.  The body that sleeps holds the space of the self 
but the soul wanders.  The dream-visions and the possibility of separating parts of the self in 
order to reach the beloved demonstrate that union is achieved. 
 Through these examples we see the way troubadours use one of the very processes used 
to construct the self in their attempt to abandon the self and destroy the solidity of the subject.  
While it is through being seen and seeing one’s self amidst the elements of the world that gives 
rise to the subjective stance, the troubadours examined here conceive of the visual as a way to 
leave the self behind—its parts: cor, arma, esperitz—to go and arrive selflessly at the beloved.  
In the chapter that follows we will see that the lover can take things even farther.  Bernart de 
Ventadorn will demonstrate a profound interest in the gaze as does Jaufré but will also employ 
other means to destabilize his sense of self in order to demonstrate his humility before the 
beloved.  
 Through the study of the authors presented in this chapter we see the way troubadours 
use the very elements that construct the self to destroy the solidity of the subject. While it is 
through being seen, and seeing one’s self amidst the elements of the world that gives rise to the 
subjective stance, the troubadours examined here conceive of the visual as a way to leave the self 
behind
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CHAPTER 4: BERNART DE VENTADORN SINGING THE FADING SELF 
 
Defining the Lover as Selfless 
 
Not very much can be said about the life of this popular troubadour, but the vida depicts 
the Bernart de Ventadorn as a remarkable character, the quintessence of the fin’ amant.  As with 
the vidas of many troubadours, the biographer hints at the themes that dominate the poet’s lyrics. 
Bernartz de Ventadorn si fo de 
Limozin, del castel de Ventadorn. Hom 
fo de paubra generacion, fils d’un 
sirven qu’era forniers, qu’esquaudava 
lo forn a coszer lo pan del castel. E 
venc bels hom et adreichs, e saup ben 
chantar e trobar, e venc cortes et 
enseingnatz. E lo vescons, lo seus 
seingner, de Ventadorn, s’abelli mout 
de lui e de son trobar e de son cantar e 
fez li gran honor.  
     E·l vescons de Ventadorn si avia 
moiller, joven e gentil e gaia. E si 
s’abelli d’En Bernart e de soas chansos 
e s’enamora de lui et el de la dompna, 
Bernart de Ventadorn was from the 
Limousin, from the castle of Ventadorn.  
He was a man of poor lineage, son of a 
servant who was the baker and who heated 
the oven to cook bread for the castle.  He 
became a beautiful man and adroit.  He 
knew how to sing well and how to trobar 
[compose troubadour lyric] well and he 
became courtly and learned. And the 
viscount of Ventadorn, his lord, was 
greatly pleased by his manner of 
composing and singing and gave him great 
honor.  And the viscount of Ventadorn had 
a wife, young, noble and joyful.  And she 
was charmed by Bernart and by his songs 
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si qu’el fetz sas chansos e sos vers 
d’ella, de l’amor qu’el avia ad ella e de 
la valor de leis. Lonc temps duret lor 
amors anz que·l vescons ni l’autra gens 
s’em aperceubes. E quant lo vescons 
s’en aperceup, si s’estranjet de lui, e la 
moillier fetz serar e gardar. E la 
dompna si fetz dar comjat a·N Bernart, 
qu’el se partis e se loingnes d’aquella 
encontrada. 
     Et el s’en parti e si s’en anet a la 
duchesa de Normandia, qu’era joves e 
de gran valor e s’entendia en pretz et en 
honor et en bendig de lausor. E plasion 
li fort las chansos e·l vers d’En Bernart, 
et ella lo receup e l’acuilli mout fort. 
Lonc temps estet en sa cort, et enamoret 
se d’ella et ella de lui, e fetz mantas 
bonas chansos d’ella. Et estan ab ella, 
lo reis Enrics d’Engleterra si la tolc per 
moiller e si la trais de Normandia e si la 
menet en Angleterra. En Bernartz si 
and she fell in love with him and he with 
her, and so he made his songs and his vers 
about her, about the love he had for her, 
and the valor she had. A long time did their 
love last without the viscount or anyone 
else noticing.  And when the viscount 
found out, he sent him away from him, and 
he had his wife imprisoned and guarded. 
And the lady gave her leave to Bernart, and 
told him to leave and go far from this 
country.  
And he left and this is how he went to the 
duchesse of Normandy who was young and 
of great worth and was knowledgable in 
worthiness and in honor and in the good 
words of praise.  And the vers and cansos 
of Bernart pleased her greatly and she 
received him and welcomed him very 
warmly.  Long time was he in her court and 
he fell in love with her, and she with him, 
and he made many songs about her.  And 
while he was with her, the king Henry of 
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remas de sai tristz e dolentz, e venc 
s’en al bon comte Raimon de Tolosa, et 
ab el estet tro que·l coms mori. Et En 
Bernartz, per aquella dolor, si s’en 
rendet a l’ordre de Dalon, e lai el 
definet.  
     Et ieu, N’Ucs de Saint Circ, de lui 
so qu’ieu ai escrit si me contet lo 
vescoms N’Ebles de Ventadorn, que fo 
fils de la vescomtessa qu’En Bernartz 
amet. E fetz aquestas chansos que vos 
auziretz aissi de sotz escriptas. 284 
England took her for his wife and took her 
to England.  Bernart was left far from her, 
sad and suffering, and he went in this way 
to the good count Raimon de Tolosa, and 
he stayed with him throughout until the 
count’s death.  And then Bernart, because 
of that pain, took himself to the order of 
Dalon and there ended his days.  
And I, Uc de Saint-Circ, I have written of 
him what was said to me by the vicomte 
Eble de Ventadorn who was the son of the 
viscountess that Bernart loved. [Bernart] 
made these songs that you will hear, and 
that are written here below.  
 
 
The biographer no doubt uses what he finds in Bernart’s songs as his source material.  
The biographer, Uc de Saint Circ, sees in the songs of Bernart a lover who lives and acts only for 
his beloved.  Indeed love as described by Bernart de Ventadorn is an overwhelming power to 
which the lover must fully submit.  The divesting of parts Arnaut de Maruelh, Falquet de 
Romans, and Jaufré Rudel describe as nocturnal visions or dreams and contemplative 
envisionings Bernart de Ventadorn takes to be the very essence of the lover.  More than any 
                                                                                                                                                       
284 Boutière and Schutz, Biographies des Troubadours, Textes Provençaux des XIIIe Et XIVe 
Siècles, Les Classiques D'oc 1, 2nd ed. (Paris: A.-G. Nizet, 1964) 20-21. 
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other troubadour, Bernart de Ventadorn offers his self in its entirety to Amors and domna, “heart 
and body, knowledge and sense, force and power or will, have I placed in it [love].”285  
Relinquishing all remnants of the self provides the means to bliss in love.   
Bernart’s “Can vei la lauzeta mover,” perhaps the most widely disseminated troubadour 
song both in the Middle Ages and today, opens with the image of a lark’s falling, gliding in the 
sun’s rays, an image that inspires intense envy in the poet-lover: 
Can vei la lauzeta mover 
De joi sas alas contral rai, 
Que s’oblid e·s laissa chazer 
Per la doussor c’al cor li vai,  
Ai tan grans enveya m’en ve  
De cui qu’eu veya jauzion, 
Meravilhas ai, car desse 
Lo cor de dezirer no·m fon.286 
 When I see the lark move 
With joy its wings against the rays; that it 
forgets itself and lets itself fall because of the 
sweetness that comes into its heart, Ah, what 
great jealousy comes into me, for that joy 
which I see, it’s a wonder that because of it 
my heart doesn’t melt from desire 
 
Bernart witnesses two opposing movements in the flight of the bird.  First the lark stirs, 
moves its wings against the sun’s rays as they fall from above towards the earth. The second 
movement is introduced by the conjunction que, which in Occitan unlike other Romance 
languages, so often serves to contrast what follows with what preceded it.287 “Then in contrast” 
                                                
 
285   Cor e cors e saber e sen/ e fors’ e poder i ai mes I, ll. 5,6.  
 
286 “Can vei la lauzeta mover,” Lazar, ed., Bernard de Ventadour, Chansons D'amour.  All 
quotations from Bernart de Ventadorn will come from the edition by Moshé Lazar and all 
translations are mine unless otherwise noted.   
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begins the line, “he forgets himself and allows himself to fall.”  This is what Bernart defines as 
“jauzion,” bliss: forgetting the self, stopping the movement, the movement of the body that 
comes from the stirring of the will.  The lark moves away from the position of acting subject to 
become the linguistically distinct “s,” the self qua object that can be forgotten, the self as object 
that can be dropped.  The small bird’s joyful flight is in fact the loss of self that comes from the 
heart’s being penetrated by sweet pleasure. The bird gives up its own will to move and allows 
itself to be moved by external force; it lets itself fall. This selfless bliss that comes from a 
movement in the heart is what Bernart envies, wishes to share, but in so doing only suffers for to 
envy is to exercise the will and actively move with desire.  To desire, to act according to one’s 
will is the exact opposite of allowing one’s self to freefall—that will-less fall that Bernart says is 
the cause of “jauzion.”  The distinction between the movement of desire and will and the selfless 
falling of the lark in this first stanza is highlighted by the music of the song.  When the lark 
moves “with joy its wings” against the sun, the pitch moves up the scale with only a significant 
descending trill on “contr.” The cadence likewise ascends when Bernart speaks of his own acts: 
seeing in line I, envying in line IV, and marveling in line VII.  The words s’oblida, chaser and 
fon are all characterized by either three descending notes or a triplet followed by falling cadence. 
The largest jump to the top of the upper register in the song, the highest place from which to fall, 
is in verse three with the beginning of s’oblida.  The loss of self awareness and the passive 
falling of the lark are musically linked to the melting away of the poet-lover.  The forgetting of 
self and abandonment is the proper and blissful end of the stirring in the heart.  This song, like so 
                                                                                                                                                       
287 In his book, La Syntaxe de l’ancien occitan, Frede Jensen notes that “Que est une particule 
bien commode, qui sert à lier deux phrases, marquant des relations souvent difficiles à préciser” 
which leads to occasions when “la vraie nature de que, conjonction ou relatif, dans ces passages 
est difficile à déterminer.” Frede Jensen, Syntaxe de L'ancien Occitan (Tübingen: M. Niemeyer, 
1994) 143. 
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many of Bernart’s lyrics, explains that selflessness is the end of love, but what is the start of 
love? 
 Referring to lo bel Narcisus, Bernart explains how it is a lover can lose the self in one of 
the central stanzas of the song.288  Love and submission happen when the lover sees his lady.  
The song that begins, "can vei" suggests that the boundary of the self is easily penetrated through 
the eyes.  In the first stanza seeing the lark fills the lover with intense jealousy; in the stanza 
mentioning the bel Narcisus, the lover loses his will by an act of seeing. Dana E. Stewart has 
provided a book-length study of the relationship between classically founded medieval optical 
theories and love literature of medieval romanz;. Her findings stress the influence of two 
competing theories: the Platonic idea of something reaching out from the eye in the act of seeing 
and the Aristotelian theory, that something penetrates the eye to reach the heart of the viewer 
where the “common sense” is affected by the intrusion289.  Indeed the act of seeing profoundly 
alters the lover in this stanza: 
Anc non agui de me poder  
Ni no fui meus de l’or en sai 
Que·m laisset en sos olhs vezer 
En un miralh que mout me plai. 
Miralhs, pus me mirei en te, 
Nevermore have I had power over myself 
Nor have I ever been my own from the hour 
when 
she let me see into her eyes 
into a mirror which pleases me so much. 
                                                
 
288 The stanza order varies though this stanza is almost always somewhere in the center of the 
ordering being placed in third position in mss QUCI and is the fourth stanza in mss OMRNaKV.  
Only manuscript D places this stanza last.  Only W and X omit the stanza as they only salvage 
two stanzas of Can vei la lauzeta.   
 
289 Dana E. Stewart, The Arrow of Love: Optics, Gender, and Subjectivity in Medieval Love 
Poetry (Lewisburg, PA; London, England: Bucknell UP; Associated UP, 2003). See chapter 
three for a lengthier account of medieval optical theories. 
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M’an mort li sospir de preon, 
C’aissi·m perdei com perdet se 
Lo bels Narcisus en la fon.  
Mirror, upon looking at myself in you, 
Deep sighs have killed me, 
For thus I lost myself as he lost himself 
That beautiful Narcissus in the fountain.  
 
Most studies of “Can vei la lauzeta mover” focus on the remarkable parallel Bernart makes 
between his own position of selfless lover and the bels Narcisus who lost him self in the 
fountain.  There is no doubt that the act of seeing plays a crucial role in the beginning of love and 
the loss of self; As R. Howard Bloch says of this particular song, “…the despoliation of the self 
that is the equivalent of desire is in the canso, as in both its courtly and ascetic context, imagined 
to enter by the eye,…”290  Simon Gaunt has pointed out, however, that most modern studies have 
been founded on the edition produced by Appel despite the fact that his reading which makes of 
the lady’s eyes a mirror is based only on mss DIKO while other manuscripts propose other ideas 
in lieu of “Que·m laisset en sos olhs vezer/ En un miralh que mout me plai.”291 
AGLPSV:  de mos holhs That allowed me from [or with] my eyes to see  
In a mirror that pleases me greatly  
C: a mos holhs That allowed my eyes to see… 
M: Qe li plac qem laisset vezer That it so pleased her to allow me to see… 
N: Ca sos bels oils mi fes vezer For her beautiful eyes made me see … 
                                                
 
290 R. Howard Bloch, Medieval Misogyny and the Invention of Western Romantic Love (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1991) 145, 46. 
 
291 Simon Gaunt, "Discourse Desired: Desire, Subjectivity, and Mouvance in Can Vei La 
Lauzeta Mover," Desiring Discourse: The Literature of Love, Ovid through Chaucer, eds. James 
J. Paxson and Cynthia A. Gravlee (Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna UP, 1998). 
   
  
 148 
R: Pus elam mostret son voler Then she showed me her will to me … 
QU: Qant me laisset sos oils veder When she let me see her eyes in a mirror… 
 
Because the key feature of Narcissus is dropped from the readings of CENRaMPSUQV Gaunt 
claims “these variants may well indicate that the reference to Narcissus was not as crucial to an 
understanding of the poem for medieval transmitters as it has been for modern critics.”292 
Regardless of whether Narcissus is referenced or whether the lady serves as a mirror herself or 
not, it is certain that Bernart loses his self and his will at the moment when he sees his lady.  It is 
clear that sight plays a crucial role in the loss of the lover’s self.  To include the reference to 
Narcissus strengthens the idea that the lover’s life is lost when he allows himself to fall into the 
image of the beloved.  What seems at first to be a falling into selfishness or the pursuit of 
pleasure for the self is in fact the way to destroy the self altogether.  The poet-lover is completely 
subjugated to love and his lady at such an instant in a way that suggests it is the essence of the 
lady, the essence of love that demands the lover’s submission and enforces complete dominance.  
And yet, he remains there, the tool of his lady, his own desire is that of his lady, narcissism in the 
Lacanian sense without a means to go beyond.  As Yolande de Pontfarcy notes, “he [Bernart de 
Ventadorn] had hoped to pass through the mirror of her eyes just as the lark approaches the 
luminous source and lets itself fall in rapture; but this has been denied him.  The mirror has 
become a screen behind which the lady has retired, he sees only his own image.”293  There is the 
female’s ocular matter he cannot enter into except as a reflection that sits on the slippery tears 
                                                
 
292 Gaunt, "Discourse Desired" 96. 
 
293 Yolande de Pontfarcy, “The Myth of Narcissus in Courtly Literature,” Echoes of Narcissus. 
ed. Lieve Spaas (Oxford: Bergham Books 2000 ) 26.  
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that shield her eye from the exterior.  It is not a water into which he can dive.  His image is 
suspended there, trapped on this thin sheet of viscous liquid that protects his beloved from the 
elements, and from his penetration. 
 In this song Bernart suggests the sight, Love, the lady, imply his love by their very 
existence: he has no choice, that is, he has no will independent of that of the Lady or Love: “car 
eu d’amar no·m posc tener.”294  And the result of this loving is the loss of everything to the lady.   
Car eu d’amar no ·m posc tener 
Celeis don ja pro non aurai. 
Tout m’a mo cor, e tout m’a me, 
E se mezeis e tot lo mon ; 
E can se·m tolc, no·m laissez re 
Mas dezirer e cor volon.295 
 
For I cannot stop myself from loving 
Her from whom I’ll never receive joy.  
She has all of me, my heart, all of me 
completely, herself and the whole world; 
And when she took herself from me, she 
left me nothing but desire and a longing 
heart. 
 
In the end of this stanza, his entire self has been handed over to the lady who has likewise taken 
into her possession everything in the world, the world itself. Bernart’s last lines saying what she 
has left him are doubly negated.  It is negated first by the avowal of his being left no thing (no·m 
laisset re), followed by “mas” that is, “but” or “except” and yet despite the hope this caveat 
instills it is only to be defeated by the nature of what he keeps: desire and longing—that is, what 
he has is not a thing at all but only a lack.  His self has nothing but the silhouette left by what he 
does not have.  Like Jaufré Rudel, Bernart here can only define himself negatively.  All elements 
                                                
 
294 for I cannot stop myself from loving. l. 9.   
 
295 ll. 11-16. 
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of selfhood addressed in the first chapters of the dissertation—language, bodily sensations and 
emotional heights, and the will are negated throughout the oeuvre of this quintessential poet-
lover.  His self is dead or eclipsed as the close of “Can vei la lauzeta mover” suggests with its 
eerie description of the poet as a dead man.  
Aissi·m part de leis e·m recre! 
Mort m’a, e per mort li respon, 
E vau m’en pus ilh no·m rete, 
Chaitius, en issilh, no sai on. 
Tristans, ges no·n auretz de me, 
Qu’eu m’en vau, chaitius, no sai on. 
De chantar me gic e·m recre, 
E de joi e d’amor m’escon.296 
And so I separate myself from her and 
retreat! She killed me, and through death I 
answer, and since she won’t keep me, I go,  
Defeated, in exile, I know not where. 
Tristans, never will you hear from me, 
For I go, defeated, I know not where. 
I abandon song and retreat 
And from joy and love I hide myself.  
 
Bernart’s shell speaks only to explain that he is retreating, fading, and hiding himself, his self, 
from joy and love—those very things that he consistently defines as what give life to the subject. 
He is as dead, killed by his lady.  As one without life, “per mort,” he wanders aimlessly without 
knowing where he goes.  He has no intent, no goal, no destination. How could he?  He can no 
longer act with the will and power of a complete and full subject, an “I” but is instead only an 
object his lady does not keep: “pus ilh no·m rete.” Throughout these closing lines Bernart, like 
the lauzeta at the moment of its forgetting of itself and falling, becomes object rather than 
subject with the use of the oblique pronoun “me” ten times in eight lines.  The subject has been 
denied, replaced by an object that can retreat, fade away, and be hidden or lost.  These last lines 
                                                
 
296 ll. 53-60. 
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of one of the most widely distributed troubadour songs suggests the weakness of troubadour 
subjectivity, the possibility of the fading subject that Bernart de Ventadorn proposes throughout 
his oeuvre. 
 
The Frailty of the Centered Body, Will, and Mind  
 
Cor e cors e saber e sen 
e fors’ e poder i ai mes297 
 In contrast to the suggestions of so many who would like to claim a modern origin to 
subjectivity,298 Bernart de Ventadorn’s work stands as testimony of a consciousness of self, 
identity, and subjectivity but also of the mechanisms of how all of these entities are constructed. 
The lyrics of this Limousin troubadour put the questioning, construction, crisis and 
deconstruction of the subject on display.  This crisis of subjectivity is played out by a variety of 
characters—the elements that make the subject.  As some enter onto the stage others fade into 
the wings. At times the lyrics place dueling elements of the self center-stage.  As with each of the 
authors included in the dissertation, Bernart de Ventadorn explores the significance of the 
various elements of selfhood presented in the introduction: body, mind, emotions, and will.  As 
                                                
 
297 These lines from Bernart’s “Non es meravelha” can be found translated into French in the 
lyric of the Chatelain de Coucy, “ains ai mis en li sevir / cuer et cors, forche et pooir” (V, ll. 
21,22) and “Ke g’i emt tot, cuers et cors et desir, / sens et savoir,…(VII, ll. 21,22). Chastelain de 
Couci, Chansons Attribuées Au Chatselain de Couci, Fin du XIIe - Début du Xiiie Siècle, ed. 
Guy and Alain Lernod, (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1964). 
 
298 I direct the reader to Chapter One where I suggest the medievalist interested in studies of 
selfhood suffers the scrutiny of skeptical medievalists, psychoanalysists, and Early Modernists. 
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he strives to make a gift of himself to his beloved he constantly shifts the location of the self 
from one entity to another.  He gives over all of himself to his lady.  
  In “Non es meravelha” the poet-lover offers up a complete inventory of self: “Cor e cors 
e saber e sen/ e fors’ e poder i ai mes.”299  The components of the lover are divided into three 
parts of two items each.  The heart belongs with the body, knowledge and sense follow, and 
finally the lover offers his force and power or will, to love.  The heart then would seem to belong 
to the physical rather than emotional aspect of the lover.  And indeed the heart is a physical part 
of the body, yet since Antiquity, though more prominently since Christian thinking, the heart has 
been adopted as metaphor for a variety of meanings.  Xavier-Leon Durfour found that the New 
Testament presents the heart as signifier for the affective life and inwardness.300  This is the very 
                                                
 
299 Body and heart and sense and force and will have I put in it [love]. Lazar, ed., Bernard de 
Ventadour, Chansons D'amour I, ll. 5,6.  The song, Estat ai en greu cossirier by the Comtessa de 
Dia includes a stanza where she too offers her love the parts of her body and her selfhood: "eu 
l'autrei mon cor e m'amor,/mon sen, mos huoills e ma vida" [To him I grant my heart, my love, 
my mind, my eyes, my life.]  What is remarkable in the stanza is the many functions of the 
lover's body:  
Ben volria mon cavallier 
Tener un ser en mos bratz nut, 
Q'el s'en tengra per ereubut 
Sol q'a lui fezes cosseillier; 
Car plus m'en sui avellida 
No fetz Floris de Blanchaflor; 
Eu l'autrei mon cor e m'amor, 
Mon sen, mos huoills e ma vida. 
 
I'd like to hold my knight  
In my arms one evening, naked,  
For he´d be overjoyed  
were I only serving as his pillow, 
and he makes me more radiant 
than Floris his Blanchaflor. 
To him I grant my heart, my love, 
my mind, my eyes, my life.  
 
 
The trobairitz, the Comtessa de Dia explores the significance of the body for her beloved in a 
way a troubadour cannot for she speaks of the joy and comfort he would derive were she to take 
him in her arms and let him lie down upon her.  Her body in love is active, embracing, but also 
the passive furniture that serves to comfort her beloved as pillow.  And at the close of the stanza 
the Comtessa offers up to her beloved, in lines that recall those of Bernart, all the elements of 
self: heart, love, mind, eyes, and life itself. "Estat ai en greu cossirier," edition and translation 
from the previously cited Songs of the Women Troubadours, 10, 11.  
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use Bernart gives to the heart in his lyric.  It is a part of the self, but ultimately seems to represent 
the most interior, that is, the most essential part of self where experience and feelings reside.   
Cor e cors 
Throughout his lyrics Bernart de Ventadorn focuses his attention inward on the heart, the 
“centre profound de l’être” and “siege de l’affectivité” as Phillippe Ménard says301 and then on 
the most readily visible part of the person: the face.  In his claim that his song is better than that 
of anyone else, Bernart de Ventadorn reveals his anxiety about how one can ever truly know 
what is inside another’s heart.  His lyrics often suggest congruence between inner feelings and 
outward expressions of love but these are only thrown into doubt as Bernart likewise laments 
that man and language allow for semblance, for falsehood and deception to exist.   
Bernart de Ventadorn claims “chantars no pot gaire valer si d' ins dal cor no mou lo 
chans!”302  The quality of song is dependent upon the composer’s heart.  Phillipe Ménard 
devoted an article to the heart in the poetry of Bernart for he finds that “il n’est pas sans intêret 
de préciser les valeurs et les résonances du coeur chez le plus grand des troubadours.”303  Ménard 
seeks to define as completely as possible the heart as employed in Bernart’s lyric.  He finds that 
“le coeur n’est pas isolé au sein de l’être come une île dans une mer. Il entre, au contraire, dans 
un réseau de relations et d’oppositions” and these are what Ménard runs through in his article.  
The heart is “le côté le plus intime et le plus profond de l’âme” as says Friedrich Hegel in 
                                                                                                                                                       
300 Xavier Leon- Durfour. Dictionnaire du Nouveau Testament,  (Paris: Seuil, 1996) 171. 
 
301 Phillippe Ménard, "Le Coeur dans les Poésies de Bernard de Ventadour," Présence des 
troubadours, Annales de l'Institut d'études occitanes II.5 (1970) 120, 121.  
 
302 The singing does not have any worth if the song does not move from within the heart.  
“Chantars no pot gaire valer” Lazar, ed., Bernard de Ventadour, Chansons D'amour ll. 1,2. 
 
303 Phillippe Ménard, "Le Coeur dans les Poésies de Bernard de Ventadour" 119. 
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collection of works on poetry and lyric compiled and translated for French readers in 1855.304  
Bernart would seem to present a lyrical œuvre anticipating a variety of Hegel’s claims and 
certainly the idea that the self is most deeply, most truly, within the heart.  And yet this 
troubadour is consistently returning to the question of outward expressions of intimate emotions, 
either writ on the face, or sung in the lover’s sighs turned song.  What is the relation between this 
intimate face of the subject and the subject’s lyrical utterances?  Why is the song’s worth 
dependent on the heart?  Oddly enough I think there might be a hint in the poet’s references to 
the body.   
Pierre Bec discusses the distinction between body and heart in Bernart, “Mais ce qui 
characterize essentiellement le corps par rapport au coeur, c’est sa pesanteur, sa materialité, son 
immobilité, alors que le coeur, lui, est léger, mobile, aérien, libre de se  
déplacer à son gré pour se render auprès de la dame et devenir son bien propre.”305  The body is 
the material, the shell of the self; in Bernart the heart moves from being paired with the body to 
being paired with, and finally representing, the immaterial element of selfhood.  In “Chantars no 
pot gaire valer” the cor has shifted its alliance: “qu’en joi d’amour et enten la boch’ e·ls olhs e·l 
cor e·l sen.”306  The heart here, as in “Can la freid’ aura” cited above, stands beside sen, the 
mind, and in contrast to the eyes and mouth, the physical offerings of the lover.  In “E mainh 
                                                
 
304 This particular declaration falls within a discussion of lyrical poetry about which Hegel 
suggests it is the poet’s soul that is the defining feature of unity.  As regards the lyrical and the 
heart, Hegel says, “Ce qu’il y a de plus parfaitement lyrique, sous ce rapport, c’est un sentiment 
de cœur concentré dans une situation particulière, parce que le cœur est le côté le plus intime et 
le plus profond de l’âme.” Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, La Poétique, trans. Charles Bénard 
(Paris: Veuve Joubert, 1855) 281.   
 
305 Pierre Bec, "Le Corps Et Ses Ambiguites Chez Bernard de Ventadour Et Quelques Autres 
Troubadours," Le Corps Et Ses Enigmes, ed. Bernard Ribemont. 10.  
 
306II, ll. 6,7. 
   
  
 155 
genh se volv” the joyous frenzy that overtakes the lover affects his talans, volers, and cors and 
threatens to disperse all of these in the lover who says “no sai com me contenha!” 
E mainh genh se volv e·s vira/ 
Mos talans, e ven e vai, 
Lai on mos volers s’atrai. 
Lo cors no·n pauza ni fina, 
Si ·m te conhd’ e gai/ 
Fin’ amors, ab cui m’apai;  
No sai com me contenha ! 307 
In many ways, my desire,  
 circles and turns itself 
and it comes and goes 
To there where my will is attracted. 
My heart does not stop or rest 
And so keeps me cheery and gay 
Fin’ amors, with/by whom I am pacified. 
I do not know how I contain myself! 
 
He loses hold of his heart in “Tan tai mo cor ple de joya” where this time his heart leaves his 
body to be with love, his spirit flees in hopes of catching up to his heart, and his body is simply 
somewhere altogether different: 
Mo cor a pres d’Amor, 
Que l’esperitz lai cor, 
Mais lo cors es sai, alhor, 
Lonh de leis, en Fransa.308 
Love holds my heart  
For my spirit runs there 
But the body is here, not there, 
Far from it in France. 
 
The lover is all over the place.  His parts— desire, spirit, heart— roam far and wide as they flee 
his body.  In the many lyrics that present body parts parting ways, where is the self situated?  
                                                
 
307 VIII, stanza I.  
 
308 IV, ll. 33-36 
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Where is the “I” that speaks to tell us of this peculiar experience?  In his truly revolutionary 
study of the imagining of the body, Paul Schilder claims that “Since both the body and the world 
have to be built up, and since the body in this respect is not different from the world, there must 
be a central function of the personality which is neither world nor body. There must be a more 
central sphere of the personality.  The body is in this respect periphery compared with the central 
functions of the personality.”309  Neuroscience and cognitive philosophy still struggle with these 
facts of life.  Bernart’s answer was to situate the most essential qualities of selfhood within the 
heart.  The heart was the self of the lover.  Yet he recognizes this central sphere for he still 
confuses sai and lai.  
 Early theology of Christ’s body suggests that the body part represents the whole.  (Paul 
already equates the Church with Christ’s limbs)  LeGoff reminds us that Gregory the Great gives 
to these early ideas a coherent idea of the body as metaphor or symbol.  The idea spreads to the 
bodies of saints, though slowly, allowing for the reliquaries of the later Middle Ages to, as 
Carolyn Walker Bynum has found, urge the viewer to “equate bones with body and part with 
whole, and treat the body as the permanent locus of the person.”310  Bernart equates the heart, 
even in its most abstract or metaphoric, with the identity of the person.  As if speaking with 
martyrs in mind he tells his lady “…si·l gelos vos bat’ de for,/ gradatz qu’el no vos bat’ al 
cor.”311  Outside is only the shell that guards what is essential to the lady, her heart.   
                                                
 
309 Schilder, Paul.  The Image and Appearance of the Human Body.  124. 
 
310 Caroline Walker Bynum, Fragmentation and Redemption: Essays on Gender and the Human 
Body in Medieval Religion (Cambridge, Mass: Zone Books Distributed by the MIT Press, 1991) 
296. 
 
311 If the gelos (your jealous husband) beats you on the outside, be thankful that he does not beat 
your heart.  
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For Bernart the “I” is not there where the heart is not: 
Empero tan me plai 
Can de leis me sove, 
Que qui·m crida ni·m brai, 
Eu no·n au nula re. 
Tan dousamen me trai 
La bela·l cor de se, 
Que tals ditz qu’eu sui sai, 
Et o cuid, et o cre, 
Que de sos olhs no·m ve.312 
Despite this, I am so pleased when I 
remember her that no matter who cries or 
yells for me I do not hear a thing. 
So softly does the beautiful one  
draw my heart from my breast  
that many people  
who do not see me  
with their eyes say,  
and think, and believe that I am here. 
 
Without the heart he is only there as deceptive vision.  And yet, how can he sing “sai” without 
being “sai.”  We reencounter the paradox pointed out by Michel-André Bossy in his discussion 
of the speaking body who hopes to win his debate with the soul by claiming the body cannot 
speak without a soul.  The “I” again in Bernart’s song seems to get in the way, or present itself 
subtly yet firmly as it makes its claim for defining element of self.  The story the songs tell 
however, indicate something else.  Essence would seem to be determined by the heart; Bernart 
claims one can have a “cor d’amar”313 and so be a good lover or not at all, as he claims of his 
lady who he complains has a “cor de peira dura.”314  The heart fully represents the person.   
                                                
 
312 ll. 19-27.  
 
313 “Estat ai com om perdutz” line 38.   
 
314 “Can lo dous temps comensa” line 14.  
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Though the heart is metonymically called upon to represent the self, it is also the space in 
which Bernart situates the experience of the subject.  The subject or self is known to exist 
because of its experience.  That is to say, we know we exist because we experience being.  We 
feel and sense it: its sense of being comes from feeling, tactile and emotional.315  Not, cogito 
ergo sum, but rather, I feel or sense (myself) therefore I am.  This fundamental act of being, 
feeling, Bernart claims happens in the heart.  In “Lancan vei la folha” the sensation is described 
in wholly physical terms:  “Lo cor sotz l’aissela / m’en vol de dol partir.”316  Bernart maps out 
the heart within the body and describes the experience with the “dol” of bodily experience.  In 
other instances the sensation of love in the heart is of another sort.  In “Non es meravelha” 
Bernart speaks twice of the heart being filled with a “dousa sabor” first saying that “Ben es 
mortz qui d’amor no sen/ al cor cal que dousa sabor”317 and then “Aquest’ amors me fer tan gen/ 
al cor d’una dousa sabor.”318  One should be capable of feeling, “sen” having sensation within 
the heart.  Sensory perception is what Schilder finds to be a most important factor in 
understanding the image of the self.  Bernart places this function within the heart.  The emotional 
feelings are also situated in the heart for Bernart.  In “Can lo boschatgs es floritz” Bernart cries, 
“ira·m sen al cor trenchar.”319 And yet, he also has joi in his heart “Ab l’autre joi, qu’eu ai en mo 
                                                
 
315 See the discussion of the feeling of being in Ch. 1. of the dissertation. 
 
316 ll. 19,20. 
 
317 He is quite dead who does not feel in his heart the sweet sensation of love,  I., ll. 9,10. 
 
318 This love makes me feel so gently in my heart a sweet sensation, ll. 25, 26.  Both of these 
instances are discussed again further ahead in the chapter. 
 
319 line 75. 
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coratge/ poya mos chan e nais e creis e brolha.”320  It is the emotion of his heart that forces his 
song into being.  The heart is where the emotions of the lover occur.  And yet, this completely 
personal space is vulnerable.  The heart can be penetrated with emotions and sensations 
originating from somewhere outside the self to find themselves at the center of the poet-lover.   
Because the subject is situated for Bernart within the heart, the body serves as a shell (is 
it protective? is it deceptive?).  Outside forces penetrate the heart to inspire love, fill it with 
peace, usually through particular portals or slits321 that open onto the body’s surface suggesting 
an opportunity to slip beneath the surface and reach, perchance, the heart.  These openings are 
also the locus of three of the five senses: the mouth, the eyes, the ears.  In this sense we see that 
the breaks in the surface of the body, the form of the perimeters of the self, are in fact not 
“breaks” in the boundary of the self, the skin that outlines and keeps bound within the self, but 
instead these slits or holes are the sites where some of the self-defining happens.322  
The sound of birds and the sight of green leaves and flowers reaches Bernart’s heart to 
instill it with peace and revive the lover leading him to song: 
Can par la flors josta.l vert folh 
E vei lo tems clar e sere 
When the flower appears with green leaves, 
And I see the season clear and quiet, and 
                                                
 
320 Later, with the other joy that I have in my heart grows my song and is born and grows and 
flourishes, “ Can vei la flor ” ll. 3,4. 
 
321 I think of the philosophical discussions about body by Luce Irigaray and Karmen 
Mackendrick. MacKendrick, Karmen. Word made skin: figuring language at the surface of flesh. 
1st ed. (New York: Fordham University Press) 2004;  Irigaray, Luce. Speculum de l'autre femme. 
Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1974 ; and Ce sexe qui n'en est pas un. Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 
1977. 
 
322 The discussion of the role the skin plays in the construction of the image of the self is found 
in Chapter 1.   
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E.l doutz chans dels auzels pel brolh 
M' adousa lo cor e.m reve, 
Pos l' auzel chanton a lor for, 
Eu, c' ai mais de joi en mo cor, 
Dei be chantar, pois tuih li mei jornal 
Son joi e chan, qu' eu no pes de ren al.323 
soft songs of the birds in the grove sweeten 
my heart and refresh me, then the birds 
sing in the their way, 
So I, who have more joy in my heart  
Should sing will for all my days  
Are joy and song, for I think of nothing 
else. 
And in “La dousa votz ai auzida” it is again a bird’s song that penetrates his heart to give it to 
alter the sensations within that had been introduced by love: 
La dousa votz ai auzida 
Del rosinholet sauvatge, 
Et es m' ins el cor salhida 
Si que tot lo cosirer 
E·ls mals traihz qu' Amors me dona, 
M'adousa e m' asazona. 
The sweet voice I have heard 
Of the wild nightingale, 
And it has impressed into my heart 
So much that all the ruminating 
And all the bad treatment the Love gives 
me 
It has assuaged and softened for me.  
 
The “cosirer” and “mals traihz” are relieved by the dousa votz del rosinholet in this song; the 
heart is reached, its emotions touched by way of the ears.   
 The lady reaches the lover through the eyes.  In “En cossirer et en esmai” it is not his 
eyes which see his lady, but rather her eyes which penetrate into his heart,  
                                                                                                                                                       
 
323 ll. 1-8 
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Negus jois al meu no s' eschai, 
Can ma domna ·m garda ni.m ve, 
Que·l seus bels douz semblans me vai 
Al cor, que m' adous' e·m reve!324 
No joy catches up to mine 
When my domna watches me or sees me 
For her beautiful, sweet eyes’ image goes 
To my heart, and so sweetens me and 
revives me! 
 
While it is the domna’s eyes which garda and ve, as her bel douz semblans faces him and strikes 
him to his core, it would seem that they make their way by passing through his own eyes so 
thrilled to match her gaze.  Once the heart is reached by this image of beauty, the effect is the 
same as that of its having received the bird’s song: the lover’s heart is given peace and 
revitalized.   
It is the lover’s wish that his lady approach him and reach his heart in a yet more direct 
manner, 
Domna, per cui chan e demor , 
Per la bocha·m feretz al cor 
D' un doutz baizar de fin' amor coral, 
Que.m torn en joi e.m get d' ira mortal!325 
Lady for whom I sing and remain, 
By your mouth wound me to the heart with 
a sweet kiss of fine true love 
That will return joy to me and throw mortal 
sorrow from me. 
 
The kiss placed on the mouth reaches the heart.  
                                                
 
324 ll. 41-44. 
 
325 “Can par la flors josta” Lazar, XXIV, ll. 29-32. 
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The love that inspires “cossirer” and unease and suffering does not so easily indicate its 
pathway into the heart.  It is simply the way of love to have complete access to the heart of the 
lover in Bernart’s songs, to fill it with envey and dezir. 
C’amors, qui·l cor enamora, 
M' en det, mais no·m n’escazegra  
Non plazers, mas sabetz que  
Envey’e dezir ancse. 
E s’a leis platz que·m retenha  
Far pot de me so talen, 
Melhs no fa·l vens de la rama,  
Qu'enaissi vau les seguen 
Com la folha sec lo ven.326 
and may the love that stirs my heart  
now give me (more I can not claim)  
not pleasure, but know also that,  
a steady craving and desire, 
and if she's pleased to keep me on,  
to do with me as she may wish, 
just as the wind does to the branch,  
and I will follow her the way 
the leaf of autumn does the wind. 
 
The woeful lover reproaches himself for allowing desire to have entered into his heart even as he 
admits he is powerless to stop Love from its will: 
Anceis me fari' a pendre 
Car anc n' aic cor ni voler! 
Mas eu non ai ges poder 
Que.m posca d' Amor defendre. 
Pero Amors sap dissendre 
I must take on, therefore, love  
and there’s no way I can abstain:  
in such a trance let me explain 
I have no hope of joy from this  
(for I'd be ready to be hanged  
                                                
 
326 “Amors, enquera·us preyera,” ll. 24-32. 
 
327 “Amors, e que·us es vejaire,” ll. 17-28. 
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Lai on li ven a plazer, 
E sap gen guizardo rendre 
Del maltraih e del doler.327 
if that was what I hungered for)  
but I do not have power enough  
to let me fight a war with Love. 
But love knows how to descend 
There where it gives her pleasure, 
And knows how to give reward to people 
For their mistreatment and their pain. 
 
The heart is vulnerable to love and lady.  Easily reached through the slits of the senses: the eyes, 
the ears, the mouth.  This is what James A. Schultz means when he says, “Courtly love is 
exogenous. It is caused by something external to the body.”328 Bernart shows the means by 
which this external cause penetrates the body.  
The absence of touching as effecting stirrings in the heart is curious until one realizes that 
the poet sings to implore this hitherto untouched lady to accept him as lover.  In fact he does 
want to touch his lady.  He sings of touch, of uniting their bodies.  But these are usually in pleas, 
moments characterized by hope and hypotheses but not descriptions of fulfillment:  
Midons prec, no.m lais per chastic 
Ni per gelos folatura, 
Que no.m sent’ entre sos bratz!329 
My lady, I pray, does not leave me for 
punishment nor because of mad jealousy, 
And so not let me feel myself in her arms! 
 
                                                
 
328 James A. Schultz. Courtly Love, the Love of Courtliness, and the History of Sexuality. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006) 75. 
 
329 “ Lancan folhon bosc e jarric ” VI. Ll. 33-35. 




Domna pros e valenta, 
Genser de la plus genta, 
Faitz vostre cors salvatge 
Tan privat qu’ eu lo senta.330 
Noble and worthy lady,  
finest among the finest,  
make it so that your distant 
body is so close that I can feel it. 
 
He cannot speak of the experience of this sort of touch (the second or third level of the gradus 
amoris); only of his desire to obtain it.  The experience of which he can speak is only that of 
being denied this touch and so he continues: 
Car s' eu mor, domna genta, 
Que ja nuza no.us senta, 
Mos cors n' aura damnatge 
E m' arma n' er dolenta.331 
For if I die, noble lady, 
Because I never felt you naked, 
My body/heart will have the complaint 
And my soul will be aching.  
 
Here the sensation of unfulfillment is wrought on the body and the “arma” (a term not often 
employed by Bernart who usually opts for his heart, “cor,” to speak of his inward self).  His body 
and soul will suffer the lady’s denial and his being will pass from existence into death.   
                                                
 
330 “ Can lo dous temps comensa ” XXII. Ll. 41-44.  
Moshé Lazar suggests translating this tornada as follows: “Car si je meurs, belle dame, parce 
que jamais je ne vous étreins nue, mon corps en aura le dommage et mon âme en sera dolente.” 
He then offers the following comment in a note:  Plutôt que de penser qu’après la mort l’âme 
continuera à souffrir, il faut ne pas prendre mort littéralement, mais lire: “si je meurs puisque je 
ne puis l’éteindre nue, mon corps et mon âme en souffriront toujours.” note 10, 262. 331  
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Ara cuit qu' e·n morrai 
Del dezirer que·m ve, 
Si.lh bela lai on jai 
No m' aizis pres de se, 
Qu' eu la manei e bai 
Et estrenha vas me 
So cors blanc, gras e le.332 
Now I think I will die of it,  
Of that desire that comes to me 
If the beauty where she rests  
Does not take me close to her 
That I might touch and kiss her 
And lay down with me  
Her white body, ample and sweet. 
 
At its strongest desire—this force that invades the space physical or psychical as it comes into 
the lover “que·m ve”— leads to death, or feels like death to the lover.  The only penetration 
presented in this scene of imagined or purely linguistically achieved fulfillment is in fact that of 
the desire that comes to Bernart.   
In “Non es meravelh s’eu chan,” a series of oppositions highlight the subtlety involved in 
the game and language of love while doing so by building on those understandings of 
corporeality we’ve been finding in Bernart’s lyrics.   
Non es meravelha s’eu chan 
Melhs de nul autre chantador, 
Que plus me tra ·l cor vas amor 
E melhs sui fais a so coman. 
Cor e cors e saber e sen 
E fors’ e poder i ai mes. 
It is no wonder if I sing 
Better than any other singer 
For my heart draws me more towards 
love 
And I’m better made to its command. 
Heart and body and wisdom and sense 
                                                
 
332 “ Pois preyatz me ” XVIII. Ll. 30-36. 
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Si·m tira vas amor lo fres que vas autra 
part no ·m aten.333 
And force and power have I put into it. 
So much do the reins pull me towards 
love that towards any other direction I 
cannot notice. 
 
The song opens with the suggestion that one should not be at all surprised if Bernart sings better 
than any other for this is the direct effect of his relation to love.  He follows love more, he is 
better made for love, and he has given over body and mind, will and strength to love.  The 
troubadour makes no explanation of what this has to do with singing; it is implied: The better the 
lover and the love, the better the song, the singing, and the singer.  After this introduction, which 
takes up the entire first stanza, the song follows with no further mention of song.  However, the 
theme introduced in the first stanza is not abandoned or forgotten, rather the entirety of the song 
follows the two lines of question proposed in stanza I: 1) what is the relationship between inner 
experience and outward expression and 2) the flux between active and passive participation by 
the lover in his state.  The lover is not to conceive of himself as active subject but vacillate 
between adoring subject and passive object until the importance of subjectivity can be shed 
entirely.  
Already in the first stanza Bernart explains he sings better because “plus me tra·l cors vas 
amor.”  His heart pulls him towards love more than what one finds in other poet-lovers.  In this 
first self-portrait the troubadour paints himself as passively being pulled along by an inner force 
that has a power over him towards this great outer force of love.  In the following line he makes 
a claim as to his essence and yet even this suggests a submissive position for he says he is “better 
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made” not for love as he has said of his beloved’s body elsewhere, but for the commands of love.  
And if there is any doubt as to his powerlessness he tells us that he relinquishes it all in the next 
lines: “Cor e cors e saber e sen/ e fors’ e poder i ai mes.”  He gives up all parts of himself both 
physical and abstract.  All has been given over to love.  And yet, the verb tense and word choice 
suggest a choice of will.  He has “mes,” placed, all elements of his selfhood in love.  While here 
“i ai mes” implies a choice and strength on his part, the next time the verb is employed in the 
song the interpretation of the situation has changed.  In stanza III the poet laments his state of 
suffering but ultimately asks “Eu que·n posc mais, s’Amors me pren?/ e las charcer en que m’a 
mes, no pot claus obrir mas merces…”334  The verb “metre” has been paired with “prendre” or to 
place and to take.   While in the first stanza he had placed his body and heart, saber, and mind 
within Love thus handing himself over, in the fifth he claims that it is Love that has placed him 
in the prison of love by taking him.   At least six terms from the semantic fields of mes and pres 
appear within the song.  In the second stanza Bernart combines mes and pres saying he would be 
“mespres” or mis-taken were he to be without love.  He begs for God to kill him were that to 
happen.  But, for the moment, at least in stanza VI he is indeed well taken or “entrepres” by 
Love: “Aissi sui d’Amor entrepres!” he exclaims.  Aissi or so much and in this way is he in 
Love’s snares, which, he suggests, can explain the troubadours self-portraiture presented in the 
first six lines of the stanza.  
Cant eu la vei, be m' es parven 
Als olhs, al vis, a la color, 
When I see her, well can it be seen 
In my eyes, on my face, in my color 
                                                
 
334 And what else can I do if Love takes me? And in the prison cell in which it has placed me, no 
one can open but mercy. ll. 22-25. 
 
335 ll. 41-46.  
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Car aissi tremble de paor 
Com fa la folha contra.l ven. 
Non ai de sen per un efan, 
Aissi sui d' amor entrepres!335 
For so much do I tremble with fear  
Like the leaf in the wind. 
I have not the sense of a child, 
So much am I taken by love. 
 
The structure of the stanza follows that of the first.  Outward presence is explained by the poet-
lover’s relationship to love.  While in the first stanza the poet suggests that his submission to 
love leads to good song, he here proposes that his possession by love can lead to a physiological 
rather than musical expression of his love; his state can be made “parvenu,” visibly obvious, to 
all by the look of his eyes, his face, his face color, his trembling, and his stunted sense.  His face 
speaks his heart. 
 The preoccupation with placing of one’s self in love or being taken has introduced an 
imagery of enclosure.  The poet placed his heart and body and mind within love.  He has been 
placed in prison, “las charcers.”  The image of enclosure found in troubadours like Arnaut de 
Maruelh and mystics like Angela da Foligno is envisioned not as the nestling of the lover and 
beloved one within the other, but as the lover as prisoner.  Bernart’s experience of this is one of 
anxiety rather than bliss in its constant movement, vacillation.  Bernart’s lyrics never reach 
stasis, they are forever leaving the lover right where he’d been before and fearing he’ll return to 
his lonesome state and at the same time perpetually hopeful to return to any possible moment of 
pleasure.   
 The parallel between the message of stanza I and that implied by stanza VI creates a link 
in the thinking of this troubadour between song and physiognomie.  For Bernart de Ventadorn for 
whom “Chantars non pot gaire valers si dins e·l cors no mou lo chan” song would seem to be an 
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extension of the physiological reactions of the lover.  The body would seem to speak the truth. 336  
Bernart wishes to make use of the truthfulness one attributes to physiognomie.  In “Can vei la 
flor, l’erba vert e la folha” he claims “l’aiga del cor, c’amdos los olhs me molha, /m’es be 
guirens qu’eu penet mo folatge.”337  Physiology is proof.   
And yet Bernart’s lyrics hint at his preoccupation that the physical signs of inward 
feelings are not strong enough.  In “Non es meravelha” he opposes the fin’ amador with the faus 
lamenting that “entrels” (between the two) you cannot really tell them apart so easily.  He wishes 
that the faus amador, the lauzengers, and the trichadors, had horns on their foreheads so that 
they might more easily be sifted into categories, or “triats.”  He does not say here that the faus 
amador can feign the tears and pallor of the true lover but he certainly feels that some sort of 
permanent, essential sign on the body would be helpful to those good lovers wishing to make 
progress in their pursuits which are so often hindered by wary ladies fearing insincerity.   
 As it is, what is inside the true lover appears on his face; his blushing or paling, his eyes, 
his quivering, can thus be read.  The canso is for Bernart an extension of this truism.  While 
other chantadors might produce lyric, it won’t have any value at all.  The quality of a lover’s 
song would seem to reveal just as much as his face’s reaction to his beloved’s presence.  
                                                
 
336 Jacqueline Cerquiglini finds the same faith in Guillaume de Machaut: “le poète (Guillaume de 
Machaut) n'entend qu'une seule voix disant le vrai, celle du corps.  Ainsi Servius (In Vergilii 
Carmina Commentarii, Georg Thilo et Hermann Hagen eds. Vol II) interprétant l'opposition 
virgilienne des portes d'ivoire et de corne pensait que ‘la porta cornea symbolise les yeux, qui ne 
sauraient cacher la vérité; la porta eburnea connote la dent, instrument de la parole qui peut 
mentir.’”   Jacqueline Cerquiglini-Toulet, Un Engin Si Soutil (Geneva: Slatkine, 1985) 186. 
 
337 The water of the body with which my two eyes make me wet, is to me a good guarantee that I 
repent my madness.   
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Fors’ e poder 
“Cor e cors e saber e sen/ e fors’ e poder i ai mes,” had said Bernart. While the “cor e 
cors” are followed by “saber e sen” or knowledge and sense in the lyric, we will turn to those 
later after a discussion of “fors’ e poder” or force and will because when one thinks of poets who 
have lost their saber and sen Peire Vidal or Raimbaut d’Aurenga come to mind. When one thinks 
of love service, complete submission to the will of the domna, one thinks of Bernart of 
Ventadorn.   
 As Bernart de Ventadorn tells it, the lover cannot succumb before the domna.  He has no 
choice in the matter for Love or the Domna conquers.  They overtake the will of him who sees a 
lady: “depus anc la vi, m’a conques”338 and again in the lines which state: “Anc non agui de me 
poder / Ni no fui meus de l’or en sai / Que·m laisset en sos olhs vezer.”339  In a song in which the 
lover is overpowered by joie “Si m’apodera jois e·m vens,” the lover is further conquered by the 
features that comprise the perfect domna—beauty, fine figure, nice eyes and radiant face with 
good manners.  In the song which begins “Ab joi mou lo vers e·l comemens” it is the lady’s 
beautiful eye or gaze which conquers: 
Bela domna, ·l vostre cors gens 
E·lh vostre belh olh m’an conquis, 
E ·l doutz esgartz e lo clars vis,  
E·l vostre bels essenhamens,340  
Beautiful lady, your noble body 
And your beautiful eyes have conquered 
me, 
                                                
 
338 Since I saw her, she conquered me. “Anc no gardei sazo ni mes” line 22.  
 
339 Nevermore have I had power over myself nor have I ever been my own from the hour when 
she let me see into her eyes.  Cited from “Can vei la lauzeta mouver” discussed earlier in this 
chapter. 
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And the sweet gaze and the radiant face, 
And your fine instructions.  
 
The lady has the power to conquer just as much as Amors.  Bernart often depicts the eyes as the 
focal point of the interaction or point of intersection between the lover and beloved.  They are 
where he loses himself; they are what conquer him or what poison him, “ab sos bels olhs amoros, 
/ de que·m poison’e ·m fachura.”341  The lady’s gaze is enough to undo the power and the will of 
the lover.  In the world of Bernart “The domna is almost synonymous with Amors.”342  For 
Bernart, the domna is just as omnipotent as the personified Amors.  Both the domna and Amors 
lay siege on the lover.  Bernart must love whether it is thrust upon him by the domna or by 
Amors.   
In “Per melhs cobrir lo mal pes e·l cossire” he describes himself as a victim conquered by 
Love,  
 
e per Amor sui si apoderatz, 
tot m'a vencut a forsa, ses batalha.  
…  
c'Amors mi fai amar lai on li platz; 
e dic vos be que s'eu no sui amatz,  
And by Love I am so overpowered, 
He has completely conquered me, without a 
fight. 
For Love makes me love where it pleases  
And I tell you well that if I am not loved 
                                                                                                                                                       
340 ll. 49-52 
 
341 With her beautiful living eyes with which I poisonmyself and madden myself. “A tantas 
bonas chansos,” ll. 20,21.  
 
342 L. T. Topsfield, Troubadours and Love (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) 113. 
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ges no reman en la mia nualha.343 It is not because I am being lazy. 
 
In the Amors proposed by Bernart de Ventadorn love is not born in the loving subject; the subject 
has lost the element of self that is the emotion of love, the power to desire, the strength of will.  
Love is not an emotion, a part of desire or will, but a personified force that causes the poet-lover 
to love and does so through an attack on the poet-lover.  The lover has no say in his own 
movement of will and desire, not in the stirring of the emotion nor in the target, for he is forced 
to love where Love wishes him to.  Love attacks as though in combat and becomes lord of even 
the reluctant lover as in the song “Can vei la flor, l’erba vert e la folha” discussed above, 
C’amors m’asalh, que·m 
sobresenhoreya;  
e·m fai amar cal que·lh plass', e voler;  
e s'eu am so que no·m deu eschazer,  
forsa d'amor m·i fai far vassalatge; 
 
Mas en amor non a om senhoratge; 
e qui l'i quer, vilanamen domneya, 344   
 
For love attacks me and overpowers me 
And makes me love what it pleases and 
wants. 
And if I love that which should not come to 
me, it is the force of love that makes me be 
a vassal. 
But in love one does not have the power of 
a lord, and he who wishes to have it courts 
poorly… 
 
It is clearly Amors that has “senhoratge” in this song.  It is won through battle, and when it enters 
into a scene man has no chance to ever gain or retain senhoratge.  The rhyme words that link the 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
343 “Per melhs cobrir lo mal pes e·l cossire,” ll. 5,6, 10-12. 
 
344 “Can vei la flor, la erba vert e la folha” line 11.  
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two stanzas make clear the act of the lover: what he can do and what he cannot, what he is and 
what he is not.  The first stanza ends with the status of the lover, his act, what he can do, only 
“vassalatge.”  The line stresses however that the lover does not even do this of his own will but is 
made to serve by the force of love.  The following stanza opens with the explanation of this 
position of service: no man can ever be senhor in the realm of Amors.  It is simply not possible. 
The attempt to refute this order of being, the desire to have power in the love relationship only 
makes the loving or courting ugly, villainous.  To want senhoratge cannot but ruin the act of 
domneya, loving.  Acceptance of the submissive state, abandonment, is crucial to fin’ amors.  
In “Non es meravelha” Love strikes deep into Bernart’s heart, “Aquest’ amors me fer tan 
gen / al cor d’una dousa sabor.”345  The lover falls victim to the trap set by love, and the lover 
becomes completely entrapped, powerless just as a fish once caught on the hook: 
 
Aissi co·l peis qui s'eslaiss' el cadorn 
e no·n sap mot, tro que s'es pres en l'ama,  
m'eslaissei eu vas trop amar un jorn,  
c'anc no·m gardei, tro fui en mei la flama,  
que m'art plus fort, no·m feira focs de 
forn;  
e ges per so no·m posc partir un dorn,  
aissi·m te pres s'amors e m'aliama. 
No·m meravilh si s'amors me te pres, 
Just as the fish that quickly takes the bait  
and knows nothing until he is caught in the net,  
I threw myself into love one day 
too careless till I was amidst the flame  
that burned me more than oven-fires would do:  
and yet despite that I cannot budge a finger, 
her love so tightly holds and fetters me. 
It does not surprise me that her love holds me 
prisoner, 
                                                
 
345 This love wounds me so nobly in the heart with a sweet sensation. ll. 25, 26. 
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Que genser cors no crei qu’el mon se 
mire346 
For a more beautiful body I don’t believe the 
world can see.  
 
In these lines Bernart does admit he threw himself into love, “m’eslaissei” he says, but once 
within he cannot free himself; he has become completely consumed and yet so completely 
immobilized that he cannot even move a finger’s width away.    He does not marvel at being 
captured by love because that is the only possibility left to any who happen to see the domna’s 
beautiful body.  The image of the lover trapped, imprisoned and unable to move recurs in “Bel 
m’es qu’eu chan en aquel mes” in which the lover asks Amors: 
 
Amors, e cals onors vos es 
Ni cals pros vo·n pot eschazer, 
S’aucizetz celui c’avetz pres,  
Qu’enves vos no s’auza mover? 
Love, and what honor does it give you  
And what value can you reap  
If you kill the one you have taken prisoner, 
Who against you has not dared move? 
 
 The complete inability, or even more, the unwillingness to exercise even the slightest 
movement, the slightest manifestation of personal will is the real experience of a good love and 
the practice of the good lover.  While these images suggest Amors or the domna overpower the 
lover, the inability to fight is conflated with the unwillingness to fight.  The lover submits; he has 
no choice in the face of true beauty or perfect love.    
Of all the troubadours it is certainly Bernart de Ventadorn who most fully submits to the 
position of home lige.  Perhaps for this reason Silvio Pellegrini was wont to consider the use of 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
346 “Be m’an perdut lai enves Ventadorn” ll. 8-15 
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feudal terminology in courtly love lyric as the legacy of Bernart in his 1944 article “Intorno al 
vassallaggio d’amore nei primi trovatori.”347  While I will suggest that there is good reason to 
consider Bernart the first true vassal of love, the adoption of terms of feudal service happens 
with the troubadour, Guilhem IX, often named the first troubadour whose compositions date 
roughly between 1090 and 1126.  In the paper, “Formules féodales et style amoureux chez 
Guillaume IX d’Aquitaine,”348 Rita Lejeune goes through the œuvre of the duc d’Aquitaine with 
Wechssler’s Frauendienst und Vassalität349 in order to cull the five feudal formulas mentioned 
by Wechssler.   Lejeune demonstrates that not only does Guilhem IX borrow the terminology 
from the social and political world of feudalism, but her examples allow us to see that in fact the 
relationship is structured like that of Meridional service:350 “la declaration amoureuse consiste en 
une offre de service, et ce service se définit selon l’esprit et avec le vocabulaire des contrats 
féodaux.”351 While in reality Guilhem is the lord, in song, he becomes the vassal as illustrated by 
the following lines from “Mout jauzens m’en prenc en amar,”: 
Si· m vol mi Dons s’amor donar, 
Pres suy del penr’ e del grazir 
If midons wants to give me her love, 
I am ready to take it and to appreciate it 
                                                
 
347 S. Pellegrini, "Intorno Al Vassallaggio D'amore Nei Primi Trovatori," Cultura Neolatina 4 
(1944) 21-37. 
 
348 Rita Lejeune, "Formules Féodales et Style Amoureux Chez Guillaume IX d’Aquitaine," Atti 
Del Viii Congresso Internazionale Di Studi Romanzi (Firenze, 3-8 Aprile 1956) (1962). 
 
349 Eduard Wechssler, Frauendienst Und Vassallität (Berlin: W. Gronau, 1902). 
 
350 For the difference between feudal service in the North of France and Meridional society see, 
Paul Ourliac, "Troubadours et Juristes," Cahiers de Civilisation Medievale (Xe-XIIe Siecles) 
(1965) 8.  
 
351 The love declaration consists in an offer of service and that service is defined in the spirit and 
with the vocabulary of the feudal contract.  Lejeune, "Formules Féodales," 236. 
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E del celar e del blandir 
E de sos plazers dir e far 
E de sos pretz tener en car  
E de son laus enavantir.352 
And to hide it and to serve it 
And to speak and do her pleasure (what she 
would wish or what would please her) 
And to esteem her worth 
And to spread her praises.  
 
 Lejeune notes well that this stanza is “un veritable contrat: énoncé de ce qui fait la base de 
l’accord, énumération des engagements d’une des parties.”353  For Guilhem IX, the language of 
service, of legal binding, ties him to his lady.  At the moment in which Guilhem IX composes his 
lyric, his words are completely in line with the language of allegiance used in the formation of 
service in his own region at the time.354  The stanza thus suggests to his contemporary listeners 
the ties of feudal engagement. Bernart de Ventadorn begins composing only a few decades later 
around 1150.  However that is already a period in which the plevis is falling out of practice.  
While for Guilhem’s listeners his appropriation of the formal plevis called to mind the pledge of 
the vassal to his lord, Bernart’s listeners would hear an archaic formula, and one they would 
already recognize as a dual declaration of submission: the previous generation’s pledge to a lord 
but they would also recognize the courtly singer’s language of a lover before his lady.  In this 
sense, when Bernart de Ventadorn speaks of becoming the lady’s hom lige, or sieu hom, his 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
352 Gerald A. Bond, The Poetry of William VII, Count of Poitiers, IX Duke of Aquitaine (New 
York: Garland Pub., 1982) . 
 
353 Lejeune, "Formules Féodales," 236. 
 
354 I refer the reader to the article by Lejeune, for closer inspection of the similarities in legal 
language between Guilhem IX and feudal formulas.    
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submission is one based on the nature of love service rather than simply feudal service.  The 
frame of this service is no longer the laws of a feudal society, but those of love.  For Brigitte 
Saouma the submission is of a spiritual nature: “l’humilité ainsi décrite par les troubadours est 
une pratique ascetique fort éloignée de l’humilité vassalique, souvent feinte.  Les troubadours 
auraient donc choisi le contenu spirituel de l’humilité, plutôt que son contenu social.”355  The 
man-made laws which can be escaped or broken are replaced by the laws of love which function 
as natural laws that encompass all without reserve.  Bernart de Ventadorn’s lyric already 
supposes a space where man-made laws are subordinate to those of Love.  
While Guilhem IX had transposed the feudal structure with all its precepts into the realm 
of amorous entanglements, Bernart de Ventadorn draws from both feudal structure and Roman 
law to forge a structure of love service with a code of its own: In the period of the third 
generation of troubadours like Bernart de Ventadorn, Love has its own defining features, and the 
lover submits to the domna and Amors, not a lady in the guise of a lord.  
 While Bernart suggests that Amors and the Domna leave the reluctant lover unable to 
defend himself against their powers and he finds himself forced to love, the poet-lover 
nevertheless offers himself to the lady and does so with all the formality of the vassal before his 
lord: 
 
                                                
355 Humility described in this way by the troubadours is an ascetic practice very distant from a 
vassal's 
submission, which is often feigned. The troubadours would then have chosen the spiritual 
submission 
over the social one.  Brigitte Saouma, “L'humilité et l'orgueil chez saint Bernard et les 
troubadours” in La 
France latine, (129, 1999, 340-348) 345. 
Totz tems volrai sa onor e sos bes   At all times do I wish her honor and good 




The desire hits him and regardless of the lady’s wishes and, as one has seen, even his own 
wishes: he will love her.  Though the desire comes to him from outside himself, he nonetheless 
professes his desire for her to be honored, to enjoy goodness, and his promise to be her vassal 
and friend who will always serve her.  The image of the servant kneeling before the lord with 
hands joined while pronouncing his pledge of service appears more than once in Bernart de 
Ventadorn’s lyrics.  
Bernart is not ambiguous in his declarations of service. He is the lady’s “ome lige” as he 
says in “Can vei la flor” and as he suggests with the promise to serve.  He offers himself 
completely to the domna by presenting an image of himself as humble vassal submitting to his 
superior beloved in the song “Gent estera que chantes”: 
Domna, ·l genzer c’anc nasques 
E la melher qu’eu anc vis,  
mas jonchas estau aclis, 
A genolhos et en pes, 
El vostre franc senhoratge; 
E car357 me detz per prezen  
Franchamen un cortes gatge 
Lady, the most beautiful that ever was born 
And the finest I have ever seen,  
Hands joined I am bowed  
On my knees or standing, 
To your noble lordship; 
And because you gave me as a gift 
Openly your courtly pledge 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
356 “Be m’an perdut lai enves Ventadorn” ll. 22-27. 
 
357 I reject here Lazar’s choice to render this “encar” in his attempt to make sense of these lines 
which contradictory verb tenses confuse: detz as subjunctive or preterite with fo clearly in the 
preterite.  See his note to these lines in his edition of Bernart de Ventadorn’s lyrics, Lazar, ed., 
Bernard de Ventadour, Chansons D'amour notes 4 and 5, 280-81. 
 
358 ll. 37-49 
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-mas no·us aus ddire cal fo- 
c’adoutz me vostra preizo. 
Domna, vos am finamen, 
Franchamen, de bo coratge, 
E per vostr’om me razo, 
Qui·m demanda de cui so. 358 
-I won’t be so bold as to say which- 
which sweetens my imprisonment. 
Lady, I love you nobly, 
Truly, and with good heart, 
And as your man I define myself 
To whosoever asks to whom I belong. 
 
 
And again in “Pel doutz chan”: 
 
Domna, vostre sui e serai,  
Del vostre servizi garnitz.  
Vostr'om sui juratz e plevitz,  
E vostre m'era des abans.  
E vos etz lo meus jois primers,  
E si seretz vos lo derrers,  
Tan com la vida m'er durans.  
Lady, I am yours and will be  
In your service occupied. 
I am your vassal, sworn and pledged, 
And I was yours before. 
And you are my first joy,  
And you will be my last, 
As long as life lasts for me. 
 
Bernart gives himself to his lady completely in mind, body, and heart. What he does will be done 
for her; in her service he will occupy himself and spend his time and efforts. His own joy and 
pleasure come only from her.  
Bernart is aligning his desire and demands with that of the lady.  He obliterates the 
difference between his own desire and that of his beloved.  The lover must follow the will, the 
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command of the domna; his own will disappears into that of his beloved.  The two wills should 
overlap, coincide.   
 
En agradar et en voler  
 Es l'amors de dos fis amans.  
Nula res no i pot pro tener,  
Si·lh voluntatz non es egaus. 359  
In pleasing and in will 
Is the love of two fine lovers. 
Nothing of worth can be had 
If the wills are not equal. 
 
While the lines “nula res no i pot pro tener,  / si·lh voluntatz no es egaus” can be read in such  a 
way as to suggest that both parties have the right to an equal estimation of the will of each, 
another reading is possible and more likely when placed alongside Bernart’s general discussion 
of will: the will of the two should be, not equal, but the same.  Even as he admits his heart 
desires his lady, he claims still that he wants what will please her: “c’als no reclama mos cors 
mas leis solamen / e so c’a leis es plazens.”360   In another song he even suggests that his loving 
her is dependent upon her desire: “amara la, s’a leis plagues, / e servira·lh de mo poder.”361  
Given Bernart’s consistent submission to the will of his lady the second reading of voluntatz 
egaus fits more readily with the poet-lover’s understanding of the love dynamic.   
For Bernart there should only be one will in the love relationship, and the will that 
remains intact as the unified will of the pair is that of the domna.  The lover’s own will and 
                                                
 
359 “Chantars no pot gaire valer,” ll. 29-32. 
 
360 For nothing else does my heart was but her only and that which is pleasing to her. “Amors, 
enquera·us preyara,” ll. 20-22.  
 
361 I will love her, if it please her, and I will serve her with all my force. “Bel m’es qu’eu chan en 
aquel mes,” ll. 31,32. 
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desire is absorbed into her own.  In so doing the lover loses the difference of will that is one of 
the defining features of the subject.  Once he lacks a distinct personal desire he functions only as 
an object, a tool that will allow the lady to get what she wants: he wants nothing but to be the 
servant of her will. 362 
 
Bona domna, re no·us deman 
Mas que·m prendatz per servidor, 
Qu’e·us servirai com bo senhor,  
Cossi que del gazardo m’an. 
Ve·us m’al vostre comandamen, 
Francs cors umils, gais e cortes! 
Ors ni leos non etz vos ges, 
Que ·m aucizatz, s’a vos me ren. 
Good domna, I ask nothing of you  
But that you take me as your servant, 
That I might serve you as a good lord, 
Whatever might be the prize to come to me. 
See you have me at your command, 
Noble one, with gentle body, courtly and 
joyful! 
Neither bear nor lion are you noble one, 
That you would kill me if I give myself to you. 
 
These passages clearly suggest what Bernart’s editor, Moshé Lazar, said a half a century 
ago, “La fin’ amors possède une rare puissance et de grands pouvoirs sur la vie de l’amant. 
Celui-ci perd toute volonté, toute force, et toute contrôle sur lui-même. Il souffre pour elle le 
martyre.”363  And yet despite this designation of the lover as “martyr,” Simon Gaunt’s article on 
                                                
 
362 This would be the object-instrument of the volonté-de-jouir, in Lacanian terms.  For a 
discussion of “perversion” and the perverted subject as object-instrument see: “Kant avec Sade” 
in Jacques Lacan, Écrits, vol. II (1971). 
 
363 Moshe Lazar, Amour Courtois Et "Fin Amors" Dans La Littérature du Xlle Siècle, 
Bibliothèque Française et Romane. Série C: Études Littéraires, 8 (C. Klincksieck, 1964) 67. 
   
  
 182 
Bernart entitled “A Martyr to Love: Sacrificial Desire in the Poetry of Bernart de Ventadorn” 
could not be more critical of and opposed to the theory of fin’ amors  proposed by Lazar’s 
Amour courtois et fin’ amors or the comments Lazar includes in his edition of Bernart’s oeuvre.  
While Moshé Lazar finds the troubadour’s motives to be lustfully dictated, that is based on 
sexual desire, Gaunt situates Bernart’s actions within the schema of desire as defined by Lacan, 
and in particular and ultimately suggests that the courtly lover is directed toward jouissance, 
albeit a jouissance that will be “kept at bay.”364  Ultimately as such, both Lazar and Gaunt have 
focused on the end goal, that very piece of the love relationship which dismantles any of the 
similarities that the two do find between troubadours and religious works.  They have tightened 
their focus onto that nodule of the love relationship that allows Etienne Gilson to discredit all 
attempts to bring troubadours and mystics into a common analysis.  It is clear upon reading 
troubadours and mystics, when reading Bernart de Ventadorn without question, what gives these 
love paradigms their defining flavor, what sets them apart from other love experiences, is the 
idea that the lover should offer him or her self up to the beloved.  The lover as dismantled subject 
is what makes this love relationship unique and is what allows a comparison between loves that 
have very different objects to have the same schema.  
In the lyrics of troubadours who sing of fin’ amors the lover has completely given 
himself up to the lady; the state of the fin’ amant is complete abandonment.  All of the lover’s 
movements follow the rhythm set by the domna.  Bernart’s image of the branch bending 
                                                                                                                                                       
Ultimately as such, they have both focused on the end goal, that very element of the love 
relationship which dismantles any of the similarities that the two do find between troubadours 
and religious works.  They have tightened their focus onto that nodule of the love relationship 
that allows Etienne Gilson to discredit all attempts to bring troubadours and mystics into a 
common analysis.   
 
364 Simon Gaunt,  "A Martyr to Love: Sacrificial Desire in the Poetry of Bernart de Ventadorn," 
Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies 31.3 (2001): 498.   
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according to the wind demonstrates the lack of self, the lack of will he envisions the true lover to 
have. 
C’aissi com lo rams si pleya 
Lai o·l vens lo vai menan, 
Era vas lei que·m guerreya, 
Aclis per far so coman. 
For as the branch bends 
There where the wind leads it, 
I was towards her who fought me, 
Bent to do her command.365 
 
The image of the lover as a branch bending in the wind captures perfectly what Bernart says of 
the lover throughout his oeuvre.  He is an object manipulated by the domna—an object without a 
willing, desiring, acting self.  Rarely is such an image granted the designation of a virtue but for 
Bernart it is so.  Even if the lover’s misfortune and pain is what the domna desires, the lover 
willingly obliges: 
 
Far me podetz e ben e mau; 
En la vostra merce sia; 
Qu’eu sui garnitz tota via 
Com fassa tot vostre plazer.366 
You can do good or ill to me; 
May I be in your mercy; 
For I am always still prepared 
To do all your pleasure. 
 
Not only does Bernart oblige his lady, but truly, as he stated, her pleasure is his, his will has been 
absorbed or overtaken by hers.  If it pleases the domna, it pleases him even as he suffers in pain.  
                                                
 
365 “Lo rossinhols s’esbaudeya,” ll. 17-20. 
 
366 “Ges de chantar no·m pren talans,” ll. 45-48. 
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In this state of love the poet-lover suffers immensely and yet because it comes from loving the 
finest lady even the pain is pleasure.   
 Bernart de Ventadorn describes the pain and suffering brought by love with more 
persistence than most of the other troubadours of his own generation or any other.367 What is 
remarkable in the testimony of suffering is Bernart’s conviction that the true fin’ amant does not 
flee suffering or pain, but accepts it as a fulfillment of his disavowal of his own will in order to 
take the will of the Lady as his own. 
Ara ·n fassa so que·s volha 
Ma dommna, al seu chauzit, 
Qu’eu no m’en planh, si tot me dol.368  
And now may she do what she wills 
My lady, at her discretion, 
For I do not complain, if all hurts me.  
 
The lover should promote the lady’s will regardless of what his own stakes might be.  
Only the lady is allowed an active will based on her discretion; the lover can only follow what 
his lady prescribes, wills, and desires. In the song “Non es meravelha s’eu chan” from which I 
take the organizing schema for this discussion of Bernart, the troubadour suggests he is the 
greatest composer because he is the greatest lover.   
Non es meravelha s’eu chan 
Melhs de nul autre chantador, 
It is no wonder if I sing 
Better than any other singer 
                                                
 
367 For a study of the semantic field of pain in the work of Bernart de Ventadorn see Pierre Bec, 
"La Douleur Et Son Univers Poetique Chez Bernard de Ventadour," Cahiers de Civilization 
Medieval 11 (1968). and its sequel Pierre Bec, "La Douleur Et Son Univers Poétique Chez 
Bernart de Ventadour: Suite Et Fin," Cahiers de Civilization Medieval 12 (1969).. 
 
368 “Lonc tems a qu’eu no chantei mai,” ll. 52-54. 
 
369 ll. 1-8 
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Que plus me tra ·l cor vas amor 
E melhs sui fais a so coman. 
Cor e cors e saber e sen 
E fors’ e poder i ai mes. 
Si·m tira vas amor lo fres que vas autra part 
no ·m aten.369 
For my heart draws me more towards love 
And I’m better made to its command. 
Heart and body and wisdom and sense 
And force and power have I put into it. 
So much do the reins pull me towards love 
that towards any other direction I cannot 
notice. 
 
What makes him the greatest lover is at once something innate, “plus me tra·l cors vas amor / e 
melhs sui fihz a so coman” and the result of his efforts to submit completely to love, offering 
“cor e cors e saber e sen / e fors e poder” and giving nothing else any of his attention.  And 
indeed, it is in loving alone that one really experiences life, 
Ben es mortz qui d’amor no sen 
Al cor cal que dousa sabor; 
E que val viure ses amor…? 
He is quite dead who does not feel in his 
heart the sweet sensation of love 
And what is living worth without love…? 
 
While Bernart repeats the phrase “sweet sensation” from stanza II to describe the feeling that 
penetrates the heart in stanza IV, it has become in stanza IV a wound; the effect of love is at once 
sweet and painful in a twisted understanding of pleasure and pain Bernart, and other troubadours 
and trouvères after him, will describe repeatedly. 
 
Aquest’ amors me fer tan gen This love so nobly pierces  
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Al cor d’una dousa sabor: 
Cen vetz mor lo jorn de dolor 
E revio de joi autras cen. 
Ben es mos mals de bel semblan, 
Que mais val mos mals qu’autra bes; 
E pois mos mals aitan bos m’es 
Bos er lo bes apres l’afan.370 
my heart with a sweet sensation: 
One hundred times a day I die of pain 
And a hundred more I am revived by joy. 
My pain so well seems beautiful 
That my pain is worth more than my well-
being 
And if so good seems my pain to me 
Good will be the pleasure after the pain. 
 
The connection between joy and suffering, pleasure and pain, has been confused by love in 
Bernart’s thinking.  “e platz me qued eu m’en dolha, / ab sol qued amar me volha.”371  He 
recognizes the contradiction in taking pleasure for pain  
Noih e jorn pes, cossir e velh, 
Planh e sospir; e pois m’apai. 
On melhs m’estai, et eu peihz trai. 
Mas us bos respeighz m’esvelha, 
Don mos cossirers s’apaya. 
Fols! Per que dic que mal traya? 
Car aitan rich’ amor envei, 
Pro n’ai de sola l’enveya!372 
Night and day I think, fret, and stay awake, 
Sigh and lament, and then give myself 
peace. 
Better the place I am, the worse I suffer. 
But a good sense of relief comes over me 
With which my fretting calms itself. 
Fool! Why do I say I suffer? 
For I desire a love so rich 
                                                                                                                                                       
370 ll. 25-32  
 
371 “Bel m’es can eu vei la brolha,” ll. 6,7. 
 
372 “Ara no vei luzir solelh,” ll. 33-40.  
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That good do I get from only desiring it. 
 
To consider pain and suffering as negative states makes the lover a “fol.”  Instead the lover must 
focus on the powerful will of love; Bernart remains insistent that love is strong enough to 
conquer the apparent contradictions.  The longing and loving itself are a pleasure, are the good 
that is the end of loving.  
Saber e sen 
 It is this confusion, the flip-flopping of concepts and implied meanings or significance 
that seems to readers a sign of madness.   
 
Car tan la sai bel'e bona  
Que tuih li mal m'en son bo.  
Bo son tuih li mal que.m dona!  
Mas per Deu li quer un do:  
Que ma bocha, que jeona,  
D'un douz baizar dejeo.  
Mas trop quer gran guizardo  
Celei que tan guizardona!  
E can eu l'en arazona,  
Ilh me chamja ma razo.  
Ma razo chamja e vira!  
Mas eu ges de lei no.m vir  
For so well do I know her to be good and 
beautiful, That all my pain feels good to me. 
Good is all the pain she gives to me! 
But by God’s name I want a gift: 
That my mouth that fasts 
By a sweet kiss has the fast broken. 
But I demand a prize too big 
From her who is such a prize! 
And when I reason it out 
It changes my reason. 
My reason changes and shifts! 
But from her I would never veer 
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Mo fi cor, que la dezira  
Aitan que tuih mei dezir  
Son de lei per cui sospir.  
E car ela no sospira,  
Sai qu'en lei ma mortz se mira,  
Can sa gran beutat remir.373  
My fine heart that desires her 
So much so that all my desiring 
Belong to her for whom I sigh. 
And since she does not sigh, 
I know that my death is mirrored by her 
When her great beauty reflects back.  
 
In giving himself over to the lady completely, the lover loses his subjective stance.  He arrives at 
the complete eclipse, death of the self.  The last lines make this clear.  Not only this but Bernart’s 
lyrics suggest that offering up the will to the beloved eventually leads to a loss of language as 
concepts no longer imply what they once did; signifiers no longer function as they once had.  
What Bernart describes is the aporia of mystics at the intersection between selfless experience 
and linguistic utterance.   
Tant ai mo cor ple de joya,  
Tot me desnatura.  
Flor blancha, vermelh'e groya  
Me par la frejura,  
C'ab lo ven et ab la ploya  
Me creis l'aventura,  
Per que mos chans mont'e poya  
E mos pretz melhura.  
So full of joy is my heart 
That the nature of all has been changed. 
As white, red, and yellow flowers 
Seems to me the frost, 
For with the wind that blows and the rain  
My adventure grows 
So that my song strengthens and spreads 
And my worth increases. 
                                                
 
373 “Bel m’es can eu vei la brolha” ll. 23-40. 
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Tan ai al cor d'amor,  
De joi e de doussor,  
Per que.l gels me sembla flor  
E la neus verdura.  
Anar posc ses vestidura,  
Nutz en ma chamiza,  
Car fin'amors m'asegura  
De la freja biza.   
I have in my heart so much love  
Joy and sweetness, 
That ice seems like flowers 
And the snow like grass and leaves. 
I can go without clothing, 
Naked in my chemise, 
Because fin’ amors protects me 
From the freezing wind.  
 
 
When the lady’s will dominates, commands, and subsumes the will of the lover the loss of the 
subject is inevitable and so the loss of reason and the loss of language too cannot persist.  His 
reason shifts and changes; through loving Bernart’s mind has lost its center, instead following 
the Lady and Love wherever they lead.  It should be no wonder then that Bernart speaks of 
himself as out of his head, mad. Though Raimbaut d’Aurenga gave us the term “flors enversa” 
and the most complete rendering of the world turned upside down in his song, “Ar resplan la 
flors enversa,”374 it is clear Bernart de Ventadorn had already suggested that the domna or Amors 
and the feelings or state of love make one’s experience different from those around him.  The 
song by Raimbaut d’Aurenga begins: 
Ar resplan la flors enversa Now the flora shines, perverse, 
                                                
 
374 Walter Thomas Pattison, The Life and Works of the Troubadour Raimbaut D'orange 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1952). song number XXXIX, pp. 199-200. 
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Pels trencans rancs e pels tertres 
Quals flors? Neus, gels e conglapis 
Que cotz e destrenh e trenca; 
Don vey morz quils, critz, brays, siscles 
En fuelhs, en rams e en giscles. 
Mas mi ten vert e jauzen Joys 
Er quan vei secx los dolens croys. 
Quar enaissi m'o enverse 
Que bel plan mi semblon tertre, 
E tenc per flor lo conglapi, 
E·l cautz m'es vis que·l freit trenque, 
E·l tro mi son chant e siscle, 
E paro·m fulhat li giscle. 
Aissi·m sui ferm lassatz en joy 
Que re non vey que·m sia croy. 
through the jagged cliffs and through the hills. 
Which flora? Snow, ice and frost 
which stings and hurts and cuts; 
wherefore I can't hear anymore calls, cries, 
tweets and whistles 
among leafage, branches and twigs. 
But I am kept green and merry by Joy 
now that I see wither the felons and the bad. 
For now I so reverse [things] 
that fair plains look to me like a hill 
and I mistake flowers for frost 
and, through cold, heat appears to me to cut 
and the thunder I believe to sing and whistle 
and leafage seem to me to cover the twig. 
I am so firmly bound in joy 
that, to me, nothing looks bad. 
Bernart knows that there can be madness in love, in forgetting one of the primary features 
necessary to fin’ amors: mezura.   
 
Mas es fols qui.s desmezura,  
E no.s te de guiza.  
Per qu'eu ai pres de me cura,  
But he is crazy he who loses mezura,  
And does not stand upright. 
For this reason I have taken care of myself 
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Deis c'agui enquiza  
La plus bela d'amor,  
Don aten tan d'onor,375  
… 
Ever since I had sought out  
The most beautiful in love 
From whom I wait for so much honor.  
 
Mezura is the proper balance and thoughtfulness that one associates with reason. And yet what 
Bernart described in the lines 1-16 hardly seem manifestations of mezura or proof of one with 
reason.  This song offers no remedy to the apparent contradiction, and yet, what would one have 
expected from a song that suggests that ice is flower and snow foliage?   
Just as Bernart accepts pain and suffering as his pleasure he recognizes that the loss of 
reason or madness is the state of the lover, “c’anc pois qu’eu l’agui veguda / non agui sen ni 
mezura.”376  It is simply the law of the lover one might forget at times but will never change: 
Amors, aissi·m faitz trassalhir:  
Del joi qu'eu ai, no vei ni au  
Ni no sai que.m dic ni que.m fau.  
Cen vetz trobi, can m'o cossir,  
Qu'eu degr'aver sen e mezura  
--Si m'ai adoncs, mas pauc me dura --  
C'al reduire.m torna·l jois en error.  
Pero be sai c'uzatges es d'amor  
Love, you have thus made me tremble:  
From the joy that I have I do not see nor 
hear. Nor do I know what I say nor what I 
do. A hundred times I found myself, when 
I think to myself that I should have sense 
and mezura—and if then I have some, it 
lasts but a short time—for ultimately joy 
turns to pain. But I know well that it is the 
                                                
 
375 ll. 17-22.  
 
376 For from the moment I had seen her I have neither sense nor mezura. “A! tantas bonas 
chansos!” ll. 23, 24.  
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C'om c'ama be non a gaire de sen.377  law of love that a man who loves well 
cannot have the slightest sense. 
 
From the loss of will, the loss of faith in language, and the loss of sense and mezura that implies 
a loss of self it is but a small step to the loss of life.  The obsession with death in his lyric sets 
Bernart de Ventadorn apart from the other troubadours.  Ultimately Bernart de Ventadorn moves 
throughout his love and his lyrics towards a complete annihilation of the self as he divests 
himself of will, language, reason and mezura—“ Cor e cors e saber e sen/ e fors’ e poder i ai 
mes.”378 
 Once conquered by love Bernart de Ventadorn finds himself in the throes of madness 
with the sense that death or complete annihilation alone awaits him.  For Bernart the true fin’ 
amant divests himself of all the elements of selfhood to arrive at a nothingness, madness, and 
ultimately the sense that being itself is too much for him.  He depicts the imagined ends of the 
love that led himself, Arnaut de Maruelh, Falquet de Romans, and Jaufré Rudel and so many 
other poets of fin’ amors to strive to overcome the barriers of subjectivity to arrive at the bedside 
of their beloved domna.  The use of envisioning, contemplative imagining, overpowering the will 
and desire of the self give the lyrics of the troubadours a shape not found in other earthly love 
poetry.  However, what distinguishes these songs from other poems of earthly love is exactly that 
which characterizes the language of our second type of lovers in this study: the mystics who seek 
union with their beloved, the divine.  
                                                                                                                                                       
 
377 “Be m· cuidei,” ll. 19-27. 
 
378 heart and body, knowledge and sense, force and power or will, have I placed in it [love],  
“Non es meravelha s’eu chan,” ll 5,6.  
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PART III: THE MYSTICS 
 
The troubadour features that characterize the presentation of the self in love as discussed 
in the previous chapters will find remarkable parallels in the works of mystical women.  The 
elements of the self discussed in the first part of the dissertation are what gave shape not only to 
the sense of self and Other, but to the structure of love in the lyrics of the troubadours and the 
experiences and/or accounts of the mystics will show the structure of love is the same even if the 
end is not.  The significance of contemplating the image of the domna finds its counterpart in the 
work of Angela da Foligno.  The preoccupation with the body found in the troubadours haunts 
both Marguerite d’Oingt and Angela da Foligno as they attempt to lose themselves in order to 
join their beloved.   
Unlike the troubadours, however, the mystics are given the opportunity to speak of 
union—the experience of joining the divine Other.  While the troubadours gave themselves to an 
earthly creature whose will could only be like a mirror of their own, that is to say human as well, 
the mystics give themselves up to God.  They are able to arrive at the notion that what is, is 
God’s will.  Troubadours, despite losing their own subjective stance, never lose sight of the fact 
that the domna is a constructed subject in her own right, and one for whom the lover is Other.  
The mystics conceive of their beloved as an entity that exists outside of time and space.   
The fact that the subject’s sense of self is constructed from the experience of the body, 
the imagination, and language explains why the works of mystics seeking to lose the self in favor 
of complete union with God will center on these particular fields of play just as they did with the 
troubadours studied in this dissertation.  It seems simple enough to sort out which mystics 




focus on the body, and Meister Eckhart, Marguerite Porete and so many practicants of negative 
mysticism trip themselves up with poetry. Both Marguerite d'Oingt and Angela da Foligno 
provide interesting ideas regarding envisioning much like what was discussed in chapter 3 and 
questions of speech and writing as well. Because the focus of this dissertation is the notion of the 
self in the intimate relationship between lover and beloved, earthly or divine, the significance of 
the images and words studied here will be related to that intimate exchange rather than the wider 
social exchanges that might have influenced Angela and Marguerite.  As such only a brief sketch 
of the biographical will be provided for each.  Instead the chapters of part III represent a close-
reading of what we have been left by both mystics.   
Angela da Foligno has no faith in language but loses herself in contemplation of images 
both real and imagined, a practice that leads her to a relation with the divine that confirms her 
distrust in linguistic signs as it introduces a new sign, the only true sign of Love directly planted 
into her heart by God.  Marguerite d’Oingt, however, tangles these three threads of the mystical 
experience; she teaches the methods of mystical practice in an instruction that simultaneously 
targets contemplatives who are visual, bodily, or linguistic practicants.  The Speculum 
interchanges the functions of image, text, and the bodily, suggesting the body is text, the text is 
image, and the image can be found within or on the body and read as text.  
The Traditions of Mysticism 
 
The desire to escape the weight of the self or consciousness of self can lead to many 
behaviors.  When this desire is inscribed within a belief system that offers a supreme or perfect 
being that is to be reached through practices that tend to focus on the imagination, language, and 




mystical.  Mysticism is the process of arriving at a state in which the self has been annihilated 
and the divine, the One, the act or being itself alone remains.  The desire to achieve oneness with 
a greater force and the practices created to make this happen are not limited to any culture or 
faith. Christian mystical traditions were a natural evolution from their Greek and Jewish 
foundations.  While the Greek tradition imbued Christian mysticism with the value of 
contemplating the Godhead as perfect and Judaism encouraged recurrent reading of the sacred 
texts, Christianity's theology of the trinity; the idea of man made in the image of God; Christ as 
divinity in human form all gave Christian mysticism its unique form.379   
It would seem that the greater divides in discussions of mysticism lay not along borders 
of faith but along lines of explaining mystical experience and expression irrespective of religion.  
Within and without the Christian tradition exists a divide between a dualistic notion of 
"experience" in which the self is not entirely lost, but exists if only to know that it is doing 
nothing but attesting to, or feeling completely, the divine.380  A monistic understanding of union 
suggests the subject is completely erased, absorbed into God as Marguerite Porete's Mirouer 
attempts to describe or depict.  Another aspect of difference that does not follow religious beliefs 
but linguistic beliefs reveals itself in that previous sentence.  Is it the experience or the 
expression that is "mystical"?  In the three authors studied here, the act of enunciation itself 
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Robert Javelet's book, Image et ressemblance au douzième siecle. 2 vols. (Paris: Éditions 
Letouzey et Ané, 1967). 
 
380 The nobel laureate, Albert Schweitzer's The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle provides such a 
dualistic definition saying: "We are always in presence of mysticism when we find a human 
being looking upon the division between earthly and super-earthly, temporal and eternal, as 
transcended, still feeling himself, while still externally amid the earthly and temporal, to belong 
to the supernatural and eternal." Albert Schweitzer, The Mysticism of Paul, (New York: 





affects the subject's experience of the world and the beyond.  In this sense their words are part of 
a practice.  Speaking the experience of mysticism or any special feeling is less important (in fact 
both Angela da Foligno and Marguerite Porete suggest it is nothing more than blasphemy) than 
getting words out as an experience in and of itself.  
In Part III three mystics engage our attention yet only one of these, Marguerite d'Oingt, 
was a member of a formal religious order.  Both Marguerite Porete and Angela da Foligno 
participate in a religious tradition because a "new mysticism" born of a "process of 
democratization and secularization" in the conceptualizing of a relationship with the divine that 
begins in the thirteenth century.381  
Body 
  
Caroline Walker Bynum suggests that the “peculiarly bodily” focus of spirituality in the 
Middle Ages is due to the fact that “theology and natural philosophy saw persons as, in some real 
sense, body as well as soul.”382  Jerome Kroll and Bernard Bachrach have recently proposed an 
explanation for the widespread use of self-inflicted pain in the Medieval Western Christian 
tradition in their book The Mystic Mind.  Kroll and Bachrach build their book upon the idea that 
mystics of the Western Christian Middle Ages, “employed harsh self-injurious practices as a 
method of inducing altered states of consciousness,” and this because “Western Christianity 
during much of the Middle Ages did not have available, … as strong a tradition of meditative 
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382 Bynum, Caroline Walker, Fragmentation and Redemption: Essays on Gender and the Human 




practices as those found in Eastern religions.”383   If pain was used by so many of those seeking 
to destroy the self, it is because it was a method available to them.  In contrast, Laurie Finke 
argues something very different when she suggests that, “the female mystic’s only means of 
escaping her body was to indulge in an obsessive display and denouncing of its most ‘grotesque’ 
features” and the reason these women do so is because “the female mystic has internalized the 
discursive norms of the dominant “high” culture.”384  Images of the grotesque are present in 
Marguerite d’Oingt’s Life of Sainte Beatrix d’Ornacieux where, for example eyes pop out of 
their sockets, but in the Speculum, bodies and body parts speak not through their vileness but 
because they are covered in writing or they are read as a text.385 As a result, the image of Christ’s 
body and his wounds serve as a visual base for contemplation and meditation, just as one 
meditates on the meaning(s) or words of a text in the practice of lectio divina.  
 Despite Kroll and Bachrach’s assessment that a culture of meditation was not fully 
developed in the West in the Middle Ages, meditation and contemplation are fundamental to the 
medieval Christian.  Hugh of Saint Victor claims there are only two activities that bring man into 
the image of the divine: contemplation of the truth and the exercising of virtues.386  While the 
                                                
 
383 Jerome Kroll and Bernard S. Bachrach, The Mystic Mind: The Psychology of Medieval 
Mystics and Ascetics (New York: Routledge, 2005) 2.  Given the practice of lectio divina and 
meditation in monastic culture Kroll and Bachrach’s claim is difficult to accept. 
 
384 Laurie A. Finke, "Mystical Bodies and the Dialogics of Vision.," Maps of Flesh and Light. 
Ed. Ulrike Wiethaus. (Syracuse: Syracuse UP, 1993) 38.  I am not sure whether it is necessary to 
limit this assessment of “only means of escaping body” to women. Think of Suso- there is a 
grotesque display and yet he’s not female.  Male flagellants do the same as the women Finke 
discusses. Now, are they doing so because of having internalized the norms of “high” culture? 
 
385 This text is included in the edition by Durrafour from which we will take all citations. 
Antonin Duraffour, Les Oeuvres de Marguerite d'Oingt, Publications de L'institut de 





Didascalicon is concerned with the meditation that comes from reading, “Meditation takes its 
start from reading but is bound by none of reading’s rules or precepts,387 the definition offered by 
Hugh is not that different from what medieval practicants would do with visual material, 
“Meditation is sustained thought along planned lines: it prudently investigates the cause and the 
source, the manner and the utility of each thing.”388  Indeed Jean Leclercq notes that,  
in secular usage, meditari means, in a general way, to think, to 
reflect, as does cogitare or considerare; but, more than these, it 
often implies an affinity with the practical or even moral order.  It 
implies thinking of a thing with the intent to do it; in other words, 
to prepare oneself for it, to prefigure it in the mind, to desire it, in a 
way, to do it in advance—briefly, to practice it.389 
 
 William of St. Thierry suggests the inevitable tie that meditation has with what the Christian 
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In great part the medieval Christian was introduced to the passion, the liturgy, and other 
narratives associated with the beliefs of the Church through images.  As early as the second 
century, "we also find increasing emphasis on the contemplative vision of God (theôria theou) as 
the ultimate goal of the devout Christian" as McGinn has noted.391  And while the beginnings of 
Christianity borrowed from Platonic notions of image and visions Jaroslav Pelikan says in his 
chapter on the thirteenth century, "[t]he culmination of the history of the church was the vision of 
God.  It was not, strictly speaking, a doctrine, but it was the consummation of all doctrine."392  
Not only did Abbots like Suger of Saint-Denis ensure that the eye of the visitor would be 
attracted but sermons, texts, and confessors promoted the contemplation of images, envisioning 
of scenes from Christ’s life or imagining the details of his wounds.  In fact, Bonaventure 
suggested that beginning with the Alongside the texts that attest to a meditative culture, the 
images and objects which served as props in contemplation remain today housed in museums 
and Church properties.  As Mary Carruthers reminds those looking to the currency of these 
“cognitive images” in the medieval West, “The first question one should ask of such an image is 
not ‘What does it mean?’ but ‘What is it good for?’”393  In so questioning the images of the 
Benedictine abbey of St. Walburg, Jeffrey Hamburger shows that the drawings held in the abbey 
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392 Jaroslav Pelikan, The Growth of Medieval Theology (600-1300), (Chicago: University of 
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act as prompts for meditative practice: “Like a rosary itself, the representation of the rose serves 
as both emblem of prayer and object of devotion. The rose… presents the viewer with Christ as 
her exemplar, contemplating his own passion, …even as it reminds her to meditate on the same 
subject.”394  Similarly, Angela’s work provides an account of how images, those of the passion 
which she calls the Liber vitae,395 can prompt the transformation of the soul along the via 
mystica.  Marguerite’s Speculum functions in exactly this way despite its being a text rather than 
an image. Laurie Finke says of one of Julian of Norwich’s accounts of a vision, “although Julian 
calls it a ‘bodily vision,’ suggesting a vision appearing to her eyes, reading the passage one is put 
in mind of an intense meditation upon a visual image—a picture in a book of hours, a station of 
the cross, or some other church painting Julian might have seen.”396  The close link between 
inner visions and external images plays a major role in the mystical practice described by Angela 
da Foligno in her Memoriale. 
While visions are often considered the manifestation of fulfillment in the mystic quest for 
transcendence, Angela suggests her conscious envisioning as well as visions that appear to her 
while waking or sleeping function as objects for contemplation or meditation in much the same 
way paintings or sculptures might.  Indeed, Marguerite creates images in her Speculum and 
speaks of the visionary’s imaginings in order to teach her readers that envisioning and the images 
envisioned are a means of reaching the divine much as “the drawings from St. Walburg 
themselves serve as ladders, helping the viewer mount, step by step, toward union with Christ” 
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as Hamburger remarked and as he further notes, “beatific vision, sight itself becomes not only 
the end, but also the means of achieving union with God.”397  Prayer, devotion, can rest upon the 
aid of image, rather than language.  The mystical process described by Angela da Foligno centers 
on the visual: the meditation upon paintings and other external figures, the summoning of visions 
in the mind which I call envisioning, and the way to contemplate and arrive at understanding 
using these visual tools.  Marguerite d’Oingt will recognize the great attraction such dependence 
on the visual holds as she brings together the textual and the imagistic in her own instructions on 
contemplation and enlightenment.   
Language 
 
 The role of language within mysticism is so significant that it is at the heart of one of the 
divides of theological distinction. Affirmative theology suggests language, specific words even 
can signify God while negative theology claims the divine cannot be spoken of in any way that 
reaches the truth of his being.  William Franke places Thomas Aquinas on one end of this 
particular theological spectrum with Dionysius on the other.398  McGinn's understanding of the 
origins of "new mysticism" place at the center gender, what he calls the "second major shift in 
late medieval mysticism...it is only after 1200 that women begin to take a prominent place in the 
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mystical tradition."399 This role, I believe, is linked to one of the other moves McGinn cites as a 
change that brings forth the "new mysticism" and that gives meaning to the focus on language 
rather than experience in his work and in a comparative study of mysticism and other literary 
traditions.  McGinn makes the focus on language in his own work very clear and likewise 
fundamentally tied to the nature of how mysticism works as demonstrated in its evolution by 
saying: 
I have insisted that the immediate object of study is not mystical 
experience as such but the mystical text, both written and (increasingly 
in the late Middle Ages) visual.  This conviction about the textual and 
linguistic foundation of mysticism is even more central to the present 
volume, because after 1200 the forms of mystical language become far 
more diverse with the move into the vernacular languages, a transition 
that allowed the modes of representation of mystical experince to take 
on remarkable new configurations.400  
It is this focus on the text rather than the experience that allows Etienne Gilson's qualms to be 
allayed; the object of love may very well be different in the traditions of the troubadours and the 
mystics, but the text is what is being studied here.  There is something to be gleaned from a 
comparison that limits itself to the study of the textual reality without seeking to make claims 
regarding experience beyond the word.  This dissertation can study mystical writing in romance 
in part because of this movement that enables people outside the cloister to take on the mantel of 
the religious without leaving the world and the language of that world to do so.  Women who 
                                                
399 McGinn, The Flowering of Mysticism 15. 
 





were not schooled in Latin were permitted access to religious traditions that inspired verbal 
practices of mystical exploration.  Indeed it is necessary to clarify that even though some texts 
were penned in Latin the nature of their structure and the quality of their language carry spoken 
qualities that should be associated with the vernacular.  McGinn speaks of a "'vernacular' way of 
using language" that characterizes the textual remains of Francis of Assisi and Angela da 
Foligno.401  While both the consciousness of a possible mystical trajectory or practice and the 
discussion within it, the words to help the practicant move through this experience of religious 
inquiry as well as the accounts of the experiences were unavailable before the development of 
the "new mysticism" or perhaps the idea of a new mystical geography beyond the cloister in the 
medieval West.  The religious authors studied here wish to speak but find they cannot make 
language coincide with the supreme being as they have come to understand it.  Speaking their 
experience, the world, and the Godhead becomes less a means of expression and more a practice 
in the process of mysticism.  In this way their speech is an active un-saying, apophasis.  If 
apophasis is usually opposed to kataphasis the fact that apophasis is a speech act that undoes or 
as Michael Sells puts it, "un-says," highlights the fact that kataphasis or the naming of the divine 
remains within the laws of language.  Language functions because words direct the listener or the 
reader to something.  The word, the sound or its shape on the page, should fade as the thing itself 
enters the mind.  Kataphatic discourse might present an oppulent signified, but it doesn't subvert 
the laws of language.  Apophasis cannot but preoccupy itself with that sound and shape and the 
distance between the word and the thing it is supposed to signify.  Each of the authors studied 
here draw attention to the ineffability of love and the beloved and the crack in linguistic function 
that this implies.  While Marguerite d'Oingt and Angela da Foligno make use of analogy and 
                                                





other strategies that seem to weaken the power of language to signify without calling attention to 
its problematic nature, it isn't until the final chapter and Marguerite Porete that we arrive at an 
author who rejects linguistic constraints and logical laws to embrace aporia, or the presentation 
of words that don't even seem to try to signify what they point to as much as they seem to call 
attention to the fact that they cannot really represent what they are meant to. 
 205  
CHAPTER 5: THE IMAGE AND ENVISIONING IN THE MYSTICISM OF ANGELA DA 
FOLIGNO 
    
Female Franciscans 
 
 While the shape of theology and the tenets of religions themselves can be understood by 
a web of texts and beliefs that create a whole—an order's rule, a religion's doctrine(s)—
mysticism seems accessible or understandable by recourse to key figures.  Francis is one of the 
quintessential mystics who thus gives shape to modern understandings of what mysticism is.  
Bernard McGinn calls him, "the mystic par excellence."402  The life of Francis is more than a 
story, more than simple biography; it is vita apostolica itself.  The apostolic life and the practice 
and the beliefs that undergird those practices align with the biography of Francis.  Francis 
withdrew from his family and community in early adulthood and returned to later to community 
by preaching and accepting brothers in his company.  It is this movement that informs 
Franciscanism in its formal and informal manifestations through Italy.403  
While the call to poverty reverberates through the decades after his death it is not this 
feature of Franciscan piety that informs the practice of Angela da Foligno the most. It is the 
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Grundmann, Religious Movements in the Middle Ages: the Historical Links between Heresy, the 
Mendicant Orders, and the Women’s Religious Movement in the Twelfth and Thirteenth 






hagiographical Francis that influences those mystics like Angela da Foligno who follow him.  
Bernard McGinn notes that the texts left by Francis of Assisi do not describe visions or ecstatic 
experiences but "the hagiographical picture of Francis found in the early lives and stories places 
emphasis on his ecstatic visionary experiences."404  The theological amplificatio of Franciscan 
beliefs is undertaken by Bonaventure in the latter half of the thirteenth century. For Jaroslav 
Pelikan Bonaventure's interpretation of Francis as espoused in Itinerarium in mentis Deum, is the 
most remarkable manifestation of the, "identification of personal religious experience as an 
epistemological principle in theology."405  Bonaventure, following Francis and perhaps even 
more than the historical Francis, the hagiographical, places enormous emphasis on the 
imagination and the power of envisioning in the process of seeing God.  Angela da Foligno's 
mysticism is characterized by the theology that, like Francis' own life, mysticism, and 
hagiography, and Bonaventure's Franciscan theology places far more interest in envisioning and 
imaging than textual practices of prayer or modes and means of ascent to God. 
Angela da Foligno  
  
The life story of Angela da Foligno comes primarily from her own account as dictated to 
her relative and confessor who has been given the name Fra Arnaldo.406  She was born within 
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only a few decades of the deaths of Umiltà of Faenza and Francis of Assisi and only a short 
distance from Assisi.  The region was permeated by Franciscan spirituality though Angela claims 
in her first Instruction, her own interest in piety was based on the desire to create or construct an 
identity and so was self-interested:  
De quia ostendeba me esse filiam orationis, 
et ego eram filia irae et superbiae et 
diaboli ; et ostendebam me habere Deum in 
anima et consolationes divinas in cella, et 
ego habebam diabolum in anima et in cella.  
Et sciatis quod toto tempore vitae meae 
studui quomodo possem adorari et honorari 
et quomodo possem habere famam 
sanctitatis….407   
While I pretended to be a daughter of 
prayer, I was a daughter of pride, and I had 
the devil in my soul and in secret;408 And I 
pretended to have God and divine 
consolation in my soul and in my self, and 
I actually had the devil in my soul and in 
my cell.  Know that, during all my life, I 
studied how I could be admired and 
honored and enjoy a reputation for sanctity.  
 
Instead, if the vivid image she provides of the sinner’s delights is any indication,409 Angela was 
interested in indulging her pride and flesh.  Angela was born into a financially comfortable 
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407 All quotations from the works of Angela da Foligno come from the edition by Thier and 
Calufatti. Quotations are usually taken from the Italian, though in this case the Latin offers a 
more interesting, nuanced version and for this reason is being cited here. Thier and Calufetti, Il 
Libro della Beata Angela 407. 
 
408 Though the word could indeed refer to her cell, the Italian suggests it might very well have 
been of her inner space, of secretness or hidden space that she speaks. 
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situation.  She married and had children.  While still a wife and mother she experienced an 
epiphany involving Francis in 1285.  It is after this that Angela begins her conversion to pious 
living in earnest and here too begins the Memoriale, the account detailing her transformation 
which she begins dictating after the mystical rapture she experiences in 1291.    After her 
conversion experience of 1285 Angela loses her husband and then her children.  She begins 
living a secular penitent’s life and joins the Franciscan tertiaries in 1291.   Angela undertakes a 
pilgrimage to Assisi where, stopping in a church upon her return, she becomes overwhelmed by 
the sensation of God’s presence. Angela’s confessor and scribe explains why he took down her 
story: 
Ma la caxione over raxione che io lo 
comenzai a scrivere, da la parte mia fo 
questa. Inperzioché la perdita fedel de 
Cristo una fiata era venuta a la zità d’Asixii 
a San Franzesco, ove io era conventuale, e 
sedendo ne l’usio de la chiexia, aveva 
criado molto. De la qual cossa io, che ièra 
suo confesore e parente e conselgiere 
spizialle, molto me ne vergognai, 
…volendo io saper la caxone del dito 
cridare, io la comenzai a constrengere per 
ogni modo ch’io poteva, che essa me 
dizesse perché tanto aveva stridito e 
The true reason why I wrote is as follows. 
One day the aforementioned person, 
Christ’s faithful one, came to the church of 
St. Francis in Assisi, where I was residing 
in a friary. She screamed greatly while she 
was sitting at the entrance to the portals of 
the church. Because of this I, who was her 
confessor, her blood-relative, and even her 
principal and special counselor, was greatly 
ashamed…[After some time, back in 
Foligno, the tale continues] Wanting to 
know the cause of her shouts, I began to 




cridato.410 me why she had screamed and shouted so 
much in Assisi.  
 
Fra Arnaldo explains that he compelled her to speak and he transcribed (and simultaneously 
translated it would seem) her words because he was “e avèndollo sospeto, dubitando non 
prozedèse da malegno spirito.”411  Angela was not herself so eager to write her own story. She 
told the tale to her confessor reluctantly and it was in fact he who wished to put it on paper for 
others, “some wise and spiritual man” to help with this seemingly crazed or possessed woman. 
Though Angela did not seek out a scribe, she does eventually take an interest just as her relative 
and confessor begins to recognize the worth of her account.  He admits she spoke too quickly 
and in a way that was not easy for him to understand.  He says of the act of transcribing her 
words the following:  
 
De li quail, in veritade coss’ì poco poteva 
prendere al describere, ch’oi me pensai e 
intixi che io ero come lo crivolo over lo 
burato, lo qual la prezioxa sotille farina non 
retinne, ma la grosa.412 
In truth, I wrote them, but I had so little 
grasp of their meaning that I thought of 
myself as a sieve or sifter which does not 
retain the precious and refined flour but 
only the most coarse.  
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He explains that he wrote so hastily that he had not the time to convert her first-person voice into 
the third person and indeed the text we read today switches between third and first persons.  The 
text also retains a good deal of her Umbrian speech that Fra Arnaldo simply could not translate 
quickly enough or as effectively as he would have liked.  He stresses the dissonance between the 
words of his penitent and what he gives her reader by offering an account of Angela’s reactions 
to his efforts, “And this will give an idea,” he says,  
 
E qui può in alguno modo apparere, ch’io 
de le parole divine non poteva prendere se 
no le plui grose. Ché alcuna volta, mentre 
como da la soa boca prendere poteva cusì 
lo scriveva dretamente, e mentre relegendo 
quelo ch’io aveva ben scripto, che altro a 
scrivere me dizèse, mi dizeva 
meraveiàndose che quele cosse non 
recognoseva. 413 
Oh how very unrefined was my 
understanding of the divine words I was 
hearing from her: One day after I had 
written as best I could what I had been able 
to grasp of her discourse, I read to her what 
I had written in order to have her dictate 
more to me, and she told me with 
amazement that she did not recognize it.   
 
 He offers further examples of her amazement at hearing the words that call to mind her 
own words and in some way her experience while not at all capturing what her “soul felt,” as she 
put it.  The fact that she does not write her own story and finds fault with the words for she 
complains they provide only a weakened or “bland” image of her experience corroborates her 
                                                
 





constant decrying of the ability to speak of the divine, union with the divine, or even experiences 
on the path to transcendence.  While this claim is one common to the traditions which attempt to 
speak the divine, what is interesting is that while others write that they cannot say anything, 
Angela does not.  Her experience is conveyed through words that we are told are hers but written 
by someone else.  We have not one but two “writers” expressing anguish of two different kinds 
at the prospect of writing a personal experience of the divine.  Neither has faith is the expression 
of the experience.  Putting together a story, a story of transformation, would seem less about 
expressing a lived, past experience, than part of a process of transformation in and of itself.  The 
experience of anyone from the past is wholly lost.  Language is a means to try and point back to 
something, but it cannot endow a reader with the experience of another.  As Bernard McGinn 
notes,  
Those who define mysticism in terms of a certain type of experience of 
God often seem to forget that there can be no direct access to 
experience for the historian.  Experience as such is not a part of the 
historical record. The only thing directly available to the historian or 
historical theologian is the evidence, largely in the form of written 
records, left to us by Christians of former ages.414 
The textual evidence might not offer us a chance to live the experiences of others.  We 
must not forget that despite all that we cannot know about the experience that leaves us a text 
might however, allow us to witness the intersection of self and text by showing us what people 
                                                






thought should be preserved in writing and all the judgments regarding the quality of the written 
words that are left after the experiences have gone.   
Along with the story of her steps to experience of the divine that is the Memoriale, we 
also have a collection of texts, letters and other material known as The Instructiones, in which 
she offers counsel to those wishing to grow closer to God.  Together these texts form the text 
known as the Liber de vera fidelium experientia known in English as The Book of the Blessed 
Angela da Foligno.415  In the instructions words are not given great importance, neither writing 
nor reading is significant. Though she does mention prayer, but stresses that by this she does not 
refer to words coming from the mouth but explains that: 
 
E chiamo ‘orazione’ non solamente de la 
boca, ma de la mente e del cuore e de tute 
la potenzie de l’anima e de li sentimenti del 
corpo. La qual orazione fa l’anima la quale 
vuolle e dexidera questo divino lume 
trovare, studiando e pensando e legiendo 
continuamente ne lo libro e sopra lo libro 
de la vita; lo quale libro de vita è tuta la 
vita de Cristo, mentre vise in questa vita 
mortale.416  
By prayer I mean not merely prayer from 
the mouth, but of the mind and heart, of all 
the powers of the soul and senses of the 
body. This is the prayer prayed by the soul 
who wills and desires to find this divine 
light, studying, meditating, and reading 
without cease in the Book and the more-
than-book of Life. This Book of Life is the 
entire life of Christ while he lived as a 
mortal on earth. 
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Her exhortation to pray and pray in this manner despite coming from one outside of the monastic 
tradition is oddly reminiscent of the monastic “craft” described by Mary Carruthers: “The craft 
of making prayer continuously, which is the craft of monasticism, came to be called sacra 
pagina in Latin, the constant meditation based on reading and recollecting sacred texts.”417  It is 
clear in her instructions to others as from the story of her own experiences, that images, visual 
meditation, and visions are what not only lead the penitent toward Christ, but also are the means 
of manifesting or the way of experiencing union with the divine.  For Angela, the sensory 
experience of mystical ecstasy is only explained as a “vision” and the way to reach the divine is 
through envisioning.  The Memoriale and The Instructiones offer a model and a doctrinal treatise 
of envisioning as a means of losing the self to arrive at the ecstasy of mystical union.  
 From the beginning of the Memoriale it is clear that Angela da Foligno sees her 
experience of ecstatic vision and the possibility of union with the divine as the result of a series 
of steps which transformed her little by little into a being capable of reaching God—ironically, 
we will see that it is in fact only an entity devoid of a sense of being, of a sense of selfhood that 
can arrive at such union.  The first chapter of the Memoriale explains that Angela had found 
there to be thirty steps in transformation: 
 
Disse l’anzolla de Cristo, che, parlando con 
la sua conpagna, aveva asegnati trenta pasi 
overo mutazione le qual fa l’anima ne la 
A certain servant of Christ related that in 
conversations about God with her 
companion, she had designated (drawing 
                                                
 





via de la penetenzia, li quail in se 
trovono.418 
from her own experience) thirty steps or 
transformations which the soul makes as it 
advances on the way of penance. 
 
From the beginning of the first chapter then it is clear that the author of the text, be it Angela or 
her confessor, understands transformation as a series of steps. The goal itself is outlined 
throughout her dictated work and the Instructions in a variety of ways that indicate she wishes 
the elements of the self to be shucked and a complete possession of and by God to be so 
seamless that there is only a single entity, a complete union: 
 
Ancora poi, la divina bontad mi feze questa 
grazia, che de due me feze uno, ch’io non 
posso volere alguna cossa se non quello 
che esso vuole—grande mixericordia è 
questa di Questo che feze tal 
conzonzimento! -, e fèzeme ne l’anima mia 
uno stato d’uno modo, e rezeveva poca 
mutazione; et àzo de Dio in tanta 
plenitudine che non sono ora in quello 
ch’io soleva, ma sono menata in una paze 
ne la qualle era collui, e sono contenta 
Likewise, the divine goodness granted me, 
afterward, the grace that from the two there 
was made one, because I could not will 
anything except as he himself willed.  How 
great is the mercy of the one who realized 
this union!—it almost completely 
stabilized my soul. I possessed God so 
fully that I was no longer in my previous 
customary state but was led to find a peace 
in which I was united with God and was 
content with everything.  
                                                                                                                                                       
 




d’ogni cossa.419  
 
This describes the mystic’s goal: to be with God and be content, fulfilled, lacking or desiring 
nothing.  The way to achieve this, Angela suggests, is to follow practices (for either herself or 
her scribe these are considered steps) that will lead the elements of self to be abandoned.   
 In the second instruction, Angela explains the three types of transformations that exist, 
that each build on the one before it: 
 
In tre maniere la transformazione de 
l’anema: inperzioché alguna fiata l’anima 
se transforma ne la volontade de Dio, 
alguna fiata con Dio, alguna fiata dentro da 
Dio e Dio è dentro da l’anima.420 
There are three kinds of transformations: 
sometimes the soul is transformed into 
God’s will; sometimes it is transformed 
with God; and sometimes it is transformed 
within God and God within the soul. 
 
The ways of being with God are varied.  The metaphysics of union has three forms for Angela.  
In each the boundaries between self and Other are penetrated in some way.  God is accessible 
through the space of the will, the space of divine being itself, or through space reserved for the 
divine in the self and vice-versa.  Angela goes on to describe the process for her 
listener(s)/readers in her second instruction.  The language and the process are remarkably clear: 
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La prima transformazione é quando lánima 
se sforza de seguitare le opere de questo 
Dio et omo pasionato, inperzoché in esse se 
manifesta la volontá de Dio.  La segonda 
transformazione é quando lánima se 
transforma e conzone con Dio et áve grandi 
sentimenti e grande deletazione de Dio, ma 
inpertanto un poco se puo exprimere con 
parole e pensare.  La terza transformazione 
e quando l´anima in perfetisima unione e 
transformamata entro da Dio e Dio entro da 
l’anima e sente de Dio altisime cose et 
asaza, in tanto che per nessuno modo se 
puo exprimire con  parloe né pensare.421 
The first transformation occurs when the 
soul strives to imitate the works of the 
suffering God-man because God’s will has 
been and is being manifested in them.  The 
second transformation occurs when the 
soul is united with God, feels deeply the 
consolations of God’s presence, and can 
express these with words and thoughts. The 
third occurs when the soul, by a most 
perfect union, is transformed within God, 
and God within the soul; then it feels and 
tastes God’s presence in such a sublime 
way that it is beyond words and 
conception. 
 
Angela’s acts before the crucifix depict how one can move from the first through to the last 
transformation.  Her book in its entirety demonstrates the need to divest the soul of its sense of 
self—will, feelings or sensations, are all one in God and so when one is united with God.   
The moments that precede so many of Angela’s raptures happen when she has been 
meditating on an image before her or one she has brought to her mind.  It was while looking 
upon a crucifix in 1291 that she felt the urge to strip during her mystical rapture.  On another 
                                                
 




occasion while gazing at the cross, her reaction is one of the greatest joy and certainty that we 
can be made one with the divine: 
 
E sguardando lo cruzifiso con li ochi del 
corpo, incontinente fo accesa l’anima de 
uno amore che tute le member del corpo ne 
sentivano grande letizia. E vedeva e sentiva 
che Cristo dentro in me abrazava l’anima 
con quelo brazio lo qual fo cruzifiso. E 
questo fo alora over poco poi. E 
alegravame con lui in tanta letizia e 
securitade, piu che mai fosse uxata.  
And while I was thus gazing at the cross 
with the eyes of the body, suddenly my 
soul was set ablaze with love; and every 
member of my body felt it with the greatest 
joy. I saw and felt that Christ was within 
me, embracing my soul with the very arm 
with which he was crucified. This took 
place right at the moment when I was 
gazing at the cross or shortly afterward. 
The joy that I experienced to be with him 
in this way and the sense of security that it 
gave me were far greater than I had ever 
been accustomed to.  
 
Gazing on the outward image of the cross brings Christ into her body, and yet allows herself to 
be at the same time enveloped by his body, his arm.  Indeed Angela’s reactions to the image of 
the passion were so intense that it was necessary for her companion, Masazuola, to cover up or 





E quando vedeva la Pasion de Cristo 
depenta, apena mi poteva sostenire, ma 
pilgiàvame la febre e deventava inferman, 
onde per questo la mia compagna 
nascondeva e studiava de ascondere le 
depenture de la Pasion de Cristo da me.422 
Also, whenever I saw the passion of Christ 
depicted, I could hardly bear it, and I would 
come down with a fever and fall sick. My 
companion, as a result, hid paintings of the 
passion or did her best to keep them out of 
my sight. 
 
In fact, Angela’s receptivity to images is just as much a fundamental feature of her mystical 
process as it is to the experience of love as an attack on self as described by Bernart de 
Ventadorn, Arnaut de Maruelh, and other troubadours.  It is through the eye that the self is 
penetrated; the eye is the crack in the surface of the self that allows for the sense of self to 
eventually be shattered.  The crucifix, paintings, and eventually inner images that come unasked 
or when envisioned play a major role in moving the soul from each step to the next. Angela 
explains that this was done before she had undergone her great transformation during her 
pilgrimage to Assisi.  Kathleen Kamerick has claimed that, “[m]editation on Christ’s corporeality 
and physical suffering framed and inspired her spiritual struggles, and was aided—at least in the 
early part of her spiritual journey—by religious art.”423  It seems that the images of Christ 
including those of his suffering inspired ecstasy rather than struggle, but generally it cannot be 
missed that the significance of images in the mysticism of Angela da Foligno is crucial.  The 
point has been well proven by Kamerick but also by Molly Morrison whose article, “A Mystic’s 
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Drama: The Paschal Mystery in the Visions of Angela da Foligno”424 extends the study of outer 
influences to the Paschal Mystery suggesting the possibility that Angela viewed a dramatization 
of the passion prior to her own ecstatic experiences.  What is important to note is that despite 
Angela’s claim that her early reactions to images of the passion came unbidden, it is her careful 
contemplation of the image of Christ that truly leads her or any pilgrim closer to the divine. In 
her text she offers careful descriptions of her own experiences with images both external and 
envisioned.  These often include lessons in how to use these images to arrive at selflessness.  The 
lessons do not always come from the discourse of Angela herself, but are presented as embedded 
in the visions she recounts. 
In the tenth step Christ “appears” before her.  The appearances call her to reflect on the 
vast difference between his greatness and her vileness, a practice she learns from Christ’s 
promptings during these visions: 
 
M’aparava crusifiso ne la croze. E dizeva a 
me, ch’io sgaurdàse ne le sue piaghe , et in 
meravelgioxo modo mi mostrava como tuto 
mi aveva sostenuto; e questo fo folto fiate. 
E quando singularmente m’aveva mostrato 
tuto quelo che aveva sustenuto per me, 
dizeva: que adonque puoi per me pare che 
…he appeared to me many times, both 
while I was asleep and awake, crucified on 
the cross.  He told me that I should look at 
his wounds. In a wonderful manner, he 
showed me how he had endured all these 
wounds for me; and he did this many times. 
As he was showing me the sufferings 
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ti basta?425 which he had endured for me from each of 
these wounds, one after the other, he told 
me: ‘What then can you do that would 
seem to you to be enough?’ 
 
Not only does Christ appear to her, but he explains what she is to do with her visions of him: she 
is to focus on the significance of each element before her, each wound in this passage.  shortly 
after this exchange she says,  
 
…mostrandome li peli de la barba a lui trati 
e de le zeie e del capo, numerando et 
asegnando et asegnando tuti li flageli.  E 
me dizeva: Tuto questo i’ò sostemnuto per 
te.426 
He even showed me how his beard, 
eyebrows, and hair had been plucked out 
and enumerated each and every one of the 
blows of the whip that he had received. 
And he said: ‘I have endured all these 
things for you.’ 
  
Just as in the experience of the vision, Christ instructs Angela how to use the vision she 
witnesses, Angela’s recounting teaches her listener(s) and her readers what one is to do with the 
images of the passion, the images of Christ’s wounds.  In the fourteenth step the instructions call 
her to touch the wound, to take it inside herself: 
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…mentre che stava in orazione, cristo me 
se mostrò ne la croxe ciu chiaro.  E disse 
ch’io ponèse la mia boca ne la sua piaga 
del costato, e parevami ch’io vedèse e 
bevèse sangue che nuovamente transcoreva 
dal suo lato, e dàvamese at intendere che in 
questo me mondava. E qui comenzai ad 
aver gran letzia, avegachè considerando la 
pasione avèse tristizia.427 
…He then called me to place my mouth to 
the wound in his side. It seemed to me that 
I saw and drank the blood, which was 
freshly flowing from his side. His intention 
was to make me understand that by this 
blood he would cleanse me. And at this I 
began to experience a great joy, although 
when I thought about the passion I was still 
filled with sadness. 
 
Christ’s wounds were at first to be considered and meditated upon.  In the second vision she is 
urged to drink from the bloody wounds, thus literalizing the metaphoric implications of 
nourishing her soul with meditation upon Christ’s wounds as was suggested in the first vision.  
This move from the symbolic to a literalized ingestion calls to mind the shift from the lyric of 
Guilhem de Cabestanh which suggests the lover gives the beloved his heart, meaning his love, 
which is then made literal by Guilhem’s biographer creating a motif of the coeur mangé which 
spread throughout Europe. 
Angela  grows to focus on the joy of Christ’s suffering instead of the sadness it had once 
inspired in her. After she has completed her steps towards union with God, the marks of 
suffering now inspire joy:  
 
                                                
 




E dilèctome di vedere quele mane, li quale 
mostraràme con queli segni de li chiodi, 
quando dirà: Ecco quelo ch’io sostini per ti 
e per li altri. E latizia, la quale qui pilgia 
l’anima, non se puo narare. E per nessuno 
modo posso mo’ avere tristizia nessuma de 
la pasione, ma dilectome di vedere e de 
prevenire a quell omo. E tua la letizia è ora 
in questo Dio omo pasionato.428 
My delight at present is to see that hand 
which he shows me with the marks of the 
nails on it, and to hear him say: ‘Behold 
what I have suffered for you and others.’ 
The joy which seizes my soul in this 
moment can in no way be spoken of. And 
in no way whatever can I be sad concerning 
the passion: on the contrary, my joy is in 
seeing this man, and to come to him. All 
my joy now is in this suffering God-man. 
 
Angela has managed to arrive at a point where the suffering of Christ is a source of joy rather 
than pain and guilt—she no longer thinks of herself, what this act of sacrifice means for her, but 
is concerned with what it means in the scheme of the divine order. The contemplation of God’s 
image, in particular with the passion, allows Angela to progress along the mystical journey 
towards self-annihilation.   
The steps towards mystical union are in this way the shedding of layers of selfhood as 
Angela saw when she experienced an illumination that came to her while she looked upon the 
crucifix: 
 
Ma in questo cognoscimento de la croze Nonetheless, this perception of the 
                                                
 




m’era dacto tanto fuoco che, stando apresso 
de la croxe, me spolgiai tute le vestimente e 
tuta me ofresi a lui. Et avegnaché con 
tremore, ma alori promisi a lui de observare 
castitade perpetua, e de non ofender a lui 
con algun di mie menbri, e accusando li 
peccati de tuti i membri.429 
meaning of the cross set me so afire that, 
standing near the cross, I stripped myself of 
all my clothing and offered my whole self 
to him. Although very fearful, I promised 
him then to maintain perpetual chastity and 
not to offend him again with any of my 
bodily members, accusing each of these 
one by one. 
 
Angela da Foligno strips herself of all that had been draped on her; once stripped she offers 
herself completely to God. Her bodily members she doffs one by one by giving them a name, an 
identity apart from her own. She explains that she was: 
 
iluminata e fòme insingnata la via de la 
croxe in questo modo, zioè ch’io mi 
spolgiàse e fosse piui liziera, e nuda a la 
croxe andàse, …zioè ch’io perdonàse queli 
che me avevano ofexo e spolgiàseme de 
tute le cose terene e de tuti li omeni e 
femene, amizi e parenti e da tuti li altri e da 
la mia posesion e de mi medexima…430 
… instructed, illumined, and shown the 
way of the cross in the following manner: I 
was inspired with the thought that if I 
wanted to go to the cross, I would need to 
strip myself in order to be lighter and go 
naked to it. This would entail forgiving all 
who had offended me, stripping myself of 
everything worldly, of all attachments to 
                                                                                                                                                       
 





men and women, of my friends and 
relatives, and everyone else, and, likewise, 
of my possessions and even of my very 
self... 
 
She strips herself of her shell, her clothing, literally and then describes the need to do so 
figuratively, ridding herself of her social garb: the friends and family that along with her 
possessions wrap up her self.  She claims that to arrive at the foot of the cross she needs also to 
get rid of “even [her] very self.”  The process modeled here is one in which meditation upon a 
real, physical image leads to reflection on one’s own situation.  As Lachance notes in the 
introduction to the text, in the early stages of her experience, “visions of the Crucified 
increasingly quickened Angela’s journey.”431  “This perception made me aware of all my sins, 
and this was extremely painful” says Angela, a realization which then sparks a passionate 
response or desire, but a desire that cannot be denied or tamed, to go to Christ.  All things not 
Christ are found wanting, distracting, and so the one who wishes to join him cannot but want to 
lose all of the worldly objects that stand in the way between subject and beloved Christ.   
Even the self must be examined and relinquished.  The first step Angela claims is the 
awareness of one’s sinfulness, and again in the fifth step the focus is once again on knowledge of 
the nature of the self:  
 
El quinto passo è cognoscimento si se The fifth step is the knowledge of self. 
                                                                                                                                                       
430 Thier and Calufetti, Il Libro della Beata Angela 139. 
 




inperzioché za un poco aluminata, non 
vede in se se no difeti. Et alora condapna se 
medexima a Dio, inperziò ch’è degna se 
l’inferno; e qui rezeve ancora pianto 
amaro.432 
Partially enlightened, the soul sees nothing 
but defects in itself, and condemns itself 
before God as most certainly worthy of 
hell. This is a source of much bitter 
weeping.   
 
 
Angela da Foligno explains that one day she heard God say: 
Io te voglio mostrare la mia potenzia.433 I want to show you something of my power; 
 
and this is her account of what occurred:    
 
Et incontenenti furono aperti li ochi de 
l’anima e vedeva una plenitudine de Dio, 
ne la quale conprendeva tuto lo mondo, 
zioè oltra mare e di qua da mare e l’abisso, 
lo mare e tute le cose. Et in tute queste cose 
no se dizernèa se no la divina potenzia, et 
inpertanto in modo al tuto inenarabile.434 
And immediately the eyes of my soul were 
opened, and in a vision I beheld the 
fullness of God in which I beheld and 
comprehended the whole of creation, that is 
what is on this side and what is beyond the 
sea, the abyss, the sea itself, and everything 
else. And in everything that I saw, I could 
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perceive nothing except the presence of the 
power of God and in a manner totally 
indescribable.  
 
Angela da Foligno uses the imaginary as a method of reducing her own worth to the smallest 
grain within the small thing that is the whole of creation : 
 
E conprendea tuto lo mondo quaxi una 
picola cosa.435 
Wherefore I understood how small is the 
whole of creation. 
 
She has lost herself in the immensity and grandeur of the imaginary. Angela loses her self by 
creating and focusing on images of the divine.  Steven Fanning suggests this preoccupation with 
being a small thing and being full of defects as the lines cited above note betray the influence of 
Franciscanism: "In typical Franciscan style, Angela emphasized a life of penance and recognition 
of one's own sinfulness and nothingness..."436 Her instructions urge the reader to penance 
because of a conviction that the practicant will move closer to God by embracing a 
consciousness of one's sinful and pathetic nature when compared with the divine.  
The unworthiness of the mystic is fundamental to transformation and must ultimately be 
surpassed.  When Angela was focused on her sinfulness she was saved by grace: 
 
                                                
 
435 Thier and Calufetti, Il Libro della Beata Angela 263. 
 




E mentre era in amaritudine per li pecati e 
ancora  non sentiva divina dolzeza, mutata 
fu de questo stato in questo modo.  Nel 
Sestodezimo passo una fiata io era andata a 
la chiexia et aveva oregato Dio che alguna 
grazia me fazasèse.437 
Up to this point, I was still feeling bitter 
sorrow for my sins and did not yet feel 
divine sweetness. I was transformed from 
this state in the following manner. In the 
sixteenth step, one time I had gone to 
church and prayed God to grant me a grace 
of some kind. 
 
The grace Angela da Foligno receives is a freedom from the focus on her own sinfulness and her 
own sorrow and distress with her sinful state.  It is while praying that God gives her a grace.  
 
E mentre orava, puse el Pater-nostro noe 
cuor mio, con tanto chiaro intendimento de 
la bontà divina e de la mia indegnitade che 
tute le parole sel cuor me se poneva. E 
dizeva el paternostro con la boca in tanta 
demoranza e cognisimento di me, che da 
l’una parte, avegna ch’io pianzèse 
amaramente per li mie pecati e la mia 
indegnitade la quale cognoseva, e pertanto 
lì àbi gran consolazione e comenzai a 
While I was praying the “Our Father,” I 
received deep in my heart a very clear 
awareness of the divine goodness and my 
own unworthiness. …I recited the Our 
Father so slowly and consciously that even 
though, on the one hand, I wept bitterly 
because I was so aware of my sins and my 
unworthiness, still on the other hand, I felt 
a great consolation and I began to taste 
something of the divine sweetness… 
                                                
 




asazare  alcuna cosa de la dolzeza 
divina…438 
 
The transformation from a focus on her own sinfulness to an understanding of the “Our Father” 
as a prayer that offers consolation can only come from God.  The change in understanding is 
possible only through an act of Grace.  The mystic can be told and even attempt to follow steps 
towards transcendence but ultimately it is grace from God that will transform the penitent.   
The progress made by the religious is slow according to Angela da Foligno.  She warns 
her students of the slow process that is losing one’s sinfulness and then selfhood: 
 
Et intendi che in tuti questi paso è 
demoranza e tenpo ; onde 
grandecuordologio e pietade è de l’anima, 
che si gravemente e con dolore e peso in 
verso de Dio fa tropo pizolo paso.439 
You need to be aware also that each of 
these steps takes time. It is indeed very 
pitiful and truly heartbreaking that the soul 
is so sluggish and moves so painfully and 
ponderously toward God. It takes such tiny 
steps at a time. 
 
At another moment in her dictation to Fra Arnaldo, Angela once again explains that she was 
slow to move through her early steps of transformation.  The soul is simply overwhelmed with 
the worldly and to lose everything takes time: 
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Et in zacuna de la perdite demorai per 
molto tempo inanzi ch’io mi potese 
mouvere ad otro passo ; et in alcuno paso 
sono dimorato più et in alcuno meno. Onde 
essa fedelle di Cristo ameravelgiàndose 
dizeva: O con cuanto graveza l’anima va 
avanzi, e qui non se ne screvire niente. Cusì 
èbe forte lazi e ligami ne li piedi e si male 
adiutorio ebe dal mondo e dal demonio.440 
At each of the previous steps [1-16], I 
lingered for a good while before I was able 
to move on to the next step. In some of the 
steps I lingered longer, and for a shorter 
time in others. At which point, Christ's 
faithful one also expressed her amazement: 
“oh! Nothing is written here about how 
sluggish the soul's progress is! How bound 
it is, how shackled are its feet, and how ill 
served it is by the world and the devil.” 
  
Not only does the penitent need to meditate and draw one’s focus to following the path, but the 
world is not made to assist him or her in the endeavor to transcend.  Again, it is only through 
grace, because of God that the soul can be changed. Angela explains,  
 
Et alora la vertù de l’amore transforma 
l’amante ne l’amato e l’amato ne 
l’amante.441 
Then the power of love transforms the 
lover into the Beloved and the Beloved into 
the lover; 
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If transcendence, union with the divine, depends ultimately upon the power of God then 
what Angela da Foligno provides in her works is a model and a description of how one can 
prepare for absorption or the embrace of the divine.  The practices she describes focus the 
believer’s attention on the fragility and faulty nature of the self so that its power, its presence has 
been diminished. The most important tool to move through the steps of self-effacement in the 
mysticism of Angela da Foligno is meditation, what is unique in the description provided by 
Angela of her experience is the great role given to artistic representations, actual physical images 
of the life of Christ to foster meditation and the subsequent weaning from these physical images 
in favor of inward envisioning.  Angela's language does not seek to imitate that of fin' amors as 
Marguerite Porete does, and indeed is distinguished from the Beguines Hadwijch, Mechthild, 
and Marguerite Porete as McGinn notes, by "having no connection with the courtly motifs 
employed by the three northern mulieres religiousae."442   However, like Arnaut de Maruelh and 
other troubadours who focus on the image of the beloved, Angela suggests that it is through 
contemplation of God’s image, Christ’s suffering that the penitent can arrive at a selfless state 
and union with the divine.  Rather than the word, it is the image of Christ that guides Angela 
along the path toward self-negation.  
Indeed even before her ecstatic unio mystica Angela had learned to call up images in her 
mind first through prayer and so as a gift of grace from God: 
 
Nel terzodezimo passo entrai per dolore de 
la pasione de la quale èbe la madre de 
Cristo e San Zuane. E pregàili che 
In the thirteenth step, I entered into the 
sorrow over the passion suffered by the 
mother of Christ and St. John. I prayed 
                                                




m’acatasero segno zerto per lo qual potesse 
aver memoria de la pasione de Cristo 
continuamente et infro queste cose 
adevenne che in sonio me fo mostrato lo 
cuore de cristo…443 
they would obtain for me a sure sign by 
which I might always keep the passion of 
Christ continually in my memory. 
Thereupon, the heart of Christ was shown 
to me during my sleep… 
 
This is one of the many consolations she says she began to receive in dreams.  As Angela 
discusses her seventeenth step, she explains that she began to have many dreams and was able to 
experience the joy of God’s presence waking and sleeping: 
 
E qui cominizai aver consolazione per sonii 
; et avera sonii belli et in essi m’era dato 
consolazione. E si comenziòmese aa dare 
dolzeza da Dio dentro ne l’anim, vegliando 
e dormendo continuamente…444 
Then I began to receive consolation 
through dreams, which were numerous and 
gave me great comfort. My soul also began 
to experience the sweetness of God 
continually, both while I was awake and 
asleep; 
 
Angela can call images to mind to bring her this great comfort when she feels distress as when 
she considers her lowliness in comparison with the magnificence of the divine: 
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Et imperziochè in Paternostro me fo 
manifesta la indegnitade mia e I mei pecati, 
e comenzai ad esser vergognoxxa in tanto 
che apena voleva levare gli occhi nè era 
osata ; ma presentai alla beata Vergine che 
me atrovàse perdonanza de li mie pecati.445 
But since reciting the Our Father made me 
so aware of my own unworthiness and my 
sins, I was overcome by great shame and I 
hardly dared to raise my eyes. I pictured in 
my mind the Blessed Virgin so that she 
would beg forgiveness of my sins for me. 
 
She thus could simultaneously experience worthlessness and grace with two different meditative 
practices (alternating?) at once— that of envisioning the Madonna even while she meditates on 
the words of the “Our Father” as divine enlightenment allowed: 
 
E mentre orava, puse el Pater-nostro noe 
cuor mio, con tanto chiaro intendimento de 
la bontà divina e de la mia indegnitade che 
tute le parole sel cuor me se poneva.446  
While I was praying the Our Father I 
received deep in my heart a very clear 
awareness of the divine goodness and my 
own unworthiness. I understood the 
meaning of each of the words I was saying 
deep in my heart. 
 
It is clear that these moments of enlightenment are examples of grace given by God but offered 
only when Angela has entered into prayer or turned her eye, inward or bodily, toward the divine.  
It is a pattern that was established at the beginning of her journey and the Memoriale when 
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Angela finally asks Saint Francis for his help and he quips that all she had needed to do was to 
turn to him, “Sister, if you had asked me sooner, I would have complied with your request 
sooner.”447 Likewise it is through God’s grace that the penitent is able to behold images within, 
to see with an inner eye at all: 
 
E pregava Dio che li dovèse dar di se 
inperziò chera cusì seca d’ogno bene. E 
aloro fono aperti i ochi de l’anima e 
vedeva l’amore che veniva pianamente 
verso se, ... Et incontenente che pervenne a 
lei, parve a lei apertamente che vedèse con 
i ochi de l’anima più che non se può 
vedere con i ochi del corpo... 448 
   
She prayed to God that he give her 
something of himself for she felt very dry 
and deprived of every good. And then the 
eyes of her soul were opened and she had a 
vision of love gently advancing toward 
her...  And suddenly she saw it coming 
toward her with the eyes of her soul, more 
clearly than can be seen with the eyes of 
the body, ...;  
 
The power to see clearly, to understand, to see love coming toward her comes from the divine 
grace that allows her inner eyes to see.449  It is clear that the meaning of the images she 
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contemplates is not reached by her reasoning but from god-given illumination.  While the images 
appear only when she has readied herself to receive them, though the Christ in her vision points 
to his wounds, his beard, and each element he wants her to consider and instructs her in what she 
is to think of these, she describes the peace and well-being, joy and ecstasy as feelings that 
invade her being rather than coming from her ability to think and arrive at the meanings being 
given.  She is given understanding with a spark, through sudden and unexpected illumination.  
As she describes it her soul, her self is disassociated from the body in the experience: 
 
Et  essa anima , mentre era in essa tenebra, 
e voleva tornare a reitro a se non poteva et 
non poteva ire inanti, nè riturnare a rietro a 
rietro a sse. Et dapo’ queste cosse l’anima 
subitamente fo levata et iluminata e 
vendeva la possanzade Dio inenarabile e la 
divina volontade. Ne le quale intendeva 
plenisimamente e zertisimamente tute le 
cose, le quale io avèva adimandate. E fo 
l’anima incontinenti trata de tta quela 
tenebra de prima.  Onde e inprima in quela 
tenebra io iazea in terra, ma in questa 
grande inluminazione stiti in piedi, in su le 
At a certain moment, immersed in these 
thoughts, my soul was drawn out of itself 
to perceive that the mystery of what I was 
asking had neither beginning nor end. And 
the soul when it was in that state of 
darkness wanted to return to its normal 
state but could not; it could not move 
forward or go back to itself. After that my 
soul was suddenly lifted up and illumined 
to see the indescribable power of God, as 
well as his will. From these visions I 
received a most complete and certain 
understanding of everything I had asked 
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ponte de le dite grosse de li piedi. Et era in 
tanta letzia e alegreza del corpo e 
rinovazione, che mai tanta non aveva 
avuta.450  
about. And so, when I was in that darkness, 
I lay flat on the ground, but when I was in 
the state of greatest illumination, I stood 
straight up on my feet, on the very tips of 
my big toes. I was so joy-filled, and my 
body felt so agile, healthy, invigorated, that 
I had never experienced anything like it. 
 
 
The understanding and the sensation are one.  Illumination provides instantaneous understanding 
and the ecstasy that this implies.  The understanding is the end and ultimately true understanding 
cannot be expressed through signs or symbols of any kind, not linguistic or imagistic. As she 
recounts what she has seen, she, paradoxically, consistently claims the impossibility of speaking 
her visions by adding preambles or postscripts to the descriptions of her visions : 
 
 
Ancora me disse a me, frate scriptore, essa 
fedele de Cristo, exponiéndome tute queste 
cose scrite, che tanta pasione vide l’anima 
sua, che quantonque santa Maria ne vedèse 
più che nulo santo in molti modi como essa 
At this point, Christ’s faithful one, in an 
explanation of the above, told me, brother 
scribe, that her soul had seen so much of 
the passion that it understood that even 
though the  Blessed Virgin had seen more 
of it and mentioned more of its details than 
                                                                                                                                                       
 




asegnava, inpertanto essa intendeva che per 
nessuno modo Ella la potesse dire, né santo 
alcuno.451  
     
 
any other saint, still she herself could not—
neither could any other saint—find words 
to express it; 
 
This lament that words cannot speak the experience or understanding that comes through the 
mystical process is common.  McGinn attributes it to all Christian mystics saying, “one thing that 
all Christian mystics have agreed on is that the experience in itself defies conceptualization and 
verbalization, in part or in whole.”452  The passion is shown to her in such a way that the power 
of the image goes beyond the power of the tongue,  
 
Questo dolore acuto, fo sì grande che 
lingua no zi basta a dire nì cuore a 
pensare...453 
This acute pain, so intense that the tongue 
cannot express it nor is the heart great 
enough to imagine it; 
 
Language ceases to have any power: Love beyond telling:   
 
E vego et intendo che quelle operazione I am convinced that there is no saint, angel, 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
451 Thier and Calufetti, Il Libro della Beata Angela 293. 
 
452 McGinn, Foundations xvii.  
 




divine e quelo profondissimo abisso, nullo 
anzolo e nula criatura è sì larga e capaze 
che la possa comprenderé; e tuta queste 
cosse cue ora dico si può sì male dire e 
meno dire, che sono biastemare quelle.454  
 
or creature which has anywhere near the 
capacity to understand these divine 
workings and that extremely deep abyss. 
And everything I am saying now is so 
badly and weakly said that it is a 
blasphemy against these things;  
 
Angela da Foligno might make the effort to dictate her visions to Brother Arnaldo but her ecstasy 
does not come from playing with language as she strives to explain her experience to him.  
Angela’s joy comes in the moments of her rapture, the moments when she “sees” the glory of 
God, the suffering of Christ not from her linguistic recreations of these moments or these visions. 
Angela seems much more interested in the imaginary than in the rhetorical. Angela cannot 
express strongly enough that, 
  
…e ziò ch’io dico me pare dire niente, over 
dire malle. E poi dìsseme: parme de 
biastemare.455 
Everything I say now about it seems to say 
nothing or to be badly said. It seems that 
whatever I say about it is blasphemy; 
 
As she speaks to her confessor and amanuensis Angela’s frustration at her inability to express 
her experience, the various features of her new understanding, and God himself erupts regularly 
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throughout the text of the Memoriale.  She ultimately decides there is no way to talk about God 
or union with the divine:  
 
E perciò non si può dire nulla 
assolutamente, e perché non si può trovare 
nessuna parola che esprima queste cose 
divine e nessun pensiero e nessuna 
intelligenzia può estenderi ad esse, tanto 
soperchiano ogni cosa, como Dio per 
chivele non si può comendare, inperzioché 
Dio al postuto non si può comendare. E 
dizea la predita fedele de Cristo con 
grandísima certeza e dava at intendere che 
Dio non si può per nessuno modo 
comendare.456 
 
Therefore, there is absolutely nothing that 
can be said about this experience, for no 
words can be found or invented to express 
or explain it; no expansion of thought or 
mind can possibly reach to those things, 
they are so far beyond everything—for 
there is nothing which can explain God. I 
repeat there is absolutely nothing which 
can explain God. Christ’s faithful one 
affirmed with utmost certitude and wanted 
it understood that there is absolutely 
nothing which can explain God; 
    
 
The divine is not to be explained through language, but praised.  Understanding, if it is to come, 
will be bestowed by God through illumination when the recipient is ready.  When Angela da 
Foligno asked God to give her a sign, she had not yet understood that the divine does not need 
signs.  God responds to Angela’s wish for a sign saying,  
                                                
 





Questo che tu adimandi è uno segno che te 
darìa senpre letizia quando lo vedèsi e 
tocàsi, ma non te trarìa de dubio e in cotale 
segno poresti esser inganata.457 
This sign which you are asking for is one 
which would always give you joy 
whenever you see it or touch it, but it 
would not take away your doubt. 
Furthermore, in such a sign you could be 
deceived; 
 
What is “cotale segno” but an image or an event that points to something else.  In the space 
between the sign and the thing itself the room for interpretation allows for mis-interpretation and 
misreading.  While these signs, symbols, imagistic and linguistic are useful at some stages of the 
mystical process, ultimately the mystic should arrive at a stage where signs and symbols no 
longer point to something beyond themselves, but are the thing itself.  
Instead of “such” a sign, God proposes he place inside her heart a sign of his kind: 
 
E questo è lo segno lo quale laso entro ne 
l’anima tua, lo quale è melgio che quelo lo 
qualle adimandasti: Làsote uno amore di 
me, per lo quale l’anima tua continuamente 
serà calda di me.458  
Here then is the sign which I deposit in the 
depths of your soul, one better than the one 
you asked for: I deposit in you a love of me 
so great that your soul will be continually 
burning for me. 
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Love is what he places in her heart—the thing itself, the “authentic sign” –  his presence itself is 
more than sign, it is the thing, and yet, he says, a sign of it. The sign that speaks, that signifies, 
points to something not there—something that might have been there, but is no longer. The sign 
is fleeting, dependent on those moments when she “sees” or “touches” it, that is, uses the tools of 
the imagination or the body.  Just as for Arnaut de Maruelh all signifieds point back to his 
beloved, all signs are inscribed here within a sameness that is the divine.  In this scene God 
describes the “meaning event” as defined by Sells: “Meaning event indicates that moment when 
the meaning has become identical with existence, but such identity is not only asserted, it is 
performed.”459  The type of sign God speaks of no longer points to the signified, but is truly the 
thing itself. 
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CHAPTER 6: FROM IMAGE TO TEXT IN THE MYSTICISM OF MARGUERITE D’OINGT 
 
The Women Carthusians 
 
 Marguerite d'Oingt differs from both Marguerite Porete and Angela da Foligno in that she 
was a member of a formal religious order and even held the position of Prioress in the convent of 
Poletains.  The Carthusian women religious were founded in what is now southern France as 
early as the first half of the twelfth century.  A number of houses were being developed for men 
when Marguerite de Bâgé wished to open a monastery for women.  Her family had contributed 
to the growth of the male Carthusians and it is therefore perhaps natural that she chose to become 
a Carthusian herself and ordered constructed a house in the years around 1225 or 1226 though 
the scribes of the annals for the Carthusians only say, "vers 1230."460  
What is remarkable and relevant to this study of Marguerite d'Oingt is the liberty the 
women religious had as regards their learning.   Carthusian women were deaconesses who could 
read scripture to their sisterhood.461  It is the synthesis of a mysticism of image and word that 
characterizes Marguerite d'Oingt and distinguishes her from Angela da Foligno and Marguerite 
Porete and indeed makes her a unique voice in medieval feminine mysticism in general. 
                                                
 
460 For a brief sketch of this history see the introduction to Marguerite's Speculum by Antoine 
Duraffour, Pierre Gardette, and Paulette Durdilly, Les Oeuvres de Marguerite d'Oingt, (Paris: 
Société d'édition "Belles Lettres," 1965) 13 ff.  
 
461 For a general introduction to the Carthusians see Bernard McGinn, The Growth of Mysticism 
(New York: Crossroad, 1994) 353-362.  For a discussion of women in Carthusian houses see, 
Yves Gourdal, "Chartreux," Dictionnaire de spiritualité ascétique et mystique doctrine et 






The “ancilla Christi” offers her name as Marguerite at the start of her Pagina 
Meditationum; to this Christian name the scribe who wrote the incipits and explicits informs us 
that she was the prioress of Pelotens, present-day Poletains.  The corpus of this 13th -century 
religious includes an account of a vision which we have in Latin which is the Pagina 
Meditationum written around 1286; “una partia de la honesta et saincta et discreta conversation 
que citi espousa de Jhesu Crit” which is known as The Life of Beatrice of Ornacieux, and the 
Speculum (written before 1294), the last two written in Franco-Provençal.  Letters remain and 
indicate that she was well respected during her time as Prioress.  Her death date is recorded as 
the eleventh of February of 1310.  
The prioress writes for herself according to her own declarations. In a letter she says of 
her writing, and of the Speculum in particular,  
 
Mon tre chier pere, je n’ay pas escrit ceste 
chose por co que jo les balliasso a vos ne 
autra persona, ne por ce que il me 
remansissent après la mort, quar jo ne suis 
pas persona que doie escrire chosa durabla, 
ne que doyent ester misse avant. Je n’ay 
escrit ces choses manque por ce que quant 
mes cuers seroyt espanduz parmi le munde 
My dear father, I did not write these things 
so that they might be given to you or 
anyone else, nor so that they remain after 
my death, for I have not been intended to 
write things that will last nor that should be 
taken as important, I did not write these 
things except that so, when my heart was 




que je pensaso en cetes choses, por ce que 
puisso retorner mon cuer a mon creatour et 
retrayre du mundo.462 
these things, so that I could return my heart 
to my creator and pull it from the world.463   
 
Speaking in the third person she claims that she who has had visions wrote them all in her heart 
until it was so full she was unable to eat or sleep and so, 
  
elle se pensa que s’ela metoyt en escrit ces 
choses que sos cuers en seroyt plus 
alegiez.464 
She thought that if she wrote those things 
down that her heart would be lightened of 
the burden. 
 
In this letter the prioress offers a variety of reasons one might choose to write down such a 
vision:  to be contemplated by a reader, for the reader’s benefit; for posterity; as mental prod to 
the memory of the writer herself; as a blinder that upon reading leads the author’s heart to God 
and away from the world; and finally, as a mental purge necessary to the writer herself.  
Marguerite recognizes the variety of functions the text gives the one who writes and the one who 
reads.465  By penning the Speculum she modifies her own mindset [mental state] even as the text 
                                                
 
462 Antonin Duraffour, Les Oeuvres de Marguerite d’Oingt, Publications de L'institut de 
Linguistique Romane de Lyon ; V. 21 (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1965) 142. 
 
463 English translations my own. 
 
464 Duraffour, Les Oeuvres de Marguerite d’Oingt 142. 
 
465 Finke suggests that for medieval women, mysticism was a public discourse, Finke, "Mystical 




produced offers the reader instruction in how to do the same.466  As Catherine Muller has said, 
“Elle sert de modèle et de miroir au lecteur comme le Christ lui avait servi d’essemplayre…”467  
This is effected by the very model of writing and her description of it in the Speculum, by the 
model of contemplation the text describes, and by the act of reading itself, which the message of 
the text proposes, is already a means to an altered state of being and relationship with God.   
The Speculum’s exordium claims that Marguerite writes for her correspondent because 
the recipient claims to feel better upon hearing stories which tell of God’s graces.  The grace 
recounted in the Speculum is one of the merging of grace and writing itself:  
 
Citi creatura, per la graci de Nostre 
Seignor, aveit escrit en son cor la seinti via 
que Deus Jhesu Criz menet en terra et sos 
bons exemplos et sa bona doctrina.  E 
aveyt illi468 meis lo douz Jhesu Crit en son 
cor que oy li eret semblanz alcuna veis que 
il li fut presenz e que il tenit un livro clos 
en sa mayn per liey ensennier.469  
By the grace of Our Lord, this creature had 
inscribed on her heart the holy life that 
God, Jesus Christ led on earth, his good 
example and good teaching. So firmly had 
she placed sweet Jesus Christ in her heart 
that it sometimes seemed to her that he was 
present and that in his hand he held a 
closed book for teaching. 
 
                                                
 
467 Catherine M. Muller, Marguerite Porete et Marguerite d’Oingt de L'autre Côté du Miroir, 
Currents in Comparative Romance Languages and Literatures, Vol. 72 (New York: P. Lang, 
1999) 56. 
 
468 ms pr.: e avia tant mes 
 




Marguerite paints an image of a heart inscribed with the three materiae any good religious must 
study: the story of Christ’s life, the lessons of his life, and his doctrine.  Inside this heart with 
tattoos the girl nestles the sweet Jesus.  The intensity of his presence becomes the sensation that 
he is presenting himself to her with a book in his hand to teach her.  Bringing the sweet Jesus 
into your heart invites not only his presence but his teaching and this in the form of a book.   
 The image which opens Marguerite’s Speculum emphasizes the link between text and an 
embodied experience of the divine.  Throughout the Speculum, text, the flesh, and imagining or 
contemplation switch roles or functions.  Marguerite emphasizes the power that imagining, 
envisioning, or seeing the divine will have suggesting it will necessarily lead the onlooker into 
love, just as any troubadour would say of his domna.  However, Marguerite d’Oingt turns this 
imaginative contemplation into a type of reading.  As Elizabeth Petroff has pointed out when 
considering Marguerite in the context of other female visionary writers Marguerite “brings … 
the idea that the visionary is not a vessel but a text, a body in whom or on whom a text is 
inscribed.”470  The body described in this opening with its embossed heart, functions as the page, 
the book, but not quite the text.  That is to say, it carries the letters but Marguerite does not read 
off the heart. Their meaning is never revealed nor their message conveyed.  Instead the engraved 
casing opens to reveal another image and another collection of letters on a book held by Christ.   
 The next paragraph describes the book, and the letters it carries,  
 
                                                
 





Ciz livros eret toz escriz per defor de letres 
blanches, neyres, et vermeylles; li fe[r]mel 
del livro errant escrit de letres d’or.471   
This book was written all over on the 
outside with white letters, black ones, and 
red, the clasps of the book were written 
[on] with gold letters. 
 
 She does not reveal what the letters say. Instead Marguerite describes the book and even the 
letters as though they were not a meaningful text at all but a piece of art, a painting an image; 
just as Julian of Norwich seemed to speak with the language used for describing a painting to 
describe her dream vision, Marguerite here speaks of this book and the letters that adorn its cover 
as though she sees them as an image in a painting.  Marguerite designates the meaning of the 
letters by referring to their color rather than their configuration into meaningful words or 
phrases:  
En les letres blanches eret escrita li sancta 
conversations al beneit fil Deu,  li quaus fut 
tota blanchi per sa tres grant innocenti et 
per ses sainctes ovres.”472 
In the white letters was written the holy life 
of the blessed son of God which was all 
white because of his great innocence and 
his holy deeds. 
 
The sign’s power to signify is altered in such a way that the congruence between signifier and 
signified no longer functions in accord with a sign’s producing a meaning that matches, however 
imperfectly, or points to its signified.  Instead Marguerite gives not a word of the “text” written 
in white. The letters’ color matches their signified: Christ’s saintly life of innocence and holy 
                                                
 
471 Duraffour, Les Oeuvres de Marguerite d’Oingt 90. 
 




deeds. We expect painting to work this way, not text.  She continues her description indicating 
that, 
  
[e]n les neyres errant escrit li col et les 
temples et les ordures que li Jue li gitavont 
en sa sainti faci et per son noble cors, tant 
que il semblevet ester meseuz. En les 
vermelles errant escrite les plaes et li 
pretious sans qui fut espanchies per nos.473 
In the black letters were written the blows 
that the Jews threw in his holy face and on 
his noble body so much that he looked like 
a leper. In the red were written the wounds 
and the precious blood that was poured out 
for us. 
 
Though she does not tell us what the letters spell out for the white, black or red letters, she does 
tell us what is written on the clasps of the book in gold: 
 
En l’un aveyt escrit: ‘Deus erite omnia in 
omnibus’. En l’autre aveit escrit: ‘Mirabilis 
Deus in sanctis suis’.474 
On the one was written: God is all in 
everything. On the other was written:  
‘Mirabilis Deus in sanctis suis.’ 
 
The two truths that hold the book closed are succinct enough to be spelled out for the reader of 
Marguerite’s text.  For the others she says she can only tell, 
  
                                                
 
473 Duraffour, Les Oeuvres de Marguerite d’Oingt 90. 
 




briament coment ci creatura se estudievet 
en cet livro.475 
Briefly how this creature applied herself to 
the study of this book. 
 
 Marguerite depicts for us the image of the girl beginning her study of the book and yet 
there is no mention of reading or of a book at all,  
 
Quant veneit lo matin, illi comencavet a 
pensar coment li beneyz fiuz Deu volit 
desendre en la miseri de ce mont…”476 
When morning came she began to think 
how the blessed son of God wished to 
descend to the misery of this world. 
 
As the description continues, Marguerite employs the verb pensar repeatedly:  
 
Apres illi pensave la grant humilita que fut 
en luy. Et pui pensave coment il vocit ester 
persegus toz jors. Apres pensave en sa 
grant poureta…477 
Afterwards she thought in the great 
humility that was in him. And then thought 
of how he wanted to be persecuted. 
Afterwards she thought about his great 
poverty. 
 
                                                
 
475 Duraffour, Les Oeuvres de Marguerite d’Oingt 92. 
 
476 Duraffour, Les Oeuvres de Marguerite d’Oingt 92. 
 




To follow the model of this girl who carries in her heart a Jesus who holds a book, one need not 
have a book to read, but instead simply contemplate the nature, desires, and doings of Christ the 
word.    
 As Marguerite d’Oingt moves into the next step, the image of the book returns and the 
prioress speaks of reading:  
 
Quant illi aveyt ben regarda cet livro, illi 
comencavet a liere el livro de sa 
concienci…”478 
When she had taken a good look at  cet 
livro that book, she began to read in the 
book of her conscience. 
 
The antecedent for “cet” livro is then the being and doings of Christ.  His life on earth is a book 
and one to be looked at, contemplated.  Our own human conscience takes the form of Christ’s 
image so that Marguerite calls it a book.  While many theologians and mystics have spoken of 
man being made in the image of God by borrowing metaphors based on images, Marguerite has 
chosen the metaphor of a book. Just as Meister Eckhart speaks of man as a grimy mirror image 
of God, Marguerite too notes that the image she speaks of is not perfect—the book of the 
visionary’s conscience does not match the one she had been studying. 479 
                                                
 
478 Duraffour, Les Oeuvres de Marguerite d’Oingt 92. 
 
479  
Quant illi regardavet la humilita Jhesu Crit, 
illi se trovavet tota pleyna d’eguel. Quant 
illi pensavet qu’il volit ester mesprisies et 
persegus, illi trovavet en se tot lo 
contrayrio. 
When she looked at the humility of Christ, 
she found herself full of pride. When she 
thought how  he had wished to be despised 
and persecuted, she found that she was tot 
lo contrayrio/ the complete opposite 




The elements of character, the desires Christ has, find their opposites in Marguerite’s 
book.  Other qualities of the Divine she lacks altogether, “Quant illi regardavet sa pacienti, illi no 
trovavet point en sei,” and others she has in lesser degrees “Quant illi pensavet coment il fut 
obediens tan que a la mort, illi ne trovavet pas si bien obediens coment mestiers li fut.”480 
Marguerite clarifies for her reader at this point that all these qualities that she has described: “Co 
erunt les letres blanches, en que eret escrit li conversations al beneit fil Deu.”481  Once 
Marguerite has compared her own letters to those of Christ’s qualities, she “se perforsavet de 
l’emendar tan come illi puet a l’essemplayre de la via Jhesu Christ.”482  Chapter one closes with 
the reader’s gaze focused on this scene of contemplative reading of a book and a life.  
Marguerite’s account thus far has not touched on the contents of the interior of the book 
in Christ’s hand.  She has only described the heart of the religious, inscribed with letters, holding 
inside Christ who holds a book, and the external features of that book and how the visionary 
studies the outer binding and clasps of the book. The religious “estudiavet grant teins” and then 
“Quant illi ne s’en prit garda oy li fut senblanz que li livros se uvrit”483 Marguerite tells us “Cit 
                                                
 
480 When she looked at his patience, she found none in herself…when she thought of how 
obedient he  
was, unto death even, she found herself not as obedient as was necessary.   Duraffour, Les 
Oeuvres de Marguerite d’Oingt 92. 
 
481 These were the white letters in which was written the life of the blessed son of God. 
Duraffour, Les Oeuvres de Marguerite d’Oingt 92. 
 
482 She put herself to emend them as best she could a l’essemplayre, according to the 
image/example of the life of Jesus Christ, Duraffour, Les Oeuvres de Marguerite d’Oingt 92. 
 
483 When she did not notice, it seemed as though the book opened itself. Duraffour, Les Oeuvres 




livros fut dedinz come uns beauz mirrors, et no hy aveit fors que due pages”484 Her description 
can only go so far, for she claims, 
 
De co que illi vit dedenz lo livro, jo ne vo 
conteray pas mout, quar jo no hay cor qui 
lo puit pensar, ne bochi qui lo sout devisar. 
Tot ades jo vos direy alcon petit si Deus me 
donet la graci.”485   
Of that which she saw inside the book I do 
not want to tell too much, for I do not have 
a heart capable of thinking of it nor a 
mouth that can describe it. Nonetheless I 
will tell you a little bit of it if God gives me 
this grace. 
 
We now see why it was that when discussing the letters on the book’s cover, text, word, and a 
linguistic means of signifying generally, had been left aside in favor of a notion of letters as 
image, and a means of reaching understanding and a closeness to the divine based on the verb 
“pensar” rather than “liere.”  The visionary was to imagine, envision the scenes from Christ’s 
life rather than confide in language.  To fall prey to the meaning of linguistic constructs without 
recognizing the degrees of separation inevitable between the words that speak God and God 
himself, is to risk misplacing one’s faith in the worldly, in language. Marguerite d’Oingt’s 
Speculum problematizes language even while valorizing the book and writing, producing text for 
her own well-being and for that of her reader.  When speaking of the cover she focuses on the 
plasticity of language, language qua colored shapes.  The book’s interior abandons all trace of 
                                                
 
484 The book was inside as a beautiful mirror and there were no more than two pages. Duraffour, 
Les Oeuvres de Marguerite d’Oingt 94. 
 




linguistic means of signifying or pointing the reader towards the divine.   The book’s interior 
displays nothing but image or likeness “semblanz” a mirror, an image.  Marguerite instructs her 
reader to “pensar”  
Or pensas que en luy ha d’autres biens 
avoy cetuy. Et co est li escriptura qui eret 
escripta el premier fermel del livro ou 
aveit escrit “deus erit omnia in omnibus. 
486 
Now think that all other good is 
contained in him. He is all that one may 
think and desire in all the saints. And this 
is the inscription that was on the first 
clasp of the book where it was written, 
“God shall be all in all.”   
 
Marguerite d’Oingt creates in the Speculum a variety of means to perform such reflection; she 
provides a text to read and consider, images to contemplate, and a notion of the body as a place 
on which to explore the experience of Christ.  Not only does her text provide all of these 
methods for the practicant to employ, the story of the visionary and her practices model for the 
reader a complete meditative regime to follow.  
The third chapter breaks this chain of scenes and images to speak of another visionary 
experience altogether. Christ appears in all his glory and from his glorious wounds comes light.  
The face will be gazed upon by any who happen to be so lucky as to see it: 
Sa faci eret si tres graciousa que li angel 
qui l’aveiant contempla de que il furont 
crea non se puyant solar de luy regardar, 
His face, was so graceful that the angels 
who contemplated it since their creation 
could not pull themselves from looking at 
                                                
 




mais lo desirravont a regardar.487 him, but desired to look upon it. 
 
While Angela da Foligno consistently stresses the fact that she was in prayer or had turned to 
God in some way and only then been given a vision of the divine, Marguerite d’Oingt follows 
the idea so often found in troubadour lyric that the beloved’s beauty is a force that one cannot 
help but turn toward.  Like troubadours who suggest that proximity with the domna, or 
contemplation of her image near or far can bring cortezia, Marguerite suggests that looking at 
Christ’s body brings love, 
Certes qui penseroyt et regarderoyt sa beuta 
et la bonta que est en lui, on l’amerit tant 
que totes atres choses li sariont amares. 
Quar el est si bons et si douz et si corteis 
que tot quanque il a de bein il ha dona et 
parti a ses amis.488   
Certainly, he who imagines and sees his 
beauty and the goodness that is in him, will 
love him so much that all else will seem 
bitter. For he is so good and sweet and 
courtly that he has shared all that is good in 
him with his friends. 
 
Marguerite’s suggestion parallels entirely the suggestions by troubadours who also claim that 
beholding the body of the noble beloved domna can reveal that all goodness is in her and all 
others and indeed everything else compared with her seems tarnished.   
The Speculum closes by summing up the lesson of Marguerite d’Oingt’s text:  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
487 Duraffour, Les Oeuvres de Marguerite d’Oingt 98. 
 




Certes jo ne croy que el mont ait cor si 
freyt, se il saveyt bien pensar et cogneitre 
la tre grant beuta de Nostrum Segnour, que 
il no fu toz embrasas d’amour.489 
Certainly I do not think that there can be a 
heart so cold in the world that did he know 
how to think well and recognize the very 
great beauty of Our Lord, that it would not 
be overcome by love.  
 
 Like Bernart de Ventadorn and the other troubadours who sing of awe-inspiring ladies, the 
nature of the beloved is such that love is simply inevitable. 
Through contemplating the pieces of the image she has depicted, the image that is the 
reality of God and his creation, one arrives naturally at the words that speak the truth. God is all, 
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CHAPTER 7: THE LOVER RAFFINNÉE OF COURTLY LITERATURE BECOMES THE 
SOUL ANIENTIE OF THE BEGUINES AND MARGUERITE PORETE 
 
Concluding the Dissertation Uniting Mystical and Fin' Amors Writing 
  
The final chapter of this dissertation studies a single mystic, Marguerite Porete, and yet 
can be viewed as a type of closing of the circle or conclusion to the processes of self-negation 
and the relationship between mysticism and fin' amors. 
In previous chapters I have simply outlined the particularities of writing and thematics in 
the works of troubadours and mystics suggesting that it is their relation to the goal of negating 
the self that provides an explanation to the similarities between the two literary traditions.  While 
direct allusions to the tradition of the troubadours were not a part of constructing grounds for 
comparison in these previous chapters, explicit allusions to fin’ amors and courtly stories of love 
are fundamental part of Marguerite Porete’s project.  While modern scholars might struggle to 
pinpoint the exact why and wherefore that will allow them to explain the somehow the link 
between the courtly and mystical traditions in the period of the twelfth to the fourteenth or even 
fifteenth centuries, such preoccupations with justifying the link, providing a grounds for 
comparison, did not preoccupy Marguerite.  She wants to speak of a soul that reduces itself to 
nothing and without worrying about why it might be the case, she turns to the language of fin’ 
amors, pulling language, images, and more from the varied literatures of fin’ amors and courtly 
love.490     
                                                
 
490 Given recent scholarship highlighting the ambiguities regarding the term and concept of 
courtly love, I prefer to speak of fin’ amors when referring to the refined love of the troubadours 




The Beguines and the Heresy of the Free Spirit 
  
The "new mysticism" outlined by McGinn took a particular form in the region of the Low 
Countries, the Rhineland, and northern France after Cistercian and Premonstratensian inspiration 
left women seeking a life of piety and community.491  A distinct type of religious society forms 
outside the cloister even as these “religious” attempt to live according to apostolic dictates: 
performing acts of charity, living in poverty, fasting, and piety.  Small households of less than a 
half dozen allowed women thus inclined to pursue a pious life while working collectively for 
themselves and for charity. Even so the beguine life is not strictly defined for a great variety of 
possible lifestyles and living arrangements were congruent with a pious lifestyle exercised in the 
world.  Ellen Babinsky calls this a "between status" that was a, "sort of middle way between 
ecclesiastical orders and lay status, living the religious life in chastity and in communities 
organized by house rules to which members vowed obedience."492  These "in between" women 
and the beguine movement as a whole had the respect of some religious figures from various 
orders and through the different levels of the religious hierarchy.  They likewise garnered the 
criticism from an equally varied public.  While Jacques de Vitry, biographer of Marie d'Oignies, 
                                                                                                                                                       
found in literature produced for the courts from the lyrics to the romances and allegories or 
treatises.   
 
491 A theological focus on the three most well-known Beguines, Hadewijch of Antwerp 
Mechthild of Magdeburg, and Marguerite Porete can be found in Chapter five of Bernard 
McGinn's The Flowering of Mysticism.  Indeed because the beguines were not a formal order 
discussion of beguinage tends to be focalized through one or more important figures who left 
testimony in the form of their own writing or the writings of their biographers (as in the case of 
Marie d'Oignes and Jacques de Vity) or confessors.  Most lengthy studies on Marguerite Porete 
and editions of her Mirouer include introductions to the beguines.  
 





stood as a defender of the beguines, they faced a serious threat in the personage of Guillaume de 
Saint-Amour, author of polemical texts including De periculis novissimorum temporum.493  This 
trajectory of freedom and creativity ultimately stamped out by an anxiety with new, unbridled 
orders and unchecked profusion of thoughts on the godhead and religious experience is the very 
trajectory of Marguerite Porete and her work.  
The Tradition of Fin' Amors in Mysticism before Marguerite Porete  
Marguerite’s adoption of the courtly model of love to understand and describe the love of 
the divine is not a completely unique invention.  As many scholars have recently been urging, we 
must remember that the realms of the sacred and the secular were not so starkly separated in the 
minds of medieval thinkers;494 furthermore, those who preoccupied themselves with one more 
than the other nonetheless moved between courtly and religious circles dispersing some views 
and picking up those of others.  In the mid- twelfth century Richard of Saint-Victor opens the 
door for the willful appropriation of courtly models of love when he uses the same language, the 
same steps, “gradus” to speak of earthly love of humans for each other and love of God. In 
Richard of Saint-Victor’s Tractatus de quatuor gradibus violentae charitatis, this student of 
Hugh of Saint-Victor begins outlining four stages of love in such a way that anyone familiar with 
the love of contemporary courtly lyric and romance could recognize the features of this courtly 
love in his description.  The treatise begins with the familiar outcry of the lover: “vulnerata 
                                                
493 The De Periculis has been recently edited: G. Geltner, William of Saint-Amour, De periculis 
novissimorum temporum, (Leuven: Peeters, 2008).  
 
494 Michelle Bolduc’s work, The Medieval Poetics of Contraries, makes a case for realigning our 
perspective on the separation between sacred and profane in the Middle Ages. Michelle Bolduc. 




charitate ego sum.”495  To be wounded by love is the first degree of love in Richard’s account 
just as it is in so many of the songs of fin’ amors sung by troubadours.  The following degrees 
are also applicable to contemporary secular accounts of the love experience: the second degree is 
binding love, the third is a paralyzing or languishing love, and the fourth degree of love is that of 
annihilation—the self is completely burned.  What is of particular interest to me is that once 
Richard has outlined the four degrees of love, he takes the time to compare the significance of 
each degree of love as it pertains to love between man and woman and the love of the soul for 
God.   It is not that the nature of love is different in the two; nor is it that the stages are different, 
rather Richard explains that the purpose of the degrees, the feeling of the experience of the 
degrees is what is different in earthly love. 
 
Hi quatuor amoris gradus aliter se habent in 
affectibus divinis, atque aliter in affectibus 
humanis, atque omnino aliter se habent in 
desideriis spiritualibus, et in desideriis 
carnalibus.496 
These four degrees of love are not grouped 
in divine love as they are in human love, 
and the degrees of spiritual desires are 
altogether different from those of the 
desires of the flesh.497  
 
                                                
 
495 I am wounded by love. All selections from Richard of Saint-Victor are from the Patrologia 
Latina, vol. 196, J. P. Migne and Theodor Hopfner, Patrologiae Cursus Completus; Omnium Ss 
Patrum, Doctorum Scriptorumque Ecclesiasticorum (Paris: 1857) (col. 1207 C).  This text will 
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Richard of Saint-Victor explains the way we should understand the stages of love, their meaning 
and feeling, and how it is the stages might be the same for both earthly and divine love and yet 
mean two very different things for each. 
Scimus quia in humanis affectibus 
conjugalis amor primum locum tenere 
debet, et idcirco in nuptiali toro ille amoris 
gradus bonus esse valet qui omnibus aliis 
affectibus dominari solet… Primus ergo 
gradus in humanis, ut dictum est, affectibus 
bonus esse potest, nam secundus absque 
dubio malus est... Tertius autem ille 
[Col.1214C] amoris gradus qui omnem 
alium affectum excludit, non solum est 
malus, imo etiam incipit esse amarus; cum 
voto suo semper pro voto frui impossibile 
sit, et ex alia aliqua re consolationem 
recipere non possit. Quartus autem gradus, 
ut diximus, omnium est pessimus. Quid illo 
pejus inveniri possit quod animam non 
solum malam, sed et miseram reddit? Quid 
miserabilius quam ejus rei desiderio 
semper fatigari cujus fructu nunquam 
We know that among human affections 
conjugal love must take the first place 
therefore in wedded life, that degree of love 
which generally dominates all other 
affections seems to be good… Therefore, 
the first degree in human affections is good 
but the second is certainly bad. …But the 
third degree of love which excludes every 
other affection is not only bad, but begins 
to be bitter, when it is impossible to enjoy 
one’s desire according to one’s desire and 
one cannot be consoled by any other thing. 
And the fourth degree is worst of all, as we 
have said. What can be worse than that 
which makes a soul not only bad but 
miserable also?  And what is more 
miserable than always to be plagued by 
desire for a thing, the fruit of which can 




possis satiari? [Col. 1214C] … Hic itaque 
ultimus amoris gradus in humanis 
desideriis omnium pessimus est, in divinis 
autem affectibus, ut dictum est, omnium est 
praecipuus.498 
love belonging to human desires is worst of 
all but in spiritual affections it is highest of 
all.499  
 
 While Richard’s description of love and its stages could have been pulled from the songs 
of languishing poet-lovers, and he does make an explicit comparison between earthly and divine 
love, Richard does not refer to fin’ amors or courtliness or courtly literature.  Despite this, from 
such a comparison it is but a small step to arrive at a more focused effort to bring together the 
language of the type of love defined in the courtly culture of the period with the love of God.  
Indeed it is the reversals of desire that Richard stresses but already in the Beguine literature that 
comes in only one score after the great bliss of a fulfilled desire is put off until after a period in 
which the mystic does feel the very suffering, the "douche souffranche" of the courtly lover.  
McGinn suggests that the amor de lonh was in fact one of the most important of the 
characteristics borrowed by Beguine mystics, "The mystics did not need the troubadours to 
inform them about the role of longing for the absent Beloved as integral to the experience of 
love...for some thirteenth-century women longing seems to become more important than 
possession."500  And yet it would seem that these mystics did take many lessons in love from the 
songbook of the troubadours and trouvères.  In the borrowing of courtly motifs Marguerite 
Porete is not first for a hybrid text produced in the mid-thirteenth century brings together pieces 
                                                
 





from secular lyric, the Bible, and exegetical works to explain both the way to flee earthly love 
and the way to instill divine desiring.  The Cistercian Gérard de Liège, author of five texts 
including his perhaps more familiar De doctrina cordis, interjects these texts produced in Latin 
with French words and entire phrases of multiple lines because he recognizes that the lines that 
describe fin’ amors apply perfectly (perhaps more perfectly he would insist) to the love of the 
divine.  His borrowings from the trouvères slip perfectly into his discussion of God because the 
courtly language of love fits the theological: “scilicet amorem diuinum, de quoi toute ioie uient 
et totius solas—unde dicit quod amor est causa totius iocunditatis…”501 To explain that one can 
foster the love of God Gérard de Liège uses the language of courtly love, and not figuratively, 
not simply adopting the themes and motifs, but by literally code-switching from Latin to French, 
and French lines taken from courtly love songs.502 
Gérard seems as free of anxiety in his translation or transposition of the courtly into the 
mystical as will Marguerite Porete fifty years or so later. Not only can he pull lines from love 
songs to explain the experience of divine love, but he can transpose the physicality of earthly 
love in much the same way lovers of l’amor de lonh had to do with their distant beloveds:  
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500 Bernard McGinn, The Flowering of Mysticism 169. 
 
501 Of course, divine love, from which all love comes and all pleasure, for which it is said that 
love is the cause of all joy.  Gérard de Liège, "Les Traités de Gérard de Liège Sur L'amour 
Illicite Et Sur L'amour de Dieu," Analecta Reginensia: Extraits des Manuscrits Latins de La 
Reine Christine Conservés Au Vatican, ed. André Wilmart, Studi E Testi 59 (Rome: Vatican, 
1933). 
 
502 For a more detailed account of this practice see the article Carlson, David. "Religion and 
Romance: The Languages of Love in the Treatises of Gerard de Liege and the Case of Andreas 





Verum est quod anima membra non habet sicut corpus. Sed tamen 
effectus multiplices habet ad modum membrorum. Amplexatur enim 
anima deum et tenet per obedientiam et per patientiam quasi duobus 
brachiis, … 503 
 
 While Gérard transposes the arms and limbs of the physical caress into the embrace of 
obedience and submission, the troubadours could be said to have done no less as they strove to 
demonstrate and even enjoy their love through full submission and service to the domna.  It is 
building on this practice that Peter Dronke is able to suggest that the language of mystics is a 
simple “transference” of the language of earthly love:  
It is easy to see at once to how great an extent such language [that of 
mystics and even theologians] is simply a transference of that used by 
human lovers.  How could it be otherwise? How else could a transcendent 
love be in any way communicated? What other area of human experience 
would be more accessible or more relevant to it? Implicitly then, through 
the very need of communication, human and divine love are here in a 
sense reconciled.504   
In such a declaration the power of language, the role of the word in the creation of experience, 
has been denied.  What Dronke asks, how else an experience could be “communicated,” implies 
already that the only reason for a linguistic borrowing is one of communication, the expression 
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of an experience already complete and understood.  It is communication, the attempt to share 
with another human an experience, that explains, even demands the overlap of language in the 
texts of mystics and fin’ amants.  For Dronke the motive of communicating an experience 
suffices to explain his second point in his discussion of mystical/courtly linguistic coincidence.  
The “point” for Dronke is not a question of wherefore but simply happening for he says, “the 
second point is this: that a wealth not merely of love-language, but of precisely that kind of love-
language which is most consonant with amour courtois, had accumulated over the centuries in 
the mystical and theological tradition itself.”  Dronke does not explain why this might be the 
case, that is what the metaphysical reality or psychological reality or contemporary 
understandings might be that would allow for this fact.  Instead, he goes on to say that, “This is 
to me the most striking thing that emerges from Gérard’s juxtapositions: the more deeply 
religious the language, the closer it is to the language of courtoisie.”505 The why is not striking to 
Dronke; It is the possibility, the fact that there is a realm where the reasoning, the why, is not 
striking, revolutionary, or odd. It has been my intention in this dissertation to turn the focus onto 
that “why,” to discover the reasoning, the theology, metaphysics, or linguistic theories that do 
allow for the overlap in language to exist between mystical and courtly literatures and to exist 
without revolution or anxiety.  It is only because the goal of self-annihilation is so clear to both 
types of lovers, and the role of language so crucial to this goal according to both traditions, that 
the two discourses leave us with the same textual traces.  The two discourses are as one linguistic 
phenomenon. For this reason ca. 1250 Gérard de Liège was able to insert lines in French lifted 
from secular love lyric alongside quotations from the Bible.  It is for this reason that fifty years 
later the anonymous author of the Rigle des fins amans felt the language—and again both langue 
                                                
 




and langage—of the trouvères appropriate for the compilation of rules for Beguines written “en 
l’onneur del roi de la roine des angles.”506  The rigles and ordinaries of the Beguines does not 
equivocate about the object of the fin’ amans’ affections, “fin amant sunt apelé cil et celes qui 
dieu ainment finement”507 begins the text under the rubric “Qu’est fine amors.” While for 
Richard of Saint Victor the difference between divine and human love was merely one of the 
experience or significance of the degrees—the end of love being more pleasurable when the love 
object is divine while the first stage is more enjoyable in human love—and for Gérard de Liège 
the love of ladies produced a language perfectly apt to speak of the love of God, the anonymous 
thirteenth century author of the Rigle suggests that the degrees of love or refinement are greater 
in those who love God, “Beguinaiges est li orders des fin amans.” And also:  
Cist .xii. signe sont tous jours en vraie 
amor et en fins amans. Les beguines les ont 
plus vraiement que les autres gens. Car eles 
les ont esperitueument.508  
These twelve signs of love are always in 
the true love of fine lovers. The Beguines 
have them more truly than other people. 
This because they have them spiritually. 
 
He then expands on this saying:  
Quele merveille, se eles ainment plus 
vertueument et plus fermement et miex 
What surprise is there if they love more 
virtuously and more firmly and know better 
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seven amer que nule autre, qu’eles sont de 
l’ordre as amans, si comme fu la 
Madelainne qui Jhesucrist ama si 
ardanment!509  
how to love than anyone else, for they are 
of the order of lovers, just as was 
Madeleine whom Jesus Christ loved so 
ardently! 
 
The choice of the question, "Quele merveille, se eles ainment plus vertueument...?" with its 
answer following a causal "que" is structurally and conceptually reminiscent of one of the most 
widely-known troubadour songs. Bernart de Ventadorn begins one of his songs saying:  
Non es meravelha s'eu chan 
melhs de nul autre chantador, 
que plus me tra·l cors vas amor 
el melhs sui faihz a so coman.510 
It is no wonder if I sing  
Better than any other singer, 
For love pulls my heart towards love 
And I am better made to follow its 
command. 
 
The coincidence between the author’s words and those of Bernart de Ventadorn is remarkable 
and not in the least because though the second part of the equation, the cause for each being the 
best lovers is not quite the same, in neither case is it defined by the love object.  While Etienne 
Gilson had claimed that the difference between mystic and troubadour lay in the insurmountable 
gulf that divides the human domna and God, that is not what appears in this diptych of perfect 
loving.  While for the beguines their ability to love comes from an alignment with other lovers, 
that is, it has nothing to do with the beloved, for Bernart it is his susceptibility to Love itself that 
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allows him to be the best lover (and so best troubadour).  In fact this is not the only occasion 
Bernart seems to have been adopted by the religious author; it is hard not to remember Bernart 
de Ventadorn’s claim that he could be carried off by thieves fully unawares if he is 
contemplating his beloved when the author of the Rigles describes the soul looking upon and 
contemplating Christ’s glory in human form:  
En pensant et mirant icele humanité vestue 
de gloire, …: quant ame est fichié ensi en 
tele meditacion, nus des sens corpereus n’i 
œuvre de son office, et ce apele on 
ravisement.511  
While thinking and looking upon that 
humanity robed in glory…: when that soul 
is thus focused in such meditation, none of 
his or her corporal senses are doing their 
duty, and this is called rapture. 
  
He has given name to Bernart's experience even if a name that is only truly appropriate in the 
case that the love object is divine.  After providing examples from Biblical stories, the author of 
the treatise describes this state more fully saying, “Ele ne pooit soustenir les merveilles qu’ele 
veoit, si se pasma. Quant ame est en tel estat, lors est ele en contemplacion. Celle est la quarte 
espese d’orison.”512 
 Along with these elements indebted to the courtly tradition the text closes with an 
allegory reminiscent of the Roman de la rose followed by a closing lyric about the enflamed 
heart that longs for a distant paradise where her pleasure and beloved reign.513 Barbara Newman 
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claims that the Rigles des fins amans, “can be read as a typical or representative statement of a 
beguine ethos that by 1300 was widely shared.”514The courtly language of love has at this point 
been completely absorbed within the mystical tradition of the beguines creating what Barbara 
Newman calls a “mystique courtoise.”  
Marguerite Porete 
 
The details regarding Marguerite Porete's life can only be broached by the material left 
by her incredible trials and death.515 At around the turn of the century, Marguerite Porete 
produced a text entitled, Mirouer des simples ames anienties.  The text might have circulated in 
written form but was certainly also disseminated by Marguerite with public oral presentations.  
The bishop of Cambrai, Guy de Colmieu learns of Marguerite’s preaching's and condemns the 
text, demanding it be burned in front of Marguerite in Valenciennes.  He also declared that any 
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holding or disseminating the text could be excommunicated.  Despite the unorthodoxy implied as 
well as the danger for herself, Marguerite continued spreading her word.  Her choice to do so did 
not go unnoticed; she was persecuted by Guy de Colmieu’s successor, Phillipe de Marigny, as 
well as inquisitors from various parts of France.  The inquisitor of Paris, Guillaume Humbert, 
also known as Guillaume de Paris, calls for her arrest in 1308.  She rejected all opportunities to 
repent or recant her pronouncements. In the spring of 1310, almost a year and a half later, 
Guillaume de Paris sends a list of articles extracted from her Mirouer to twenty-one regents of 
the University of Paris for examination.  Guillaume then calls together five canon lawyers who 
declare her a relapsed heretic.  When before the inquisitor she refuses to plead her case at all, not 
even taking the oath or testifying.  In May Guillaume de Paris orders Marguerite Porete 
condemned to death and she is burned for having  refused to desist from sending her work to 
theologians and beghards.  
As noted above in the beginning of this chapter, when Marguerite Porete writes her 
Mirouer, other female religious have already been exposed not only to courtly songs and 
romances of earthly love, but to the transposition of the court’s love into mystical or theological 
discussions of love.  She begins the Mirouer with an exemplum that is nothing more than a 
romance told in summary just as Li Rigles de fins amans had ended.   
Marguerite Porete highlights her debt to the love of courtly literature throughout her text.  
Marguerite’s extremely complex text the full title of which reads: Le Mirouer des simples ames 
anienties et qui seulement demourent en vouloir et desir d’amour, already in the prologue makes 
a very direct reference to the tales of courtly love.  The audience or reader is urged to listen to a 
tale of love just as courtiers might be called to draw their attention to a recital in court: “Or 




followed by another dictate, “et l’entendez aussi pareillement de la divine amour.”516  The story 
is the stuff of courtly romance, and yet, Marguerite’s project of mystical experience and 
theological dissemination not only incorporates the piece, but places it at the beginning and 
suggests reading or listening to the story of worldly love offers lessons in how to read the 
Mirouer as a whole. She suggests this “petit exemple de l’amour du monde” speaks just as much 
of divine love as earthly.   
The story tells of a damsel of great worth, heart, and nobility who hears tell of a courtly 
and noble King Alexander and her will immediately succumbs to the love of him.  He is “si 
loing” however, that she could not see or hold him and suffered this “amour loingtaigne” or 
amor de lonh that was nevertheless “prochaine ou dedans d’elle” so close because he was 
actually residing inside her.  She decides that “par ymaginacion” she might lessen her pain and 
so has an image painted to represent the likeness of Alexander.  The story concludes that “par le 
moyen de ceste ymage avec ses autres usages songa le roy mesmes.”517  The elements of courtly 
love are undeniable: a damoiselle of nobility and a King of great worth geographically distant 
and yet brought into her heart by her love, imagination, and other means which allow her to 
experience union with him.  The brief narrative incorporates the contradiction of the beloved’s 
distance while being carried within as it is expressed in the fin’ amors of Jaufré Rudel and 
Arnaut de Maruelh.  It also introduces the idea that imagining transforms the lover in such a way 
that union is experienced, an idea also present in the lyrics of the troubadours and key to the 
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mysticism of Angela da Foligno.  Once the story is outlined in the Mirouer,  the reader or listener 
is told that the soul which has become annihilated and reached union with the divine has 
followed the same trajectory as that of the exemplum “semblablement vrayement.”518  The poem 
that opens the text urges her readers to listen carefully and warns that even theologians and 
scholars cannot grasp this writing.  Marguerite consistently pits the knowledge of the learned 
against the wisdom that comes from Love’s instruction, 
Humiliez don’t voz sciences 
Qui sont de Raison fondees, 
Et mettez toutes vos fiances  
En celles qui sont donnees  
D’Amour, par Foy enluminees, 
Et ainsy comprendrez ce livre  
Qui d’Amour fait l’Ame vivre.519 
Humble then your wisdom 
which is based on Reason, 
and place all your trust 
in those things which are given 
by Love, illuminated through Faith. 
And thus you will understand this book 
which makes the Soul live by love. 
 
If the listener proceeds with caution and love she will reach God.  The book, we are told, 
will tell us how to follow this trajectory proposed as structurally identical to that of courtly love 
to reach a perfect, the annihilated state of being described by the book’s title: 
Ils sont sept estres de noble estre, 
desquieulx creature reçoit ester, se elle se 
dispouse a tous estres, ains qu’elle viengne 
There are seven states[ways of being] of 
noble being, of which the creature receives 
being, if she disposes herself to all ways of 
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a parfait ester; et vous dirons comment, 
ains que ce livre fine.520 
being, so that she comes to perfect being, 
and we will tell you how by the time this 
book ends.  
 
Just as the courtly romance models for the listener or reader the route or process to courtliness, 
and so in theory, allows its audience to undergo a transformation by romance’s end, so too will 
Marguerite’s book lead the listener through the seven stages through the various chapters.   
 Marguerite Porete’s doctrine follows a number of the laws of fin’ amors as found in the 
lyrics of the troubadours and discussed in the second half of this dissertation.  Like so many 
troubadours, Marguerite’s text suggests that Love leads naturally to the urge to speak or even 
sing of it.  The title alone attests to the importance of the image and the capacity to envision in 
the weakening of the self just as it was with Arnaut, Falquet, Marguerite d’Oingt, and Angela da 
Foligno.  The love is the focus and the very means by which one is altered, mué, is clear 
throughout the text’s many discussion of Love and Fine Love, but also because the dominant 
voice of wisdom is the allegorical figure named Amour.  Just as Bernart de Ventadorn’s main act 
of love and means of demonstrating love is his submission, his humility to the domna, so too, 
here is the most important step towards annihilating the soul and so reaching the divine, 
embracing humility.  Humility at its most extreme manifests itself with a complete loss of 
personal will.  The subservience of the troubadours is paralleled here and yet pushed even further 
to a point where reason is lost altogether as the central axis of the self; the will, has been 
abandoned.  The end of the process leaves the Soul beyond the realm of the expressive.  If will is 
truly lost, and so self, language no longer “works” as it normally does.   
                                                                                                                                                       
 




Indeed Marguerite Porete’s Mirouer, just as does troubadour lyric before it, suggests that 
Fine amour naturally produces language, even a specialized language like lyric.  In Chapter Six 
the Soul is described as having been transformed into loving by God and so does not need the 
Virtues (as odd as this sounds, the Soul does not need external instruction or counsel urging the 
bending of the will.  The change is effected, much like what troubadours proclaim, because Love 
has introduced courtoisie into the Soul.  When the Soul bids farewell to the Virtues she does so 
in song.   
L’Ame: Je le vous confesse, dit ceste Ame, 
dame Amour; ung temps fut que je y estoie, 
mais ores en est il ung aultre; voustre 
courtoisie m’a mise hors de leur servage. Et 
pource leur puis je maintenant bien dire et 
chanter : 
Vertuz, je prens congé de vous a tousjours 
Je en auray le cueur plus franc et plus 
gay ;521 
The Soul: I confess to you, says this Soul, 
Lady Love, at one time I was there, [in 
their service] but now it is another time; 
your courtliness has placed me outside 
their service.  And for this reason I can 
now well say to them, and sing: 
Virtues, I take my leave of you forever 
And so I will have a nobler and more joyful 
heart.  
 
The framework of the love relationship comes directly from the courtly model:  Love 
brings courtliness to the lover and causes a transformation of being that includes rendering the 
lover’s heart noble and bringing the lover the fin’ amant’s joi.  The Soul sings a song intended to 
speak the truth of her experience.    It is Love that frees her of Reason and the Virtues : 
                                                
 




Si beste estoie, 
Ou temps que les servoie, 
Que ne le vous pourroie 
De mon cueur exprimer. 
Et tandis que les servoie  
Et que mieulx les amoye, 
Amour me fist par joie 
D’elle oïr parler. 
Et non pour tant, si simple comme j’estoie, 
Combien que point ne le consideroie, 
Me print adonc couloir d’Amour amer.522 
So beastly was I, 
In the time when I was serving them, 
That I could not express it  
To you with my heart. 
And though I served them 
And that I loved them more, 
Love made me through joie 
Here talk about Her. 
And nonetheless, as simple as I was, 
So much that I did not consider it, 
It came upon me the desire to love Love. 
 
When Love accepts this disciple the transformation takes place and the virtues are abandoned.  
While she brushes over the process of transformation itself, the state of the changed Soul is 
presented in terms (and in form as The Soul returns to the lyrical form) that remind the listener of 
the words of lovesick troubadours.  
Penser plus ne m’y vault, 
Ne œuvre, ne loquence. 
Amour me trait si hault, 
(Penser plus ne m’y vault) 
Thinking no longer holds worth for me, 
Nor works, nor speech. 
Love draws me so high, 
(Thinking no longer holds worth for me) 
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De ses divins regars, 
Que je n’ay nulle entente. 
Penser plus ne m’y vault,  
Ne œuvre ne loquence.523 
With her divine gaze 
That I have no intent. 
Thinking no longer holds worth for me, 
Nor works, nor words. 
 
The song speaks of Love’s power to draw the lover higher, to a more noble state, through the 
gaze just as we hear troubadours sing in songs written so many years before.  Just as the selfish 
intentions and desires of the courtly lover are abandoned as he submits to his Domna, here the 
Soul loses all will, all interest in works as Love pulls her near and upward.  Just as Bernart de 
Ventadorn speaks of losing his ability to speak, but finds that before the beloved and because of 
intense love he cannot but babble nonsense, even losing sense altogether, so too does the Soul 
described by Marguerite Porete lose the language that can be understood by Reason—a topic that 
recurs in Marguerite’s text again and again.  It is Love and the “noblece” of Love that causes any 
words to be uttered, these words in verse not unlike Bernart de Ventadorn’s own songs which he 
says, “mas Domna, Amors m’enliama, que·m fai dir soven e gen de vos manh vers avinen.”524  
The same sentiment is rendered in Marguerite Porete’s Mirouer as follows:  
Amour m’a fait par noblece 
Ces vers de chançon trouver. 
C’est la Deité pure, 
Love has made me through noblesse 
These verses of a song compose. 
It is the pure Deity 
                                                
 
524 What’s more, Domna, Love binds me and makes me speak so often and so sweetly of you 
many becoming verses. “Amors, enquera·us preyara” ll. 42-44, Lazar, Bernard de Ventadour, 
Chansons D'amour. 
 




Dont Raison ne scet parler, 
Et d’ung amy, 
Que j’ay sans mere, 
Qui est yssu 
De Dieu le Pere  
Et de Dieu le Filz aussi. 
Son nom est le Saint Esperit, 
Dont j’ay au cueur telle joincture, 
Qu’il me fait joie mener.525 
Of which Reason does not know how to 
speak, 
And of a lover, 
That I have who is without mother, 
Who issues from God the Father 
And of God the Son as well. 
His name is the Holy Spirit, 
From which I have in my heart such a 
union that it makes me follow joie. 
 
 Intertwined into this courtly language of an amy and joie we find the doctrine of the 
trinity, of Christ issued of the Father and who is the Holy Spirit.  Despite knowing that nothing 
can be said that would make sense to Reason Marguerite cannot be quiet. 
As discussed in Chapter two of the dissertation, Marguerite claims that the feeling of love 
somehow pushes the one who loves to words, however weak their power of expression proves: 
Mais j’en vueil parler et n’en sçay que 
dire. Non pourtant, dame Amour, dist elle, 
mon amour est de tel arbiter, quie j’aime 
mieulx a oïr chose mesdire de vous, que 
que on ne die aucune chose de vous. Et 
sans faille ce fais je: j’en mesdis, car tout 
ce que j’en dis n’est fors que mesdire de la 
But I want to speak about it and I don’t 
know what to say about it. Nevertheless, 
Lady Love, she says, my love is so certain 
that I would prefer to hear something 
slanderous about you than that one should 
say nothing about you. And without fail I 




bonté de vous.526  
 
is nothing but slander about your goodness. 
 
Indeed the song of the Soul continues and continues because it is the great nature of the beloved 
that demands it, just as Gaucelm Faidit explains in a song that begins: 
Ja non crezatz qu’ieu de chanter me lays 
Eras, quan vey que n’es locs e sazos, 
Ans gimáis dey pus soven far chansos 
Quar silo don chan es tan belh’ e tan guaya, 
Qu’ades m’eschai que per lieys sia guays;  
E, per la belh’on joys creys et enansa, 
Non puesc mudar qu’en chantan non 
retraya 
Sa gran beutat e· l sieu ric pretz valen, 
Que·l ben qu’ieu fatz ven de lieys e 
dissen.527 
Do not think that I will leave off singing 
now when I see that there is a time and 
place for it, and in fact I should make songs 
more often for she about whom I sing is so 
beautiful and so joyful that it befits me well 
to always be joyful because of her; and 
through this beauty my joy grows and 
proceeds, I cannot help but to sketch in 
song her great beauty and her worthy, 
noble value, 
For the good that I do comes and descends 
from her.  
 
In language so similar to that of troubadours, and indeed even referring to the very qualities 
referred to by troubadours in their explanation of the lady’s worth that deserves song, The Soul 
exclaims: 
                                                
 
526 Guarnieri, Mirouer 46. 
 




Amis de gentil nature, 
Vous estes moult a louer: 
Large, courtoys sans mesure 
Somme de toute bonté, 
Vous ne voulez plus rien faire, 
Amy, sans ma voulenté. 
Et aussi ne doy je taire 
Vostre beaulté et bonté.  
Puissant pour moy estes et sage, 
Cecy ne puis je celer. 
Hahay, a qui le diray je ? 
Seraphin n’en scet parler.528 
Lover of gentle nature 
You have much to be praised: 
Generous, courteous, without measure, 
Sum of all goodness, 
You no longer wish to do anything 
Lover, without my will. 
And for this reason I should not be silent 
About your beauty and your goodness. 
Powerful you are for me, and wise, 
This I cannot hide. 
Ay, but to whom will I say so ? 
Seraphim do not know how to speak of it. 
 
The urge to sing arises, the demand for song lies in the beloved’s great worth, and yet, there is no 
“knowing” words that might speak of this great worth.  The bankruptcy of language is known to 
troubadour and mystic alike, as we hear Bernart de Ventadorn explain,  
Greu en sabrai mo melhs chauzir, 
Si sas belas faissos mentau, 
Que res mas lauzars no·m abau 
E sas grans beutatz essernir.529 
Hardly do I know the best words to choose  
If her beautiful features I wish to evoke, 
And nothing more than praising her and her 
great beauty describe becomes is what I 
should do. 
                                                
 






While Bernart’s song continues suggesting that it is the lauzengiers that worry him were he even 
able to sing as perfectly as he likes, 
Res mais no m’en dezasegura! 
Pois tant es douss’ e fin’ e pura,  
Gran paor ai qu’azesme sa valor; 
E lauzenger volon mo dan d’amor 
E diran l’en be leu adiramen.530 
Nothing makes me more insecure! 
For so much is she sweet, and fine, and 
pure, I have a great fear that she 
underestimates her own worth; 
And tattlers wanting to damage my love 
and will easily talk her into mistrust. 
 
As the Soul nears the end of her song it becomes clear that Marguerite worries about the inability 
of her words to stave off her own critics, and in fact recognizes that her preaching might indeed 
incite their anger: 
Amis, que diront Beguines, 
Et gens de religion,  
Quant ilz orront l’excellence 
De vostre divine chançon? 
Beguines dient que je erre, 
Prestres, clers, et prescheurs,  
Augustins, et carmes, 
Lover, what will the beguines say  
And the men and women of religion 
When they hear the excellence of  
Your divine song? 
Beguines say I err, 
Priests, clerics, and preachers, 
Augustinians, Carmelites, 
                                                                                                                                                       
529  “Be·m cuidei de chanter sofrir,” ll. 28-31,  Lazar, Bernard de Ventadour, Chansons D'amour. 
 
530 ll. 32-36. 
 




Et les freres mineurs, 
Pource que j’escri de l’estre  
De l’affinee Amour. 
Non fais sauve leur Raison, 
Qui leur fait a moy ce dire. 
Desir, Vouloir, et Crainte, 
Certes leur toult la cognoissance, 
Et l’affluence, et l’union  
De la haultiesme lumiere 
D’ardour 
De divine amour.531 
And the Friars Minor, 
Because I write of the being 
Of the refined Love. 
I do not save their Reason 
Who makes them tell me this. 
Desire, Will, and Fear, 
Certainly lifts from them understanding, 
And the fluidity, and the union 
With the highest light 
Of the burning 
Of the divine love. 
 
 Just as Bernart de Ventadorn and Raimbaut d’Aurenga attested that love makes the world 
upside down, makes frost seem a flower, reason seem folly, Marguerite suggests refined love is 
opposed to “their [man or the Church’s] Reason.”  It is a declaration that harkens back to Paul’s 
claim that what is reason on earth is unreason in the realm of the divine.   
Those very elements of selfhood that Bernart entrusted to his beloved and that Angela stripped 
off before the crucifix are exactly what Marguerite Porete claims keep her critics from 
understanding l’affinee Amour, a term contiguous if not an exact translation of the troubadours’ 
fin’ amor.  Not only the term but the concept and its elements of the penetration of the lover by 
the image of the beloved that inspires humility, loss of will, loss of reason, loss of language and 
apophasis or babble are all present in the mystical process and outlined in similar when not 




of fin’ amors was helpful in the mystical process, the result of which she calls annihilation, then 








   
As we have seen through the examinations undertaken here, each of the authors presented 
in this dissertation suggests that the love relationship is strong enough to change the nature of the 
loving subject.  Moreover the ideal of love for all of these authors is to arrive at a state of 
nothingness before the all-powerful and awesome beloved.  Though each author reaches a 
different point on the path to complete annihilation, the works of each suggest a variety of means 
of reaching the goal of self-negation.  However, this work demonstrates that there are indeed 
structural or foundational similarities in the nature of love and self between lyrics of fin’ amors 
and religious texts.   
 Of the many ways there are to conceive of selfhood, troubadours and mystics both find 
the self to be a malleable, fragile, and fragmented entity that can be shattered, undone, 
annihilated, or deconstructed.  For both types of lovers the self is made up of the bodily, the 
mental, and the emotive.  Each of these three elements come into play in the undoing of the self 
for these two groups.   
One might expect the troubadours to share techniques in self-destruction and that these 
might differ from what we can find in the practice of religious figures.  Instead we find that 
Arnaut de Mareulh’s consistent return to the image of his beloved falls more closely in line with 
the contemplation of images in certain religious practices than with the érotique presented by 
Bernart de Ventadorn.  In this the structure of the love relationship according to Arnaut 
resembles that of Angela da Foligno more than any other author in this dissertation.   
 This dissertation asks modern thinkers to reconsider the ideas that the subject is a modern 





altered through a variety of practices.  In fact, it would seem that a consciousness or at least 
curiosity about the nature of the subject as a piecing together of incongruous parts would seem to 
be intrinsic to human experience.  Discovering a way to work on the subject, to change the 
whole, would seem to be more natural than we might imagine.  The means of altering the subject 
are not so different from one land to another one period to the next.  The practices would follow 
the contours of the construction of self.  It isn’t because one master discovered a particular 
technique that others adopt it.  In comparing mystics and troubadours we find that influence is 
not necessarily at the root of similar practices in self-negation.  Indeed the means discussed here 
are to be found in a variety of traditions throughout various periods and in many lands.  This 
dissertation stands as testimony that a comparison between literatures of the religious and secular 
sectors can prove useful.  In particular the examination of troubadours and mystics can be 
fruitful.
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